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From: Liran Alon <LIRAN.ALON@ORACLE.COM>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: jmattson@google.com, aliguori@amazon.com,
	thomas.lendacky@amd.com, dwmw@amazon.co.uk, bp@alien8.de,
	Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/7] kvm: vmx: Set IBPB when running a different VCPU
Date: Mon, 08 Jan 2018 21:23:51 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5A53C547.60901@ORACLE.COM> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1515434925-10250-5-git-send-email-pbonzini@redhat.com>



On 08/01/18 20:08, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
>
> Ensure an IBPB (Indirect branch prediction barrier) before every VCPU
> switch.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> ---
>   arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 9 +++++++++
>   1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> index d00bcad7336e..bf127c570675 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> @@ -2375,6 +2375,8 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
>   	if (per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) != vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs) {
>   		per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) = vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs;
>   		vmcs_load(vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
> +		if (have_spec_ctrl)
> +			wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, FEATURE_SET_IBPB);
>   	}
>
>   	if (!already_loaded) {
> @@ -4029,6 +4031,13 @@ static void free_loaded_vmcs(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs)
>   	free_vmcs(loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
>   	loaded_vmcs->vmcs = NULL;
>   	WARN_ON(loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs != NULL);
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * The VMCS could be recycled, causing a false negative in
> +	 * vmx_vcpu_load; block speculative execution.
> +	 */
> +	if (have_spec_ctrl)
> +		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, FEATURE_SET_IBPB);
>   }
>
>   static void vmx_nested_free_vmcs02(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
>

Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>

  reply	other threads:[~2018-01-08 19:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-08 18:08 [PATCH 0/7] KVM: x86: expose CVE-2017-5715 ("Spectre variant 2") mitigations to guest Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-08 18:08 ` [PATCH 1/7] KVM: x86: add SPEC_CTRL and IBPB_SUPPORT accessors Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-08 18:33   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-08 19:09   ` Liran Alon
2018-01-09 10:32     ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 11:14   ` David Hildenbrand
2018-01-09 11:18     ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-08 18:08 ` [PATCH 2/7] x86/msr: add definitions for indirect branch predictor MSRs Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-08 18:35   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-08 18:52     ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-08 19:10   ` Liran Alon
2018-01-08 18:08 ` [PATCH 3/7] kvm: vmx: pass MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD down to the guest Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-08 18:43   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-08 19:18   ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-08 20:23     ` Liran Alon
2018-01-08 22:32     ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-08 23:19       ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-09 10:11         ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-08 19:22   ` Liran Alon
2018-01-08 19:41   ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-08 22:33     ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-08 22:09   ` Ashok Raj
2018-01-08 22:25     ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-11  2:47   ` Tim Chen
2018-01-11 10:41     ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-08 18:08 ` [PATCH 4/7] kvm: vmx: Set IBPB when running a different VCPU Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-08 19:23   ` Liran Alon [this message]
2018-01-08 19:36   ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-09  8:33     ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 11:01   ` David Hildenbrand
2018-01-08 18:08 ` [PATCH 5/7] kvm: svm: pass MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD down to guest Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-08 19:41   ` Liran Alon
2018-01-08 18:08 ` [PATCH 6/7] x86/svm: Set IBPB when running a different VCPU Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-08 20:00   ` Liran Alon
2018-01-09 11:07     ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-08 18:08 ` [PATCH 7/7] KVM: x86: add SPEC_CTRL and IBPB_SUPPORT to MSR and CPUID lists Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-08 20:07   ` Liran Alon
2018-01-08 20:15     ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-09 10:15 ` [PATCH 0/7] KVM: x86: expose CVE-2017-5715 ("Spectre variant 2") mitigations to guest Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-09 11:12   ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 12:03     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-09 14:06       ` Paolo Bonzini

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