From: "Nikunj A. Dadhania" <nikunj@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com,
tglx@linutronix.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
pgonda@google.com, seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 06/20] x86/sev: Handle failures from snp_init()
Date: Wed, 28 Aug 2024 10:17:57 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5b62f751-668f-714e-24a2-6bbc188c3ce8@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240827113227.GAZs25S8Ubep1CDYr8@fat_crate.local>
Hi Boris,
On 8/27/2024 5:02 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 31, 2024 at 08:37:57PM +0530, Nikunj A Dadhania wrote:
>> Address the ignored failures from snp_init() in sme_enable(). Add error
>> handling for scenarios where snp_init() fails to retrieve the SEV-SNP CC
>> blob or encounters issues while parsing the CC blob.
>
> Is this a real issue you've encountered or?
As per you comment [1], you had suggested to error out early in snp_init()
instead of waiting till snp_init_platform_device(). As snp_init() was
ignoring the failure case, I have added this patch. Following patch adds
secrets page parsing from CC blob. When the parsing fails, snp_init() will
return failure.
>
>> This change ensures
>
> Avoid having "This patch" or "This commit" or "This <whatever>" in the commit
> message. It is tautologically useless.
Sure, will do.
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
>> index ac33b2263a43..e83b363c5e68 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
>> @@ -535,6 +535,13 @@ void __head sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
>> if (snp && !(msr & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED))
>> snp_abort();
>>
>> + /*
>> + * The SEV-SNP CC blob should be present and parsing CC blob should
>> + * succeed when SEV-SNP is enabled.
>> + */
>> + if (!snp && (msr & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED))
>> + snp_abort();
>
> Any chance you could combine the above and this test?
>
> Perhaps look around at the code before adding your check - there might be some
> opportunity for aggregation and improvement...
Sure, how about the below patch ?
From: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Date: Wed, 22 May 2024 12:43:42 +0530
Subject: [PATCH] x86/sev: Handle failures from snp_init()
Address the ignored failures from snp_init() in sme_enable(). Add error
handling for scenarios where snp_init() fails to retrieve the SEV-SNP CC
blob or encounters issues while parsing the CC blob. Ensure that SNP guests
will error out early, preventing delayed error reporting or undefined
behavior.
Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 15 +++++++++++----
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
index ac33b2263a43..a0124a479972 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
@@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ void __head sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
unsigned long feature_mask;
unsigned long me_mask;
- bool snp;
+ bool snp, snp_enabled;
u64 msr;
snp = snp_init(bp);
@@ -529,10 +529,17 @@ void __head sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
/* Check the SEV MSR whether SEV or SME is enabled */
RIP_REL_REF(sev_status) = msr = __rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_SEV);
- feature_mask = (msr & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED) ? AMD_SEV_BIT : AMD_SME_BIT;
+ snp_enabled = msr & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED;
+ feature_mask = snp_enabled ? AMD_SEV_BIT : AMD_SME_BIT;
- /* The SEV-SNP CC blob should never be present unless SEV-SNP is enabled. */
- if (snp && !(msr & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED))
+ /*
+ * The SEV-SNP CC blob should never be present unless SEV-SNP is enabled.
+ *
+ * The SEV-SNP CC blob should be present and parsing CC blob should
+ * succeed when SEV-SNP is enabled.
+ */
+ if ((snp && !snp_enabled) ||
+ (!snp && snp_enabled))
snp_abort();
/* Check if memory encryption is enabled */
--
2.34.1
1. https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240416144542.GFZh6PFjPNT9Zt3iUl@fat_crate.local/
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-08-28 4:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 62+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-07-31 15:07 [PATCH v11 00/20] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCH v11 01/20] virt: sev-guest: Replace dev_dbg with pr_debug Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCH v11 02/20] virt: sev-guest: Rename local guest message variables Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 17:22 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCH v11 03/20] virt: sev-guest: Fix user-visible strings Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 17:26 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCH v11 04/20] virt: sev-guest: Ensure the SNP guest messages do not exceed a page Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCH v11 05/20] virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCH v11 06/20] x86/sev: Handle failures from snp_init() Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-08-27 11:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-08-28 4:47 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania [this message]
2024-08-28 9:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-08-28 10:16 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-08-28 10:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCH v11 07/20] x86/sev: Cache the secrets page address Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCH v11 08/20] virt: sev-guest: Consolidate SNP guest messaging parameters to a struct Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-04 14:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-09-05 4:35 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 09/20] virt: sev-guest: Reduce the scope of SNP command mutex Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-12 21:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-09-13 4:26 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-09-13 14:06 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 10/20] virt: sev-guest: Carve out SNP message context structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 15:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 11/20] x86/sev: Carve out and export SNP guest messaging init routines Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 15:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 12/20] x86/sev: Relocate SNP guest messaging routines to common code Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 16:27 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-09-16 4:42 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 13/20] x86/cc: Add CC_ATTR_GUEST_SECURE_TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 15:21 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-09-16 4:53 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 14/20] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 16:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 15/20] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 16/20] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 16:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 17/20] x86/sev: Allow Secure TSC feature for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 16:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-09-16 6:23 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 18/20] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable clocksource Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 16:59 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 19/20] x86/kvmclock: Skip kvmclock when Secure TSC is available Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 17:19 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-09-13 17:30 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-16 15:20 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-09-18 12:07 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-20 5:15 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-09-20 7:21 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-20 8:54 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-09-25 8:53 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-09-25 12:55 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-30 6:27 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-09-30 21:20 ` Thomas Gleixner
2024-10-01 4:26 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-01 14:36 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 20/20] x86/cpu/amd: Do not print FW_BUG for Secure TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 17:21 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-09-13 17:42 ` Jim Mattson
2024-09-16 11:40 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-09-16 20:21 ` Jim Mattson
2024-08-14 4:14 ` [PATCH v11 00/20] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A. Dadhania
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