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From: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
To: pbonzini@redhat.com, seanjc@google.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, kai.huang@intel.com,
	adrian.hunter@intel.com, reinette.chatre@intel.com,
	xiaoyao.li@intel.com, tony.lindgren@linux.intel.com,
	isaku.yamahata@intel.com, yan.y.zhao@intel.com,
	chao.gao@intel.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 11/18] KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore accesses to CPU state
Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2025 14:51:14 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <67dd44fb-0211-4435-a294-b9f00dc681d8@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241210004946.3718496-12-binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>




On 12/10/2024 8:49 AM, Binbin Wu wrote:
[...]
>   
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> index 413359741085..4bf3a6dc66fc 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> @@ -733,8 +733,15 @@ int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>   
>   	vcpu->arch.tsc_offset = kvm_tdx->tsc_offset;
>   	vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_offset = vcpu->arch.tsc_offset;
> -	vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected =
> -		!(to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm)->attributes & TDX_TD_ATTR_DEBUG);
> +	/*
> +	 * TODO: support off-TD debug.  If TD DEBUG is enabled, guest state
> +	 * can be accessed. guest_state_protected = false. and kvm ioctl to
> +	 * access CPU states should be usable for user space VMM (e.g. qemu).
> +	 *
> +	 * vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected =
> +	 *	!(to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm)->attributes & TDX_TD_ATTR_DEBUG);
> +	 */
> +	vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected = true;
This was mistakenly introduced during re-base and should be discarded.


>   
>   	if ((kvm_tdx->xfam & XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE) == XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE)
>   		vcpu->arch.xfd_no_write_intercept = true;
> @@ -2134,6 +2141,23 @@ int tdx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
>   	}
>   }
>   
[...]

  reply	other threads:[~2025-01-15  6:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-12-10  0:49 [PATCH 00/18] KVM: TDX: TDX "the rest" part Binbin Wu
2024-12-10  0:49 ` [PATCH 01/18] KVM: x86: Add a switch_db_regs flag to handle TDX's auto-switched behavior Binbin Wu
2024-12-10  0:49 ` [PATCH 02/18] KVM: TDX: Handle EPT violation/misconfig exit Binbin Wu
2024-12-10  0:49 ` [PATCH 03/18] KVM: TDX: Detect unexpected SEPT violations due to pending SPTEs Binbin Wu
2024-12-10  0:49 ` [PATCH 04/18] KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV CPUID hypercall Binbin Wu
2024-12-10  0:49 ` [PATCH 05/18] KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV HLT hypercall Binbin Wu
2024-12-10  0:49 ` [PATCH 06/18] KVM: x86: Move KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS to header file Binbin Wu
2024-12-10  0:49 ` [PATCH 07/18] KVM: TDX: Implement callbacks for MSR operations Binbin Wu
2025-01-15 11:26   ` Huang, Kai
2024-12-10  0:49 ` [PATCH 08/18] KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV rdmsr/wrmsr hypercall Binbin Wu
2024-12-10  0:49 ` [PATCH 09/18] KVM: TDX: Enable guest access to LMCE related MSRs Binbin Wu
2024-12-10  0:49 ` [PATCH 10/18] KVM: TDX: Handle TDG.VP.VMCALL<GetTdVmCallInfo> hypercall Binbin Wu
2024-12-10  0:49 ` [PATCH 11/18] KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore accesses to CPU state Binbin Wu
2025-01-15  6:51   ` Binbin Wu [this message]
2024-12-10  0:49 ` [PATCH 12/18] KVM: TDX: Add method to ignore guest instruction emulation Binbin Wu
2024-12-10  0:49 ` [PATCH 13/18] KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore VMX preemption timer Binbin Wu
2024-12-10  0:49 ` [PATCH 14/18] KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore accesses to TSC Binbin Wu
2024-12-10  0:49 ` [PATCH 15/18] KVM: TDX: Ignore setting up mce Binbin Wu
2024-12-10  0:49 ` [PATCH 16/18] KVM: TDX: Add a method to ignore hypercall patching Binbin Wu
2024-12-10  0:49 ` [PATCH 17/18] KVM: TDX: Make TDX VM type supported Binbin Wu
2024-12-10  0:49 ` [PATCH 18/18] Documentation/virt/kvm: Document on Trust Domain Extensions(TDX) Binbin Wu
2025-02-19 10:23   ` Huang, Kai
2025-02-20  5:50     ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-02-20 23:45       ` Huang, Kai
2024-12-10 18:25 ` [PATCH 00/18] KVM: TDX: TDX "the rest" part Paolo Bonzini
2024-12-11  1:31   ` Binbin Wu

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