From: Zeng Guang <guang.zeng@intel.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>, "Christopherson,,
Sean" <seanjc@google.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
H Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>,
"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/8] LASS KVM virtualization support
Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2023 11:05:40 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <69afdc99-df5d-678e-5a63-2ef33c607d3a@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230718131844.5706-1-guang.zeng@intel.com>
Please ignore this patch set as I posted wrong one by mistake.
I will submit the correct patch series soon. Sorry for bothering.
On 7/18/2023 9:18 PM, Zeng, Guang wrote:
> Linear Address Space Separation (LASS)[1] is a new mechanism that
> enforces the same mode-based protections as paging, i.e. SMAP/SMEP
> but without traversing the paging structures. Because the protections
> enforced by LASS are applied before paging, "probes" by malicious
> software will provide no paging-based timing information.
>
> Based on a linear-address organization, LASS partitions 64-bit linear
> address space into two halves, user-mode address (LA[bit 63]=0) and
> supervisor-mode address (LA[bit 63]=1).
>
> LASS aims to prevent any attempt to probe supervisor-mode addresses by
> user mode, and likewise stop any attempt to access (if SMAP enabled) or
> execute user-mode addresses from supervisor mode.
>
> When platform has LASS capability, KVM requires to expose this feature
> to guest VM enumerated by CPUID.(EAX=07H.ECX=1):EAX.LASS[bit 6], and
> allow guest to enable it via CR4.LASS[bit 27] on demand. For instruction
> executed in the guest directly, hardware will perform the check. But KVM
> also needs to behave same as hardware to apply LASS to kinds of guest
> memory accesses when emulating instructions by software.
>
> KVM will take following LASS violations check on emulation path.
> User-mode access to supervisor space address:
> LA[bit 63] && (CPL == 3)
> Supervisor-mode access to user space address:
> Instruction fetch: !LA[bit 63] && (CPL < 3)
> Data access: !LA[bit 63] && (CR4.SMAP==1) && ((RFLAGS.AC == 0 &&
> CPL < 3) || Implicit supervisor access)
>
> This patch series provide a LASS KVM solution and depends on kernel
> enabling that can be found at
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230609183632.48706-1-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com/
>
> We tested the basic function of LASS virtualization including LASS
> enumeration and enabling in non-root and nested environment. As KVM
> unittest framework is not compatible to LASS rule, we use kernel module
> and application test to emulate LASS violation instead. With KVM forced
> emulation mechanism, we also verified the LASS functionality on some
> emulation path with instruction fetch and data access to have same
> behavior as hardware.
>
> How to extend kselftest to support LASS is under investigation and
> experiment.
>
> [1] Intel ISE https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/671368
> Chapter Linear Address Space Separation (LASS)
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> v1->v2
> 1. refactor and optimize the interface of instruction emulation
> by introducing new set of operation type definition prefixed with
> "X86EMUL_F_" to distinguish access.
> 2. reorganize the patch to make each area of KVM better isolated.
> 3. refine LASS violation check design with consideration of wraparound
> access across address space boundary.
>
> v0->v1
> 1. Adapt to new __linearize() API
> 2. Function refactor of vmx_check_lass()
> 3. Refine commit message to be more precise
> 4. Drop LASS kvm cap detection depending
> on hardware capability
>
> Binbin Wu (4):
> KVM: x86: Consolidate flags for __linearize()
> KVM: x86: Use a new flag for branch instructions
> KVM: x86: Add an emulation flag for implicit system access
> KVM: x86: Add X86EMUL_F_INVTLB and pass it in em_invlpg()
>
> Zeng Guang (4):
> KVM: emulator: Add emulation of LASS violation checks on linear
> address
> KVM: VMX: Implement and apply vmx_is_lass_violation() for LASS
> protection
> KVM: x86: Virtualize CR4.LASS
> KVM: x86: Advertise LASS CPUID to user space
>
> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 3 ++-
> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 5 +++-
> arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 5 ++--
> arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++---------
> arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h | 9 +++++++
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 3 ++-
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c | 4 ++++
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 3 +++
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 10 ++++++++
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 2 ++
> 11 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-07-19 3:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-07-18 13:18 [PATCH v2 0/8] LASS KVM virtualization support Zeng Guang
2023-07-18 13:18 ` [PATCH v2 1/8] KVM: x86: Consolidate flags for __linearize() Zeng Guang
2023-07-18 13:18 ` [PATCH v2 2/8] KVM: x86: Use a new flag for branch instructions Zeng Guang
2023-07-18 13:18 ` [PATCH v2 3/8] KVM: x86: Add an emulation flag for implicit system access Zeng Guang
2023-07-18 13:18 ` [PATCH v2 4/8] KVM: x86: Add X86EMUL_F_INVTLB and pass it in em_invlpg() Zeng Guang
2023-07-18 13:18 ` [PATCH v2 5/8] KVM: emulator: Add emulation of LASS violation checks on linear address Zeng Guang
2023-07-24 4:25 ` Chao Gao
2023-07-18 13:18 ` [PATCH v2 6/8] KVM: VMX: Implement and apply vmx_is_lass_violation() for LASS protection Zeng Guang
2023-07-18 13:18 ` [PATCH v2 7/8] KVM: x86: Virtualize CR4.LASS Zeng Guang
2023-07-18 13:18 ` [PATCH v2 8/8] KVM: x86: Advertise LASS CPUID to user space Zeng Guang
2023-07-19 3:05 ` Zeng Guang [this message]
2023-07-20 1:59 ` [PATCH v2 0/8] LASS KVM virtualization support H. Peter Anvin
2023-08-17 7:32 ` Zeng Guang
2023-08-17 18:18 ` H. Peter Anvin
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2023-07-19 2:45 Zeng Guang
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