Kernel KVM virtualization development
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com>,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com,
	seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com,
	herbert@gondor.apana.org.au
Cc: nikunj@amd.com, davem@davemloft.net, aik@amd.com,
	ardb@kernel.org, john.allen@amd.com, michael.roth@amd.com,
	Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 1/3] x86/sev: Add new dump_rmp parameter to snp_leak_pages() API
Date: Fri, 12 Sep 2025 09:52:40 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <7132d855-d855-43c4-83a7-a6d165fc1a75@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <c6d2fbe31bd9e2638eaefaabe6d0ffc55f5886bd.1757543774.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com>

On 9/10/25 17:55, Ashish Kalra wrote:
> From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
> 
> When leaking certain page types, such as Hypervisor Fixed (HV_FIXED)
> pages, it does not make sense to dump RMP contents for the 2MB range of
> the page(s) being leaked. In the case of HV_FIXED pages, this is not an
> error situation where the surrounding 2MB page RMP entries can provide
> debug information.
> 
> Add new __snp_leak_pages() API with dump_rmp bool parameter to support
> continue adding pages to the snp_leaked_pages_list but not issue
> dump_rmpentry().
> 
> Make snp_leak_pages() a wrapper for the common case which also allows
> existing users to continue to dump RMP entries.
> 
> Suggested-by: Thomas Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
> Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>

Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 8 +++++++-
>  arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c    | 7 ++++---
>  2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
> index 00475b814ac4..7a1ae990b15f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
> @@ -635,10 +635,15 @@ void snp_dump_hva_rmpentry(unsigned long address);
>  int psmash(u64 pfn);
>  int rmp_make_private(u64 pfn, u64 gpa, enum pg_level level, u32 asid, bool immutable);
>  int rmp_make_shared(u64 pfn, enum pg_level level);
> -void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages);
> +void __snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages, bool dump_rmp);
>  void kdump_sev_callback(void);
>  void snp_fixup_e820_tables(void);
>  
> +static inline void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int pages)
> +{
> +	__snp_leak_pages(pfn, pages, true);
> +}
> +
>  static inline void sev_evict_cache(void *va, int npages)
>  {
>  	volatile u8 val __always_unused;
> @@ -668,6 +673,7 @@ static inline int rmp_make_private(u64 pfn, u64 gpa, enum pg_level level, u32 as
>  	return -ENODEV;
>  }
>  static inline int rmp_make_shared(u64 pfn, enum pg_level level) { return -ENODEV; }
> +static inline void __snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages, bool dump_rmp) {}
>  static inline void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages) {}
>  static inline void kdump_sev_callback(void) { }
>  static inline void snp_fixup_e820_tables(void) {}
> diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
> index 942372e69b4d..ee643a6cd691 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
> @@ -1029,7 +1029,7 @@ int rmp_make_shared(u64 pfn, enum pg_level level)
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rmp_make_shared);
>  
> -void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages)
> +void __snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages, bool dump_rmp)
>  {
>  	struct page *page = pfn_to_page(pfn);
>  
> @@ -1052,14 +1052,15 @@ void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages)
>  		    (PageHead(page) && compound_nr(page) <= npages))
>  			list_add_tail(&page->buddy_list, &snp_leaked_pages_list);
>  
> -		dump_rmpentry(pfn);
> +		if (dump_rmp)
> +			dump_rmpentry(pfn);
>  		snp_nr_leaked_pages++;
>  		pfn++;
>  		page++;
>  	}
>  	spin_unlock(&snp_leaked_pages_list_lock);
>  }
> -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_leak_pages);
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__snp_leak_pages);
>  
>  void kdump_sev_callback(void)
>  {


  reply	other threads:[~2025-09-12 14:52 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-09-10 22:55 [PATCH v4 0/3] crypto: ccp - Add AMD Seamless Firmware Servicing (SFS) driver Ashish Kalra
2025-09-10 22:55 ` [PATCH v4 1/3] x86/sev: Add new dump_rmp parameter to snp_leak_pages() API Ashish Kalra
2025-09-12 14:52   ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2025-09-12 15:58   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-09-12 18:34     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-13 10:55       ` Borislav Petkov
2025-09-16  3:51         ` Herbert Xu
2025-09-16 10:27           ` Borislav Petkov
2025-09-12 18:34   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-12 19:37     ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-12 19:41       ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-12 19:52         ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-10 22:55 ` [PATCH v4 2/3] crypto: ccp - Add new HV-Fixed page allocation/free API Ashish Kalra
2025-09-12 14:57   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-10 22:55 ` [PATCH v4 3/3] crypto: ccp - Add AMD Seamless Firmware Servicing (SFS) driver Ashish Kalra
2025-09-12 15:49   ` Tom Lendacky

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=7132d855-d855-43c4-83a7-a6d165fc1a75@amd.com \
    --to=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
    --cc=Ashish.Kalra@amd.com \
    --cc=Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com \
    --cc=aik@amd.com \
    --cc=ardb@kernel.org \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=davem@davemloft.net \
    --cc=herbert@gondor.apana.org.au \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=john.allen@amd.com \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=michael.roth@amd.com \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=nikunj@amd.com \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=seanjc@google.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox