From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Melody Wang <huibo.wang@amd.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Joerg Rodel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 3/7] KVM: SVM: Inject #HV when Restricted Injection is active
Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2026 14:17:17 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <73cae6f5-9af8-4951-87ef-88c14cad28a3@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <954d023cc355d1ab867c7f983c8fa830b29ee659.1777048608.git.huibo.wang@amd.com>
On 4/24/26 12:42, Melody Wang wrote:
> When Restricted Injection is active, only #HV exceptions can be injected into
> the SEV-SNP guest. Detect that, and then follow the #HV doorbell communication
> from the GHCB specification to inject the interrupt or exception.
>
> Co-developed-by: Thomas Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> Signed-off-by: Melody Wang <huibo.wang@amd.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 164 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 14 +++-
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 21 ++++++
> 3 files changed, 197 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> index f09c4236fb5e..509a4f8b5073 100644
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> index 4ab58307bf75..b4627884c36f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> @@ -55,6 +55,10 @@ extern int tsc_aux_uret_slot __ro_after_init;
>
> extern struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata;
>
> +enum inject_type {
> + INJECT_IRQ,
> +};
> +
> /*
> * Clean bits in VMCB.
> * VMCB_ALL_CLEAN_MASK might also need to
> @@ -968,6 +972,17 @@ void sev_gmem_invalidate(kvm_pfn_t start, kvm_pfn_t end);
> int sev_gmem_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, bool is_private);
> struct vmcb_save_area *sev_decrypt_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> void sev_free_decrypted_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcb_save_area *vmsa);
> +bool sev_snp_queue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> +bool sev_snp_inject(enum inject_type type, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> +void sev_snp_cancel_injection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> +bool sev_snp_blocked(enum inject_type type, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> +static inline bool sev_snp_is_rinj_active(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(vcpu->kvm)->sev_info;
You can use to_kvm_sev_info() here.
Thanks,
Tom
> +
> + return is_sev_snp_guest(vcpu) &&
> + (sev->vmsa_features & SVM_SEV_FEAT_RESTRICTED_INJECTION);
> +};
> #else
> static inline struct page *snp_safe_alloc_page_node(int node, gfp_t gfp)
> {
> @@ -1005,6 +1020,12 @@ static inline struct vmcb_save_area *sev_decrypt_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> return NULL;
> }
> static inline void sev_free_decrypted_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcb_save_area *vmsa) {}
> +
> +static inline bool sev_snp_queue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return false; }
> +static inline bool sev_snp_inject(enum inject_type type, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return false; }
> +static inline void sev_snp_cancel_injection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
> +static inline bool sev_snp_blocked(enum inject_type type, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return false; }
> +static inline bool sev_snp_is_rinj_active(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return false; }
> #endif
>
> /* vmenter.S */
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-04-28 19:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-04-24 17:42 [PATCH v4 0/7] Add SEV-SNP restricted injection hypervisor support Melody Wang
2026-04-24 17:42 ` [PATCH v4 1/7] x86/sev: Define the #HV doorbell page structure Melody Wang
2026-04-24 17:42 ` [PATCH v4 2/7] KVM: SVM: Add support for the SEV-SNP #HV doorbell page NAE event Melody Wang
2026-04-24 17:42 ` [PATCH v4 3/7] KVM: SVM: Inject #HV when Restricted Injection is active Melody Wang
2026-04-28 11:12 ` Joerg Rodel
2026-04-28 17:58 ` Melody Wang
2026-04-28 19:17 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2026-04-24 17:42 ` [PATCH v4 4/7] KVM: SVM: Inject NMIs " Melody Wang
2026-04-24 17:42 ` [PATCH v4 5/7] KVM: SVM: Inject MCEs " Melody Wang
2026-04-28 10:50 ` Joerg Rodel
2026-04-28 18:19 ` Melody Wang
2026-04-28 19:24 ` Tom Lendacky
2026-04-28 23:00 ` Melody Wang
2026-04-24 17:50 ` [PATCH 6/7] KVM: SVM: Add support for the SEV-SNP #HV IPI NAE event Melody Wang
2026-04-24 17:51 ` [PATCH v4 7/7] KVM: SVM: Enable Restricted Injection for an SEV-SNP guest Melody Wang
2026-04-28 10:52 ` Joerg Rodel
2026-04-28 18:25 ` Melody Wang
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