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From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: Junaid Shahid <junaids@google.com>, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: andreslc@google.com, pfeiner@google.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/4] kvm: x86: mmu: Use symbolic constants for EPT Violation Exit Qualifications
Date: Wed, 2 Nov 2016 19:03:45 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <78ff83b5-0694-a093-191b-ee6fabfbe1cc@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <06c553d31bc838c33dc151f3ab038ecee2da305f.1476839873.git.junaids@google.com>



On 27/10/2016 04:19, Junaid Shahid wrote:
> This change adds some symbolic constants for VM Exit Qualifications
> related to EPT Violations and updates handle_ept_violation() to use
> these constants instead of hard-coded numbers.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Junaid Shahid <junaids@google.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c         | 20 ++++++++++++--------
>  2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
> index a002b07..60991fb 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
> @@ -465,6 +465,22 @@ struct vmx_msr_entry {
>  #define ENTRY_FAIL_VMCS_LINK_PTR	4
>  
>  /*
> + * Exit Qualifications for EPT Violations
> + */
> +#define EPT_VIOLATION_READ_BIT		0
> +#define EPT_VIOLATION_WRITE_BIT		1
> +#define EPT_VIOLATION_INSTR_BIT		2
> +#define EPT_VIOLATION_READABLE_BIT	3
> +#define EPT_VIOLATION_WRITABLE_BIT	4
> +#define EPT_VIOLATION_EXECUTABLE_BIT	5
> +#define EPT_VIOLATION_READ		(1 << EPT_VIOLATION_READ_BIT)
> +#define EPT_VIOLATION_WRITE		(1 << EPT_VIOLATION_WRITE_BIT)
> +#define EPT_VIOLATION_INSTR		(1 << EPT_VIOLATION_INSTR_BIT)
> +#define EPT_VIOLATION_READABLE		(1 << EPT_VIOLATION_READABLE_BIT)
> +#define EPT_VIOLATION_WRITABLE		(1 << EPT_VIOLATION_WRITABLE_BIT)
> +#define EPT_VIOLATION_EXECUTABLE	(1 << EPT_VIOLATION_EXECUTABLE_BIT)
> +
> +/*
>   * VM-instruction error numbers
>   */
>  enum vm_instruction_error_number {
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> index cf1b16d..859da8e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> @@ -6170,14 +6170,18 @@ static int handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  	gpa = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS);
>  	trace_kvm_page_fault(gpa, exit_qualification);
>  
> -	/* it is a read fault? */
> -	error_code = (exit_qualification << 2) & PFERR_USER_MASK;
> -	/* it is a write fault? */
> -	error_code |= exit_qualification & PFERR_WRITE_MASK;
> -	/* It is a fetch fault? */
> -	error_code |= (exit_qualification << 2) & PFERR_FETCH_MASK;
> -	/* ept page table is present? */
> -	error_code |= (exit_qualification & 0x38) != 0;
> +	/* Is it a read fault? */
> +	error_code = ((exit_qualification >> EPT_VIOLATION_READ_BIT) & 1)
> +		     << PFERR_USER_BIT;
> +	/* Is it a write fault? */
> +	error_code |= ((exit_qualification >> EPT_VIOLATION_WRITE_BIT) & 1)
> +		      << PFERR_WRITE_BIT;
> +	/* Is it a fetch fault? */
> +	error_code |= ((exit_qualification >> EPT_VIOLATION_INSTR_BIT) & 1)
> +		      << PFERR_FETCH_BIT;
> +	/* ept page table entry is present? */
> +	error_code |= ((exit_qualification >> EPT_VIOLATION_READABLE_BIT) & 1)

This last line is not enough now that nested VMX supports execute-only
pages.

Paolo

> +		      << PFERR_PRESENT_BIT;
>  
>  	vcpu->arch.exit_qualification = exit_qualification;
>  
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2016-11-02 18:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 56+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-10-27  2:19 [PATCH 0/4] Lockless Access Tracking for Intel CPUs without EPT A bits Junaid Shahid
2016-10-27  2:19 ` [PATCH 1/4] kvm: x86: mmu: Use symbolic constants for EPT Violation Exit Qualifications Junaid Shahid
2016-11-02 18:03   ` Paolo Bonzini [this message]
2016-11-02 21:40     ` Junaid Shahid
2016-10-27  2:19 ` [PATCH 2/4] kvm: x86: mmu: Rename spte_is_locklessly_modifiable() Junaid Shahid
2016-10-27  2:19 ` [PATCH 3/4] kvm: x86: mmu: Fast Page Fault path retries Junaid Shahid
2016-10-27  2:19 ` [PATCH 4/4] kvm: x86: mmu: Lockless access tracking for Intel CPUs without EPT A bits Junaid Shahid
2016-11-02 18:01   ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-11-02 21:42     ` Junaid Shahid
2016-11-08 23:00 ` [PATCH v2 0/5] Lockless Access Tracking " Junaid Shahid
2016-11-08 23:00   ` [PATCH v2 1/5] kvm: x86: mmu: Use symbolic constants for EPT Violation Exit Qualifications Junaid Shahid
2016-11-21 13:06     ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-11-08 23:00   ` [PATCH v2 2/5] kvm: x86: mmu: Rename spte_is_locklessly_modifiable() Junaid Shahid
2016-11-21 13:07     ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-11-08 23:00   ` [PATCH v2 3/5] kvm: x86: mmu: Fast Page Fault path retries Junaid Shahid
2016-11-21 13:13     ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-11-08 23:00   ` [PATCH v2 4/5] kvm: x86: mmu: Lockless access tracking for Intel CPUs without EPT A bits Junaid Shahid
2016-11-21 14:42     ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-11-24  3:50       ` Junaid Shahid
2016-11-25  9:45         ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-11-29  2:43           ` Junaid Shahid
2016-11-29  8:09             ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-11-30  0:59               ` Junaid Shahid
2016-11-30 11:09                 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-12-01 22:54       ` Junaid Shahid
2016-12-02  8:33         ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-12-05 22:57           ` Junaid Shahid
2016-11-08 23:00   ` [PATCH v2 5/5] kvm: x86: mmu: Update documentation for fast page fault mechanism Junaid Shahid
2016-12-07  0:46 ` [PATCH v3 0/8] Lockless Access Tracking for Intel CPUs without EPT A bits Junaid Shahid
2016-12-07  0:46   ` [PATCH v3 1/8] kvm: x86: mmu: Use symbolic constants for EPT Violation Exit Qualifications Junaid Shahid
2016-12-15  6:50     ` Xiao Guangrong
2016-12-15 23:06       ` Junaid Shahid
2016-12-07  0:46   ` [PATCH v3 2/8] kvm: x86: mmu: Rename spte_is_locklessly_modifiable() Junaid Shahid
2016-12-15  6:51     ` Xiao Guangrong
2016-12-07  0:46   ` [PATCH v3 3/8] kvm: x86: mmu: Fast Page Fault path retries Junaid Shahid
2016-12-15  7:20     ` Xiao Guangrong
2016-12-15 23:36       ` Junaid Shahid
2016-12-16 13:13         ` Xiao Guangrong
2016-12-17  0:36           ` Junaid Shahid
2016-12-07  0:46   ` [PATCH v3 4/8] kvm: x86: mmu: Refactor accessed/dirty checks in mmu_spte_update/clear Junaid Shahid
2016-12-07  0:46   ` [PATCH v3 5/8] kvm: x86: mmu: Introduce a no-tracking version of mmu_spte_update Junaid Shahid
2016-12-07  0:46   ` [PATCH v3 6/8] kvm: x86: mmu: Do not use bit 63 for tracking special SPTEs Junaid Shahid
2016-12-07  0:46   ` [PATCH v3 7/8] kvm: x86: mmu: Lockless access tracking for Intel CPUs without EPT A bits Junaid Shahid
2016-12-14 16:28     ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-12-14 22:36       ` Junaid Shahid
2016-12-14 23:35         ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-12-16 13:04     ` Xiao Guangrong
2016-12-16 15:23       ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-12-17  0:01         ` Junaid Shahid
2016-12-21  9:49         ` Xiao Guangrong
2016-12-21 18:00           ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-12-17  2:04       ` Junaid Shahid
2016-12-17 14:19         ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-12-20  3:36           ` Junaid Shahid
2016-12-20  9:01             ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-12-07  0:46   ` [PATCH v3 8/8] kvm: x86: mmu: Update documentation for fast page fault mechanism Junaid Shahid

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