From: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
To: chenxiang <chenxiang66@hisilicon.com>
Cc: <alex.williamson@redhat.com>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
<qemu-devel@nongnu.org>, <linuxarm@huawei.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] vfio/pci: Verify each MSI vector to avoid invalid MSI vectors
Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2022 12:08:05 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <86k03loouy.wl-maz@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1669167756-196788-1-git-send-email-chenxiang66@hisilicon.com>
On Wed, 23 Nov 2022 01:42:36 +0000,
chenxiang <chenxiang66@hisilicon.com> wrote:
>
> From: Xiang Chen <chenxiang66@hisilicon.com>
>
> Currently the number of MSI vectors comes from register PCI_MSI_FLAGS
> which should be power-of-2 in qemu, in some scenaries it is not the same as
> the number that driver requires in guest, for example, a PCI driver wants
> to allocate 6 MSI vecotrs in guest, but as the limitation, it will allocate
> 8 MSI vectors. So it requires 8 MSI vectors in qemu while the driver in
> guest only wants to allocate 6 MSI vectors.
>
> When GICv4.1 is enabled, it iterates over all possible MSIs and enable the
> forwarding while the guest has only created some of mappings in the virtual
> ITS, so some calls fail. The exception print is as following:
> vfio-pci 0000:3a:00.1: irq bypass producer (token 000000008f08224d) registration
> fails:66311
>
> To avoid the issue, verify each MSI vector, skip some operations such as
> request_irq() and irq_bypass_register_producer() for those invalid MSI vectors.
>
> Signed-off-by: Xiang Chen <chenxiang66@hisilicon.com>
> ---
> I reported the issue at the link:
> https://lkml.kernel.org/lkml/87cze9lcut.wl-maz@kernel.org/T/
>
> Change Log:
> v1 -> v2:
> Verify each MSI vector in kernel instead of adding systemcall according to
> Mar's suggestion
> ---
> arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-irqfd.c | 13 +++++++++++++
> arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-its.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic.h | 1 +
> drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_intrs.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> include/linux/kvm_host.h | 2 ++
> 5 files changed, 85 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-irqfd.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-irqfd.c
> index 475059b..71f6af57 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-irqfd.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-irqfd.c
> @@ -98,6 +98,19 @@ int kvm_set_msi(struct kvm_kernel_irq_routing_entry *e,
> return vgic_its_inject_msi(kvm, &msi);
> }
>
> +int kvm_verify_msi(struct kvm *kvm,
> + struct kvm_kernel_irq_routing_entry *irq_entry)
> +{
> + struct kvm_msi msi;
> +
> + if (!vgic_has_its(kvm))
> + return -ENODEV;
> +
> + kvm_populate_msi(irq_entry, &msi);
> +
> + return vgic_its_verify_msi(kvm, &msi);
> +}
> +
> /**
> * kvm_arch_set_irq_inatomic: fast-path for irqfd injection
> */
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-its.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-its.c
> index 94a666d..8312a4a 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-its.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-its.c
> @@ -767,6 +767,42 @@ int vgic_its_inject_cached_translation(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_msi *msi)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +int vgic_its_verify_msi(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_msi *msi)
> +{
> + struct vgic_its *its;
> + struct its_ite *ite;
> + struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
> + int ret = 0;
> +
> + if (!irqchip_in_kernel(kvm) || (msi->flags & ~KVM_MSI_VALID_DEVID))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (!vgic_has_its(kvm))
> + return -ENODEV;
> +
> + its = vgic_msi_to_its(kvm, msi);
> + if (IS_ERR(its))
> + return PTR_ERR(its);
> +
> + mutex_lock(&its->its_lock);
> + if (!its->enabled) {
> + ret = -EBUSY;
> + goto unlock;
> + }
> + ite = find_ite(its, msi->devid, msi->data);
> + if (!ite || !its_is_collection_mapped(ite->collection)) {
> + ret = E_ITS_INT_UNMAPPED_INTERRUPT;
> + goto unlock;
> + }
> +
> + vcpu = kvm_get_vcpu(kvm, ite->collection->target_addr);
> + if (!vcpu)
> + ret = E_ITS_INT_UNMAPPED_INTERRUPT;
I'm sorry, but what does this mean to the caller? This should never
leak outside of the ITS code.
> +unlock:
> + mutex_unlock(&its->its_lock);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> /*
> * Queries the KVM IO bus framework to get the ITS pointer from the given
> * doorbell address.
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic.h b/arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic.h
> index 0c8da72..d452150 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic.h
> @@ -240,6 +240,7 @@ int kvm_vgic_register_its_device(void);
> void vgic_enable_lpis(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> void vgic_flush_pending_lpis(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> int vgic_its_inject_msi(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_msi *msi);
> +int vgic_its_verify_msi(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_msi *msi);
> int vgic_v3_has_attr_regs(struct kvm_device *dev, struct kvm_device_attr *attr);
> int vgic_v3_dist_uaccess(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool is_write,
> int offset, u32 *val);
> diff --git a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_intrs.c b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_intrs.c
> index 40c3d7c..3027805 100644
> --- a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_intrs.c
> +++ b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_intrs.c
> @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
> #include <linux/vfio.h>
> #include <linux/wait.h>
> #include <linux/slab.h>
> +#include <linux/kvm_irqfd.h>
>
> #include "vfio_pci_priv.h"
>
> @@ -315,6 +316,28 @@ static int vfio_msi_enable(struct vfio_pci_core_device *vdev, int nvec, bool msi
> return 0;
> }
>
> +static int vfio_pci_verify_msi_entry(struct vfio_pci_core_device *vdev,
> + struct eventfd_ctx *trigger)
> +{
> + struct kvm *kvm = vdev->vdev.kvm;
> + struct kvm_kernel_irqfd *tmp;
> + struct kvm_kernel_irq_routing_entry irq_entry;
> + int ret = -ENODEV;
> +
> + spin_lock_irq(&kvm->irqfds.lock);
> + list_for_each_entry(tmp, &kvm->irqfds.items, list) {
> + if (trigger == tmp->eventfd) {
> + ret = 0;
> + break;
> + }
> + }
> + spin_unlock_irq(&kvm->irqfds.lock);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> + irq_entry = tmp->irq_entry;
> + return kvm_verify_msi(kvm, &irq_entry);
How does this work on !arm64? Why do we need an on-stack version of
tmp->irq_entry?
> +}
> +
> static int vfio_msi_set_vector_signal(struct vfio_pci_core_device *vdev,
> int vector, int fd, bool msix)
> {
> @@ -355,6 +378,16 @@ static int vfio_msi_set_vector_signal(struct vfio_pci_core_device *vdev,
> return PTR_ERR(trigger);
> }
>
> + if (!msix) {
> + ret = vfio_pci_verify_msi_entry(vdev, trigger);
> + if (ret) {
> + kfree(vdev->ctx[vector].name);
> + eventfd_ctx_put(trigger);
> + if (ret > 0)
> + ret = 0;
> + return ret;
> + }
> + }
Honestly, the whole things seems really complicated to avoid something
that is only a harmless warning . How about just toning down the
message instead?
M.
--
Without deviation from the norm, progress is not possible.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-11-23 12:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-11-23 1:42 [PATCH v2] vfio/pci: Verify each MSI vector to avoid invalid MSI vectors chenxiang
2022-11-23 12:08 ` Marc Zyngier [this message]
2022-11-23 19:55 ` Alex Williamson
2022-11-24 13:19 ` Marc Zyngier
2022-11-26 6:33 ` chenxiang (M)
2022-11-26 10:58 ` Marc Zyngier
2022-11-24 18:00 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-11-26 11:15 ` Marc Zyngier
2022-11-28 18:01 ` Jason Gunthorpe
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