From: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: SVM: Assume a 64-bit hypercall for guests with protected state
Date: Mon, 24 May 2021 15:49:55 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87tums8cn0.fsf@vitty.brq.redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <a947ee05-4205-fb3d-a1e6-f5df7275014e@amd.com>
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> writes:
> On 5/24/21 6:53 AM, Vitaly Kuznetsov wrote:
>> Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> writes:
>>
>>> When processing a hypercall for a guest with protected state, currently
>>> SEV-ES guests, the guest CS segment register can't be checked to
>>> determine if the guest is in 64-bit mode. For an SEV-ES guest, it is
>>> expected that communication between the guest and the hypervisor is
>>> performed to shared memory using the GHCB. In order to use the GHCB, the
>>> guest must have been in long mode, otherwise writes by the guest to the
>>> GHCB would be encrypted and not be able to be comprehended by the
>>> hypervisor. Given that, assume that the guest is in 64-bit mode when
>>> processing a hypercall from a guest with protected state.
>>>
>>> Fixes: f1c6366e3043 ("KVM: SVM: Add required changes to support intercepts under SEV-ES")
>>> Reported-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
>>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>>> ---
>>> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 7 ++++++-
>>> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>>> index 9b6bca616929..e715c69bb882 100644
>>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>>> @@ -8403,7 +8403,12 @@ int kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>>>
>>> trace_kvm_hypercall(nr, a0, a1, a2, a3);
>>>
>>> - op_64_bit = is_64_bit_mode(vcpu);
>>> + /*
>>> + * If running with protected guest state, the CS register is not
>>> + * accessible. The hypercall register values will have had to been
>>> + * provided in 64-bit mode, so assume the guest is in 64-bit.
>>> + */
>>> + op_64_bit = is_64_bit_mode(vcpu) || vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected;
>>> if (!op_64_bit) {
>>> nr &= 0xFFFFFFFF;
>>> a0 &= 0xFFFFFFFF;
>>
>> While this is might be a very theoretical question, what about other
>> is_64_bit_mode() users? Namely, a very similar to the above check exists
>> in kvm_hv_hypercall() and kvm_xen_hypercall().
>
> Xen doesn't support SEV, so I think this one is ok until they do. Although
> I guess we could be preemptive and hit all those call sites. The other
> ones are in arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c.
>
> Thoughts?
Would it hurt if we just move 'vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected' check
to is_64_bit_mode() itself? It seems to be too easy to miss this
peculiar detail about SEV in review if new is_64_bit_mode() users are to
be added.
--
Vitaly
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-05-24 13:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-05-22 16:43 [PATCH] KVM: SVM: Assume a 64-bit hypercall for guests with protected state Tom Lendacky
2021-05-22 18:17 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-05-24 11:53 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2021-05-24 13:28 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-05-24 13:49 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov [this message]
2021-05-24 13:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-05-24 14:20 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-05-24 16:05 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-05-24 17:03 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-05-24 17:06 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-05-24 17:40 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-05-24 12:29 ` Paolo Bonzini
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