From: "Nikunj A. Dadhania" <nikunj@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com,
tglx@linutronix.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
pgonda@google.com, seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v15 01/13] x86/sev: Carve out and export SNP guest messaging init routines
Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2024 11:53:53 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <8965fa19-8a9b-403e-a542-8566f30f3fee@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241204200255.GCZ1C1b3krGc_4QOeg@fat_crate.local>
On 12/5/2024 1:32 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 04, 2024 at 03:30:13PM +0530, Nikunj A. Dadhania wrote:
>> The above ones I have retained old code.
>
> Right.
>
>> GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT allocation are accounted in kmemcg and the below note from[1]
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> Untrusted allocations triggered from userspace should be a subject of kmem
>> accounting and must have __GFP_ACCOUNT bit set. There is the handy
>> GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT shortcut for GFP_KERNEL allocations that should be accounted.
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Interesting.
>
>> For mdesc, I had kept it similar to snp_dev allocation, that is why it is
>> having GFP_KERNEL.
>>
>> snp_dev = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(struct snp_guest_dev), GFP_KERNEL);
>> if (!snp_dev)
>> - goto e_unmap;
>> -
>> - mdesc = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(struct snp_msg_desc), GFP_KERNEL);
>>
>> Let me know if mdesc allocation need to be GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT.
>
> Let's audit that thing:
>
> * snp_init_crypto - not really untrusted allocation. It is on the driver probe
> path.
>
> * get_report - I don't think so:
>
> /*
> * The intermediate response buffer is used while decrypting the
> * response payload. Make sure that it has enough space to cover the
> * authtag.
> */
> resp_len = sizeof(report_resp->data) + mdesc->ctx->authsize;
> report_resp = kzalloc(resp_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
>
> That resp_len is limited and that's on the guest_ioctl path which cannot
> happen concurrently?
It is a trusted allocation, but should it be accounted as it is part of
the userspace ioctl path ?
>
> * get_ext_report - ditto
>
> * alloc_shared_pages - all the allocations are limited but I guess that could
> remain _ACCOUNT as a measure for future robustness.
Ok.
> And that was it.
>
> So AFAICT, only one use case is semi-valid.
>
> So maybe we should convert those remaining ones to boring GFP_KERNEL...
>
Sure, let me add this as a pre-patch.
Regards,
Nikunj
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-12-05 6:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 96+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-12-03 9:00 [PATCH v15 00/13] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-03 9:00 ` [PATCH v15 01/13] x86/sev: Carve out and export SNP guest messaging init routines Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-03 14:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-03 14:35 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-03 14:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-03 14:52 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-04 9:30 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-04 10:00 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-04 20:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-05 6:23 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania [this message]
2024-12-06 20:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-07 0:27 ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2024-12-09 15:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-09 6:16 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-09 15:38 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-10 6:38 ` Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-04 19:06 ` Francesco Lavra
2025-01-06 4:14 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-03 9:00 ` [PATCH v15 02/13] x86/sev: Relocate SNP guest messaging routines to common code Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-04 20:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-05 6:25 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-03 9:00 ` [PATCH v15 03/13] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-05 11:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-06 4:19 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-16 16:06 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-17 6:12 ` Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-04 20:26 ` Francesco Lavra
2025-01-06 4:34 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-03 9:00 ` [PATCH v15 04/13] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-09 15:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-10 5:02 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-10 11:43 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-10 16:44 ` Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-10 14:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-10 16:59 ` Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-11 19:00 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-11 22:01 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-11 22:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-11 22:43 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-03 9:00 ` [PATCH v15 05/13] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-10 11:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-03 9:00 ` [PATCH v15 06/13] x86/sev: Prevent GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR " Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-10 12:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-10 17:13 ` Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-10 17:18 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-12 4:53 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-17 10:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-18 5:20 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-24 11:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-01 8:44 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-01 16:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-02 5:03 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-02 9:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-02 9:30 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-02 14:45 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-01-02 14:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-10 17:22 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-03 9:00 ` [PATCH v15 07/13] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable clocksource Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-11 20:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-12 5:07 ` Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-03 9:00 ` [PATCH v15 08/13] x86/cpu/amd: Do not print FW_BUG for Secure TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-17 11:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-18 5:21 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-03 9:00 ` [PATCH v15 09/13] tsc: Use the GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR for discovering TSC frequency Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-16 16:31 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-17 6:27 ` Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-17 7:05 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-17 7:57 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-30 11:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-01 8:56 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-01 16:15 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-02 5:10 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-02 9:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-02 10:01 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-02 10:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-02 13:10 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-03 12:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-03 13:59 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-04 10:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-03 9:00 ` [PATCH v15 10/13] tsc: Upgrade TSC clocksource rating Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-30 11:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-02 5:20 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-02 9:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-03 10:09 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-03 12:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-03 14:03 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-03 9:00 ` [PATCH v15 11/13] tsc: Switch to native sched clock Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-03 9:00 ` [PATCH v15 12/13] x86/kvmclock: Abort SecureTSC enabled guest when kvmclock is selected Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-16 16:36 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-30 17:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-01 9:44 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-01 16:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-02 5:34 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-02 9:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-02 10:06 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-03 9:00 ` [PATCH v15 13/13] x86/sev: Allow Secure TSC feature for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
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