From: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
To: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>,
dave.hansen@intel.com, bp@alien8.de, tglx@linutronix.de,
peterz@infradead.org, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com,
thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Cc: x86@kernel.org, kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com,
rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
pbonzini@redhat.com, seanjc@google.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
reinette.chatre@intel.com, isaku.yamahata@intel.com,
dan.j.williams@intel.com, ashish.kalra@amd.com,
nik.borisov@suse.com, sagis@google.com,
Farrah Chen <farrah.chen@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 3/6] x86/kexec: Disable kexec/kdump on platforms with TDX partial write erratum
Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2025 13:37:31 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <8a9924d8-7d73-48a4-9ed8-a031df7098e7@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <412a62c52449182e392ab359dabd3328eae72990.1750934177.git.kai.huang@intel.com>
On 6/26/2025 6:48 PM, Kai Huang wrote:
> Some early TDX-capable platforms have an erratum: A kernel partial
> write (a write transaction of less than cacheline lands at memory
> controller) to TDX private memory poisons that memory, and a subsequent
> read triggers a machine check.
>
> On those platforms, the old kernel must reset TDX private memory before
> jumping to the new kernel, otherwise the new kernel may see unexpected
> machine check. Currently the kernel doesn't track which page is a TDX
> private page. For simplicity just fail kexec/kdump for those platforms.
>
> Leverage the existing machine_kexec_prepare() to fail kexec/kdump by
> adding the check of the presence of the TDX erratum (which is only
> checked for if the kernel is built with TDX host support). This rejects
> kexec/kdump when the kernel is loading the kexec/kdump kernel image.
>
> The alternative is to reject kexec/kdump when the kernel is jumping to
> the new kernel. But for kexec this requires adding a new check (e.g.,
> arch_kexec_allowed()) in the common code to fail kernel_kexec() at early
> stage. Kdump (crash_kexec()) needs similar check, but it's hard to
> justify because crash_kexec() is not supposed to abort.
>
> It's feasible to further relax this limitation, i.e., only fail kexec
> when TDX is actually enabled by the kernel. But this is still a half
> measure compared to resetting TDX private memory so just do the simplest
> thing for now.
>
> The impact to userspace is the users will get an error when loading the
> kexec/kdump kernel image:
>
> kexec_load failed: Operation not supported
>
> This might be confusing to the users, thus also print the reason in the
> dmesg:
>
> [..] kexec: not allowed on platform with tdx_pw_mce bug.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
> Tested-by: Farrah Chen <farrah.chen@intel.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
> index 4519c7b75c49..d5a85d786e61 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
> @@ -347,6 +347,22 @@ int machine_kexec_prepare(struct kimage *image)
> unsigned long reloc_end = (unsigned long)__relocate_kernel_end;
> int result;
>
> + /*
> + * Some early TDX-capable platforms have an erratum. A kernel
> + * partial write (a write transaction of less than cacheline
> + * lands at memory controller) to TDX private memory poisons that
> + * memory, and a subsequent read triggers a machine check.
> + *
Nit: About the description of the erratum, maybe it's better to refer to the
comments of check_tdx_erratum() to avoid duplication. Also it gives a link to
how/when the bug is set.
Otherwise,
Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
> + * On those platforms the old kernel must reset TDX private
> + * memory before jumping to the new kernel otherwise the new
> + * kernel may see unexpected machine check. For simplicity
> + * just fail kexec/kdump on those platforms.
> + */
> + if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TDX_PW_MCE)) {
> + pr_info_once("Not allowed on platform with tdx_pw_mce bug\n");
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> + }
> +
> /* Setup the identity mapped 64bit page table */
> result = init_pgtable(image, __pa(control_page));
> if (result)
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-07-01 5:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-06-26 10:48 [PATCH v3 0/6] TDX host: kexec/kdump support Kai Huang
2025-06-26 10:48 ` [PATCH v3 1/6] x86/sme: Use percpu boolean to control wbinvd during kexec Kai Huang
2025-06-26 17:59 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-06-26 18:42 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-06-27 0:30 ` Huang, Kai
2025-06-30 7:09 ` Binbin Wu
2025-06-27 0:37 ` Huang, Kai
2025-06-27 0:39 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-06-27 1:06 ` Huang, Kai
2025-06-27 15:08 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-06-30 11:35 ` Huang, Kai
2025-06-28 12:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-06-28 17:04 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-06-30 11:34 ` Huang, Kai
2025-06-30 11:34 ` Huang, Kai
2025-07-01 12:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-07-02 3:06 ` Huang, Kai
2025-06-26 10:48 ` [PATCH v3 2/6] x86/virt/tdx: Mark memory cache state incoherent when making SEAMCALL Kai Huang
2025-06-26 18:37 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-06-26 23:36 ` Huang, Kai
2025-06-27 0:52 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-06-27 1:47 ` Huang, Kai
2025-06-26 10:48 ` [PATCH v3 3/6] x86/kexec: Disable kexec/kdump on platforms with TDX partial write erratum Kai Huang
2025-06-26 18:49 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-07-01 5:37 ` Binbin Wu [this message]
2025-07-02 3:12 ` Huang, Kai
2025-07-02 8:25 ` Chao Gao
2025-07-02 8:43 ` Huang, Kai
2025-07-02 22:16 ` Vishal Annapurve
2025-07-02 23:57 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-06-26 10:48 ` [PATCH v3 4/6] x86/virt/tdx: Remove the !KEXEC_CORE dependency Kai Huang
2025-06-26 18:49 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-06-26 10:48 ` [PATCH v3 5/6] x86/virt/tdx: Update the kexec section in the TDX documentation Kai Huang
2025-06-26 18:51 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-06-26 10:48 ` [PATCH v3 6/6] KVM: TDX: Explicitly do WBINVD upon reboot notifier Kai Huang
2025-06-27 0:01 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-06-27 1:00 ` Huang, Kai
2025-07-01 6:09 ` Binbin Wu
2025-07-02 3:14 ` Huang, Kai
2025-07-02 7:54 ` Chao Gao
2025-07-02 9:22 ` Huang, Kai
2025-07-07 12:37 ` Huang, Kai
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