From: "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
To: "Yang, Weijiang" <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
"seanjc@google.com" <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: "Gao, Chao" <chao.gao@intel.com>,
"Hansen, Dave" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
"peterz@infradead.org" <peterz@infradead.org>,
"john.allen@amd.com" <john.allen@amd.com>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"mlevitsk@redhat.com" <mlevitsk@redhat.com>,
"pbonzini@redhat.com" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 00/26] Enable CET Virtualization
Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2024 17:52:20 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <9abd8400d25835dd2a6fd41b0104e3c666ee8a13.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ZZgsipXoXTKyvCZT@google.com>
On Fri, 2024-01-05 at 08:21 -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> No, do not inject #UD or do anything else that deviates from
> architecturally
> defined behavior.
Here is a, at least partial, list of CET touch points I just created by
searching the SDM:
1. The emulator SW fetch with TRACKER=1
2. CALL, RET, JMP, IRET, INT, SYSCALL, SYSENTER, SYSEXIT, SYSRET
3. Task switching
4. The new CET instructions (which I guess should be handled by
default): CLRSSBSY, INCSSPD, RSTORSSP, SAVEPREVSSP, SETSSBSYY, WRSS,
WRUSS
Not all of those are security checks, but would have some functional
implications. It's still not clear to me if this could happen naturally
(the TDP shadowing stuff), or only via strange attacker behavior. If we
only care about the attacker case, then we could have a smaller list.
It also sounds like the instructions in 2 could maybe be filtered by
mode instead of caring about CET being enabled. But maybe it's not good
to mix the CET problem with the bigger emulator issues. Don't know.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-01-05 17:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 75+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-12-21 14:02 [PATCH v8 00/26] Enable CET Virtualization Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 01/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Always preserve non-user xfeatures/flags in __state_perm Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 02/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Refine CET user xstate bit enabling Yang Weijiang
2024-01-02 22:24 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 03/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Add CET supervisor mode state support Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 04/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XFEATURE_MASK_KERNEL_DYNAMIC xfeature set Yang Weijiang
2024-01-02 22:25 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-01-03 9:10 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-04 22:26 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-01-04 22:26 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 05/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce fpu_guest_cfg for guest FPU configuration Yang Weijiang
2024-01-02 22:32 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-01-03 9:17 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-04 22:42 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 06/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Create guest fpstate with guest specific config Yang Weijiang
2024-01-02 22:32 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-01-03 18:16 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-01-04 2:16 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-04 22:47 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-01-05 8:16 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 07/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Warn if kernel dynamic xfeatures detected in normal fpstate Yang Weijiang
2024-01-02 22:33 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 08/26] KVM: x86: Rework cpuid_get_supported_xcr0() to operate on vCPU data Yang Weijiang
2024-01-02 22:33 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 09/26] KVM: x86: Rename kvm_{g,s}et_msr() to menifest emulation operations Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 10/26] KVM: x86: Refine xsave-managed guest register/MSR reset handling Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 11/26] KVM: x86: Add kvm_msr_{read,write}() helpers Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 12/26] KVM: x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 13/26] KVM: x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 14/26] KVM: x86: Initialize kvm_caps.supported_xss Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 15/26] KVM: x86: Load guest FPU state when access XSAVE-managed MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 16/26] KVM: x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 17/26] KVM: x86: Report KVM supported CET MSRs as to-be-saved Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 18/26] KVM: VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 19/26] KVM: x86: Use KVM-governed feature framework to track "SHSTK/IBT enabled" Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 20/26] KVM: VMX: Emulate read and write to CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 21/26] KVM: x86: Save and reload SSP to/from SMRAM Yang Weijiang
2024-01-02 22:34 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 22/26] KVM: VMX: Set up interception for CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2024-01-02 22:34 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-01-15 9:58 ` Yuan Yao
2024-01-17 1:41 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-17 1:58 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-17 5:31 ` Yuan Yao
2024-01-17 6:16 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 23/26] KVM: VMX: Set host constant supervisor states to VMCS fields Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 24/26] KVM: x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace Yang Weijiang
2024-01-02 22:34 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-01-16 7:25 ` Yuan Yao
2024-01-17 1:43 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 25/26] KVM: nVMX: Introduce new VMX_BASIC bit for event error_code delivery to L1 Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 26/26] KVM: nVMX: Enable CET support for nested guest Yang Weijiang
2024-01-02 22:35 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-01-16 7:22 ` Yuan Yao
2024-01-17 1:53 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-03 18:50 ` [PATCH v8 00/26] Enable CET Virtualization Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-01-04 7:11 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-04 21:10 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-01-05 0:22 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-01-05 0:34 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-01-05 0:44 ` Jim Mattson
2024-01-05 0:54 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-01-05 9:28 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-05 16:21 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-01-05 17:52 ` Edgecombe, Rick P [this message]
2024-01-05 18:09 ` Jim Mattson
2024-01-05 18:51 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-01-05 19:34 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-01-08 14:17 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-09 15:10 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-01-11 14:56 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-15 1:55 ` Chao Gao
2024-01-17 0:53 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-05 9:04 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-04 22:29 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
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