From: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 4/8] KVM: VMX: Handle MMIO Stale Data in VM-Enter assembly via ALTERNATIVES_2
Date: Mon, 03 Nov 2025 10:51:44 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <DDZ03S9DS8TP.174VN17SHX6NH@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <aQUtwsfxEsUi4us0@google.com>
On Fri Oct 31, 2025 at 9:44 PM UTC, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 31, 2025, Brendan Jackman wrote:
>> On Fri Oct 31, 2025 at 12:30 AM UTC, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>> > Rework the handling of the MMIO Stale Data mitigation to clear CPU buffers
>> > immediately prior to VM-Enter, i.e. in the same location that KVM emits a
>> > VERW for unconditional (at runtime) clearing. Co-locating the code and
>> > using a single ALTERNATIVES_2 makes it more obvious how VMX mitigates the
>> > various vulnerabilities.
>> >
>> > Deliberately order the alternatives as:
>> >
>> > 0. Do nothing
>> > 1. Clear if vCPU can access MMIO
>> > 2. Clear always
>> >
>> > since the last alternative wins in ALTERNATIVES_2(), i.e. so that KVM will
>> > honor the strictest mitigation (always clear CPU buffers) if multiple
>> > mitigations are selected. E.g. even if the kernel chooses to mitigate
>> > MMIO Stale Data via X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_MMIO, some other mitigation
>> > may enable X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM, and that other thing needs to win.
>> >
>> > Note, decoupling the MMIO mitigation from the L1TF mitigation also fixes
>> > a mostly-benign flaw where KVM wouldn't do any clearing/flushing if the
>> > L1TF mitigation is configured to conditionally flush the L1D, and the MMIO
>> > mitigation but not any other "clear CPU buffers" mitigation is enabled.
>> > For that specific scenario, KVM would skip clearing CPU buffers for the
>> > MMIO mitigation even though the kernel requested a clear on every VM-Enter.
>> >
>> > Note #2, the flaw goes back to the introduction of the MDS mitigation. The
>> > MDS mitigation was inadvertently fixed by commit 43fb862de8f6 ("KVM/VMX:
>> > Move VERW closer to VMentry for MDS mitigation"), but previous kernels
>> > that flush CPU buffers in vmx_vcpu_enter_exit() are affected (though it's
>> > unlikely the flaw is meaningfully exploitable even older kernels).
>> >
>> > Fixes: 650b68a0622f ("x86/kvm/vmx: Add MDS protection when L1D Flush is not active")
>> > Suggested-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
>> > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
>> > ---
>> > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S | 14 +++++++++++++-
>> > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 13 -------------
>> > 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
>> >
>> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
>> > index 1f99a98a16a2..61a809790a58 100644
>> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
>> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
>> > @@ -71,6 +71,7 @@
>> > * @regs: unsigned long * (to guest registers)
>> > * @flags: VMX_RUN_VMRESUME: use VMRESUME instead of VMLAUNCH
>> > * VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL: save guest SPEC_CTRL into vmx->spec_ctrl
>> > + * VMX_RUN_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS_FOR_MMIO: vCPU can access host MMIO
>> > *
>> > * Returns:
>> > * 0 on VM-Exit, 1 on VM-Fail
>> > @@ -137,6 +138,12 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run)
>> > /* Load @regs to RAX. */
>> > mov (%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_AX
>> >
>> > + /* Stash "clear for MMIO" in EFLAGS.ZF (used below). */
>> > + ALTERNATIVE_2 "", \
>> > + __stringify(test $VMX_RUN_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS_FOR_MMIO, %ebx), \
>> > + X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_MMIO, \
>> > + "", X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM
>>
>> Ah, so this ALTERNATIVE_2 (instead of just an ALTERNATIVE that checks
>> CLEAR_CPU_BUF_MMIO) is really about avoiding the flags needing to be
>> mutually exclusive?
>
> Yeah, more or less. More specifically, I want to keep the X vs. Y logic in one
> place (well, two if you count both ALTERNATIVE_2 flows), so that in generaly,
> from KVM's perspective, the mitigations are handled as independent things. E.g.
> even if CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM and CLEAR_CPU_BUF_MMIO are mutually exclusive within
> the kernel (and it's not clear to me that that's 100% guaranteed), I want to
> limit how much of KVM assumes they are exclusive. Partly to avoid "oops, we
> forgot to mitigate that thing you care about", partly so that reading code like
> the setting of VMX_RUN_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS_FOR_MMIO doesn't require understanding
> the relationship between CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM and CLEAR_CPU_BUF_MMIO.
Yeah, this makes sense, if we can avoid creating any unnecessary
and awkward-to-enforce invariants that seems like a win.
>> if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_MMIO) &&
>> !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM))
>> test $VMX_RUN_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS_FOR_MMIO, %ebx
>>
>> ... right? This is a good idea but I think it warrants a comment to
>> capture the intent, without having the commit message in short-term
>> memory I'd have struggled with this code, I think.
>>
>> > /* Check if vmlaunch or vmresume is needed */
>> > bt $VMX_RUN_VMRESUME_SHIFT, %ebx
>> >
>> > @@ -161,7 +168,12 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run)
>> > mov VCPU_RAX(%_ASM_AX), %_ASM_AX
>> >
>> > /* Clobbers EFLAGS.ZF */
>> > - VM_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
>> > + ALTERNATIVE_2 "", \
>> > + __stringify(jz .Lskip_clear_cpu_buffers; \
>>
>> Maybe I'm just an asm noob
>
> Nah, all of this is definitely playing on hard mode. I'm just thankful we don't
> have to deal with the horrors of KVM doing all of this in inline asm. :-D
>
>> I was very impressed by this trick of using CF and ZF together like this!)
>> but I think it's helpful to have the comment like the jnc has below, and
>> Pawan had in his version, to really make the test->jz dependency obvious,
>> since the two instructions are quite far apart.
>>
>>
>> > + CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS_SEQ; \
>> > + .Lskip_clear_cpu_buffers:), \
>> > + X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_MMIO, \
>> > + __CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS, X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM
>>
>> Sorry I'm really nitpicking but I think it's justified for asm
>> readability...
>>
>> It's a bit unfortunate that one branch says
>> CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS_SEQ and the other says __CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS. With the
>> current code I think it would be more readable to jut have
>> __stringify(CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS_SEQ) in the CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM case, then
>> you don't have to mentally expand the macro to see how the two branches
>> actually differ.
>
> No preference here (assuming I understand what you're asking).
>
> Is this better?
>
> /*
> * Note, this sequence consumes *and* clobbers EFLAGS.ZF. The MMIO
> * mitigations uses ZF to track whether or not the vCPU has access to
> * host MMIO (see above), and VERW (the instruction microcode hijacks
> * to clear CPU buffers) writes ZF.
> */
> ALTERNATIVE_2 "", \
> __stringify(jz .Lskip_clear_cpu_buffers; \
> CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS_SEQ; \
> .Lskip_clear_cpu_buffers:), \
> X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_MMIO, \
> __stringify(CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS_SEQ), X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM
Yep that looks good to me.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-11-03 10:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-10-31 0:30 [PATCH v4 0/8] x86/bugs: KVM: L1TF and MMIO Stale Data cleanups Sean Christopherson
2025-10-31 0:30 ` [PATCH v4 1/8] x86/bugs: Use VM_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS in VMX as well Sean Christopherson
2025-10-31 11:30 ` Brendan Jackman
2025-11-01 1:46 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-03 18:18 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-07 19:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-11-11 22:03 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-11-12 10:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-11-12 18:19 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-12 18:17 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-07 18:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-11-12 18:02 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-10-31 0:30 ` [PATCH v4 2/8] x86/bugs: Decouple ALTERNATIVE usage from VERW macro definition Sean Christopherson
2025-10-31 11:37 ` Brendan Jackman
2025-10-31 17:43 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-11-01 4:13 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-03 17:00 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-11-03 17:40 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-12 12:15 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-10-31 0:30 ` [PATCH v4 3/8] x86/bugs: Use an X86_FEATURE_xxx flag for the MMIO Stale Data mitigation Sean Christopherson
2025-10-31 11:44 ` Brendan Jackman
2025-10-31 21:47 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-11-03 10:49 ` Brendan Jackman
2025-10-31 22:28 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-10-31 22:37 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-31 22:50 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-12 14:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-11-12 18:24 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-10-31 0:30 ` [PATCH v4 4/8] KVM: VMX: Handle MMIO Stale Data in VM-Enter assembly via ALTERNATIVES_2 Sean Christopherson
2025-10-31 12:32 ` Brendan Jackman
2025-10-31 21:44 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-11-03 10:51 ` Brendan Jackman [this message]
2025-10-31 23:55 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-01 3:41 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-03 9:17 ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-11-03 17:37 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-03 17:46 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-12 16:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-11-12 17:15 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-11-12 18:38 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-11-12 20:30 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-11-12 23:01 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-13 14:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-11-13 22:01 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-31 0:30 ` [PATCH v4 5/8] x86/bugs: KVM: Move VM_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS into SVM as SVM_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS Sean Christopherson
2025-10-31 12:34 ` Brendan Jackman
2025-11-13 15:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-11-13 15:37 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-11-13 16:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-10-31 0:30 ` [PATCH v4 6/8] KVM: VMX: Bundle all L1 data cache flush mitigation code together Sean Christopherson
2025-11-03 18:26 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-10-31 0:30 ` [PATCH v4 7/8] KVM: VMX: Disable L1TF L1 data cache flush if CONFIG_CPU_MITIGATIONS=n Sean Christopherson
2025-10-31 12:37 ` Brendan Jackman
2025-10-31 0:30 ` [PATCH v4 8/8] KVM: x86: Unify L1TF flushing under per-CPU variable Sean Christopherson
2025-10-31 11:22 ` [PATCH v4 0/8] x86/bugs: KVM: L1TF and MMIO Stale Data cleanups Brendan Jackman
2025-10-31 17:36 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-11-04 10:58 ` Brendan Jackman
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