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From: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	 Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	 Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Cc: <kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	 Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
	Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 5/9] KVM: VMX: Handle MMIO Stale Data in VM-Enter assembly via ALTERNATIVES_2
Date: Fri, 14 Nov 2025 12:55:09 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <DE8FM9N4GKKL.1ZXGVZA48O31X@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251113233746.1703361-6-seanjc@google.com>

On Thu Nov 13, 2025 at 11:37 PM UTC, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> Rework the handling of the MMIO Stale Data mitigation to clear CPU buffers
> immediately prior to VM-Enter, i.e. in the same location that KVM emits a
> VERW for unconditional (at runtime) clearing.  Co-locating the code and
> using a single ALTERNATIVES_2 makes it more obvious how VMX mitigates the
> various vulnerabilities.
>
> Deliberately order the alternatives as:
>
>  0. Do nothing
>  1. Clear if vCPU can access MMIO
>  2. Clear always
>
> since the last alternative wins in ALTERNATIVES_2(), i.e. so that KVM will
> honor the strictest mitigation (always clear CPU buffers) if multiple
> mitigations are selected.  E.g. even if the kernel chooses to mitigate
> MMIO Stale Data via X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM_MMIO, another mitigation
> may enable X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM, and that other thing needs to win.
>
> Note, decoupling the MMIO mitigation from the L1TF mitigation also fixes
> a mostly-benign flaw where KVM wouldn't do any clearing/flushing if the
> L1TF mitigation is configured to conditionally flush the L1D, and the MMIO
> mitigation but not any other "clear CPU buffers" mitigation is enabled.
> For that specific scenario, KVM would skip clearing CPU buffers for the
> MMIO mitigation even though the kernel requested a clear on every VM-Enter.
>
> Note #2, the flaw goes back to the introduction of the MDS mitigation.  The
> MDS mitigation was inadvertently fixed by commit 43fb862de8f6 ("KVM/VMX:
> Move VERW closer to VMentry for MDS mitigation"), but previous kernels
> that flush CPU buffers in vmx_vcpu_enter_exit() are affected (though it's
> unlikely the flaw is meaningfully exploitable even older kernels).
>
> Fixes: 650b68a0622f ("x86/kvm/vmx: Add MDS protection when L1D Flush is not active")
> Suggested-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
> Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>

Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>

  reply	other threads:[~2025-11-14 12:55 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-11-13 23:37 [PATCH v5 0/9] x86/bugs: KVM: L1TF and MMIO Stale Data cleanups Sean Christopherson
2025-11-13 23:37 ` [PATCH v5 1/9] KVM: VMX: Use on-stack copy of @flags in __vmx_vcpu_run() Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 12:36   ` Brendan Jackman
2025-11-14 15:06   ` Uros Bizjak
2025-11-19  0:29     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 16:40   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-11-13 23:37 ` [PATCH v5 2/9] x86/bugs: Use VM_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS in VMX as well Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 12:40   ` Brendan Jackman
2025-11-13 23:37 ` [PATCH v5 3/9] x86/bugs: Decouple ALTERNATIVE usage from VERW macro definition Sean Christopherson
2025-11-17 10:11   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-11-17 15:33     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-11-18 10:32       ` Borislav Petkov
2025-11-13 23:37 ` [PATCH v5 4/9] x86/bugs: Use an x86 feature to track the MMIO Stale Data mitigation Sean Christopherson
2025-11-13 23:37 ` [PATCH v5 5/9] KVM: VMX: Handle MMIO Stale Data in VM-Enter assembly via ALTERNATIVES_2 Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 12:55   ` Brendan Jackman [this message]
2025-11-13 23:37 ` [PATCH v5 6/9] x86/bugs: KVM: Move VM_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS into SVM as SVM_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS Sean Christopherson
2025-11-13 23:37 ` [PATCH v5 7/9] KVM: VMX: Bundle all L1 data cache flush mitigation code together Sean Christopherson
2025-11-13 23:37 ` [PATCH v5 8/9] KVM: VMX: Disable L1TF L1 data cache flush if CONFIG_CPU_MITIGATIONS=n Sean Christopherson
2025-11-13 23:37 ` [PATCH v5 9/9] KVM: x86: Unify L1TF flushing under per-CPU variable Sean Christopherson
2025-11-21 18:55 ` [PATCH v5 0/9] x86/bugs: KVM: L1TF and MMIO Stale Data cleanups Sean Christopherson

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