From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>,
Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/4] KVM: nVMX: Don't muck with allowed sec exec controls on CPUID changes
Date: Wed, 4 Jan 2023 14:42:40 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y7WQYLO4Ou8M8ElV@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Y7WNrZ9NaDHOxwuG@google.com>
On Wed, Jan 04, 2023, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 23, 2022, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> > On 12/13/22 07:23, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > Don't modify the set of allowed secondary execution controls, i.e. the
> > > virtual MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2, in response to guest CPUID changes.
> > > To avoid breaking old userspace that never sets the VMX MSRs, i.e. relies
> > > on KVM to provide a consistent vCPU model, keep the existing behavior if
> > > userspace has never written MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2.
> > >
> > > KVM should not modify the VMX capabilities presented to L1 based on CPUID
> > > as doing so may discard explicit settings provided by userspace. E.g. if
> > > userspace does KVM_SET_MSRS => KVM_SET_CPUID and disables a feature in
> > > the VMX MSRs but not CPUID (to prevent exposing the feature to L2), then
> > > stuffing the VMX MSRs during KVM_SET_CPUID will expose the feature to L2
> > > against userspace's wishes.
> >
> > The commit message doesn't explain *why* KVM_SET_CPUID would be done before
> > KVM_SET_MSRS.
>
> I assume you mean why KVM_SET_MSRS would be done before KVM_SET_CPUID2?
>
> This patch is mostly paranoia, AFAIK there is no userspace that is negatively
> affected by KVM's manipulations. The only case I can think of is if userspace
> wanted to emulate dynamic CPUID updates, e.g. set an MSR filter to intercept writes
> to MISC_ENABLES to update MONITOR/MWAIT support, but that behavior isn't allowed
> since commit feb627e8d6f6 ("KVM: x86: Forbid KVM_SET_CPUID{,2} after KVM_RUN").
>
> There are scenarios where userspace might do KVM_SET_MSRS before KVM_SET_CPUID,
> e.g. QEMU's reuse of a vCPU for CPU hotplug, but in those cases I would expect
> userspace to follow up with another KVM_SET_MSRS.
An argument for taking this patch is that it might be necessary to disallow
KVM_SET_MSRS after KVM_RUN[*]. If KVM manipulates VMX MSRs during KVM_SET_CPUID2,
reusing a vCPU with sequence:
SET_CPUID2 => SET_MSRS => RUN => unplug => hotplug => SET_CPUID2 => SET_MSRS
sequence will cause the second SET_MSRS to fail due to userspace "changing" the
MSR value.
[*] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220805172945.35412-4-seanjc@google.com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-01-04 14:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-12-13 6:23 [PATCH v2 0/4] KVM: nVMX: Fix 2nd exec controls override goofs Sean Christopherson
2022-12-13 6:23 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] KVM: nVMX: Properly expose ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE control to L1 Sean Christopherson
2022-12-13 10:26 ` Yu Zhang
2022-12-13 18:08 ` Jim Mattson
2022-12-13 6:23 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] KVM: nVMX: Don't stuff secondary execution control if it's not supported Sean Christopherson
2022-12-13 6:23 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] KVM: nVMX: Don't muck with allowed sec exec controls on CPUID changes Sean Christopherson
2022-12-23 17:30 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-01-04 14:31 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-01-04 14:42 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2022-12-13 6:23 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] KVM: selftests: Test KVM's handling of VMX's sec exec MSR on KVM_SET_CPUID Sean Christopherson
2022-12-14 3:00 ` [PATCH v2 0/4] KVM: nVMX: Fix 2nd exec controls override goofs Yu Zhang
2022-12-15 0:18 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-12-15 11:24 ` Yu Zhang
2022-12-15 18:33 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-12-16 9:59 ` Yu Zhang
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