From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@google.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
pbonzini@redhat.com, shuah@kernel.org, bgardon@google.com,
oupton@google.com, peterx@redhat.com, vkuznets@redhat.com,
dmatlack@google.com
Subject: Re: [V4 PATCH 4/4] KVM: selftests: x86: Invoke kvm hypercall as per host cpu
Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2023 18:20:59 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y7xbC+leVdO0TRVE@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221228192438.2835203-5-vannapurve@google.com>
KVM: selftests: Use host's native hypercall instruction in kvm_hypercall()
On Wed, Dec 28, 2022, Vishal Annapurve wrote:
> Invoke vmcall/vmmcall instructions from kvm_hypercall as per host CPU
() for functions, i.e. kvm_hypercall().
> type.
s/type/vendor, "type" is too generic.
> CVMs and current kvm_hyerpcall callers need to execute hypercall
CVM isn't a not ubiquitous acronym. I would avoid it entirely because "CVM"
doesn't strictly imply memory encryption, e.g. KVM could still patch the guest in
a pKVM-like implementation.
Use the host CPU's native hypercall instruction, i.e. VMCALL vs. VMMCALL,
in kvm_hypercall(), as relying on KVM to patch in the native hypercall on
a #UD for the "wrong" hypercall requires KVM_X86_QUIRK_FIX_HYPERCALL_INSN
to be enabled and flat out doesn't work if guest memory is encrypted with
a private key, e.g. for SEV VMs.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-01-09 18:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-12-28 19:24 [V4 PATCH 0/4] Execute hypercalls according to host cpu Vishal Annapurve
2022-12-28 19:24 ` [V4 PATCH 1/4] KVM: selftests: x86: use this_cpu_* helpers Vishal Annapurve
2023-01-09 18:07 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-01-10 23:56 ` Vishal Annapurve
2022-12-28 19:24 ` [V4 PATCH 2/4] KVM: selftests: x86: Add variables to store cpu type Vishal Annapurve
2023-01-09 18:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-01-11 0:13 ` Vishal Annapurve
2022-12-28 19:24 ` [V4 PATCH 3/4] KVM: sefltests: x86: Replace is_*cpu with is_host_*cpu Vishal Annapurve
2022-12-28 19:24 ` [V4 PATCH 4/4] KVM: selftests: x86: Invoke kvm hypercall as per host cpu Vishal Annapurve
2023-01-09 18:20 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2023-01-11 0:18 ` Vishal Annapurve
2023-01-04 19:32 ` [V4 PATCH 0/4] Execute hypercalls according to " David Matlack
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