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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>, kvm <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
	Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>,
	"jmattson @ google . com" <jmattson@google.com>,
	"wanpengli @ tencent . com" <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
	"vkuznets @ redhat . com" <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	"mtosatti @ redhat . com" <mtosatti@redhat.com>,
	"joro @ 8bytes . org" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	karahmed@amazon.com, butt3rflyh4ck <butterflyhuangxx@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 0/6] x86/xen: Add in-kernel Xen event channel delivery
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 2021 21:24:55 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YcTpJ369cRBN4W93@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e2ed79e6-612a-44a3-d77b-297135849656@redhat.com>

On Thu, Dec 23, 2021, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> On 12/22/21 16:18, David Woodhouse wrote:
> > > > n a mapped
> > > > shared info page.
> > > > 
> > > > This can be used for routing MSI of passthrough devices to PIRQ event
> > > > channels in a Xen guest, and we can build on it for delivering IPIs and
> > > > timers directly from the kernel too.
> > > Queued patches 1-5, thanks.
> > > 
> > > Paolo
> > Any word on when these will make it out to kvm.git? Did you find
> > something else I need to fix?
> 
> I got a WARN when testing the queue branch, now I'm bisecting.

Was it perhaps this WARN?

  WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 2180 at arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:3163 mark_page_dirty_in_slot+0x6b/0x80 [kvm]
  Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass
  CPU: 5 PID: 2180 Comm: hyperv_clock Not tainted 5.16.0-rc4+ #81
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  RIP: 0010:mark_page_dirty_in_slot+0x6b/0x80 [kvm]
   kvm_write_guest+0x117/0x120 [kvm]
   kvm_hv_invalidate_tsc_page+0x99/0xf0 [kvm]
   kvm_arch_vm_ioctl+0x20f/0xb60 [kvm]
   kvm_vm_ioctl+0x711/0xd50 [kvm]
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x7f/0xb0
   do_syscall_64+0x38/0xc0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

If so, it was clearly introduced by commit 03c0304a86bc ("KVM: Warn if mark_page_dirty()
is called without an active vCPU").  But that change is 100% correct as it's trivial
to crash KVM without its protection.  E.g. running hyper_clock with these mods

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
index 2dd78c1db4b6..ae0d0490580a 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
@@ -371,6 +371,8 @@ struct kvm_vm *vm_create_with_vcpus(enum vm_guest_mode mode, uint32_t nr_vcpus,
        vm_create_irqchip(vm);
 #endif

+       vm_enable_dirty_ring(vm, 0x10000);
+
        for (i = 0; i < nr_vcpus; ++i) {
                uint32_t vcpuid = vcpuids ? vcpuids[i] : i;

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/hyperv_clock.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/hyperv_clock.c
index e0b2bb1339b1..1032695e3901 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/hyperv_clock.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/hyperv_clock.c
@@ -212,6 +212,8 @@ int main(void)
        vm = vm_create_default(VCPU_ID, 0, guest_main);
        run = vcpu_state(vm, VCPU_ID);

+       vm_mem_region_set_flags(vm, 0, KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES);
+
        vcpu_set_hv_cpuid(vm, VCPU_ID);

        tsc_page_gva = vm_vaddr_alloc_page(vm);

Triggers a NULL pointer deref.

  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
  #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
  PGD 12959a067 P4D 12959a067 PUD 129594067 PMD 0
  Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
  CPU: 5 PID: 1784 Comm: hyperv_clock Not tainted 5.16.0-rc4+ #82
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  RIP: 0010:kvm_dirty_ring_get+0xe/0x30 [kvm]
   mark_page_dirty_in_slot.part.0+0x30/0x60 [kvm]
   kvm_write_guest+0x117/0x130 [kvm]
   kvm_hv_invalidate_tsc_page+0x99/0xf0 [kvm]
   kvm_arch_vm_ioctl+0x20f/0xb60 [kvm]
   kvm_vm_ioctl+0x711/0xd50 [kvm]
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x7f/0xb0
   do_syscall_64+0x38/0xc0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Commit e880c6ea55b9 ("KVM: x86: hyper-v: Prevent using not-yet-updated TSC page
by secondary CPUs") is squarely to blame as it was added after dirty ring, though
in Vitaly's defense, David put it best: "That's a fairly awful bear trap".

Assuming there's nothing special about vcpu0's clock, I belive the below fixes
all issues.  If not, then the correct fix is to have vcpu0 block all other vCPUs
until the update completes.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |  5 +++--
 arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c           | 39 ++++++++-------------------------
 arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.h           |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              |  7 +++---
 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 5d97f4adc1cb..f85df83e3083 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -971,10 +971,11 @@ enum hv_tsc_page_status {
 	HV_TSC_PAGE_HOST_CHANGED,
 	/* TSC page was properly set up and is currently active  */
 	HV_TSC_PAGE_SET,
-	/* TSC page is currently being updated and therefore is inactive */
-	HV_TSC_PAGE_UPDATING,
 	/* TSC page was set up with an inaccessible GPA */
 	HV_TSC_PAGE_BROKEN,
+
+	/* TSC page needs to be updated to handle a guest or host change */
+	HV_TSC_PAGE_UPDATE_REQUIRED = BIT(31),
 };

 /* Hyper-V emulation context */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
index 6e38a7d22e97..84b063bda4d8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
@@ -1122,14 +1122,14 @@ void kvm_hv_setup_tsc_page(struct kvm *kvm,
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(tsc_seq) != sizeof(hv->tsc_ref.tsc_sequence));
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct ms_hyperv_tsc_page, tsc_sequence) != 0);

-	if (hv->hv_tsc_page_status == HV_TSC_PAGE_BROKEN ||
-	    hv->hv_tsc_page_status == HV_TSC_PAGE_UNSET)
-		return;
-
 	mutex_lock(&hv->hv_lock);
+
 	if (!(hv->hv_tsc_page & HV_X64_MSR_TSC_REFERENCE_ENABLE))
 		goto out_unlock;

+	if (!(hv->hv_tsc_page_status & HV_TSC_PAGE_UPDATE_REQUIRED))
+		goto out_unlock;
+
 	gfn = hv->hv_tsc_page >> HV_X64_MSR_TSC_REFERENCE_ADDRESS_SHIFT;
 	/*
 	 * Because the TSC parameters only vary when there is a
@@ -1188,45 +1188,24 @@ void kvm_hv_setup_tsc_page(struct kvm *kvm,
 	mutex_unlock(&hv->hv_lock);
 }

-void kvm_hv_invalidate_tsc_page(struct kvm *kvm)
+void kvm_hv_request_tsc_page_update(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
 	struct kvm_hv *hv = to_kvm_hv(kvm);
-	u64 gfn;
-	int idx;
+
+	mutex_lock(&hv->hv_lock);

 	if (hv->hv_tsc_page_status == HV_TSC_PAGE_BROKEN ||
 	    hv->hv_tsc_page_status == HV_TSC_PAGE_UNSET ||
 	    tsc_page_update_unsafe(hv))
-		return;
-
-	mutex_lock(&hv->hv_lock);
-
-	if (!(hv->hv_tsc_page & HV_X64_MSR_TSC_REFERENCE_ENABLE))
 		goto out_unlock;

-	/* Preserve HV_TSC_PAGE_GUEST_CHANGED/HV_TSC_PAGE_HOST_CHANGED states */
-	if (hv->hv_tsc_page_status == HV_TSC_PAGE_SET)
-		hv->hv_tsc_page_status = HV_TSC_PAGE_UPDATING;
-
-	gfn = hv->hv_tsc_page >> HV_X64_MSR_TSC_REFERENCE_ADDRESS_SHIFT;
-
-	hv->tsc_ref.tsc_sequence = 0;
-
-	/*
-	 * Take the srcu lock as memslots will be accessed to check the gfn
-	 * cache generation against the memslots generation.
-	 */
-	idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
-	if (kvm_write_guest(kvm, gfn_to_gpa(gfn),
-			    &hv->tsc_ref, sizeof(hv->tsc_ref.tsc_sequence)))
-		hv->hv_tsc_page_status = HV_TSC_PAGE_BROKEN;
-	srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
+	if (hv->hv_tsc_page & HV_X64_MSR_TSC_REFERENCE_ENABLE)
+		hv->hv_tsc_page_status |= HV_TSC_PAGE_UPDATE_REQUIRED;

 out_unlock:
 	mutex_unlock(&hv->hv_lock);
 }

-
 static bool hv_check_msr_access(struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu, u32 msr)
 {
 	if (!hv_vcpu->enforce_cpuid)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.h b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.h
index ed1c4e546d04..3e79b4a9ed4e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.h
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ void kvm_hv_process_stimers(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);

 void kvm_hv_setup_tsc_page(struct kvm *kvm,
 			   struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info *hv_clock);
-void kvm_hv_invalidate_tsc_page(struct kvm *kvm);
+void kvm_hv_request_tsc_page_update(struct kvm *kvm);

 void kvm_hv_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm);
 void kvm_hv_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index c194a8cbd25f..c1adc9efea28 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -2848,7 +2848,7 @@ static void kvm_end_pvclock_update(struct kvm *kvm)

 static void kvm_update_masterclock(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
-	kvm_hv_invalidate_tsc_page(kvm);
+	kvm_hv_request_tsc_page_update(kvm);
 	kvm_start_pvclock_update(kvm);
 	pvclock_update_vm_gtod_copy(kvm);
 	kvm_end_pvclock_update(kvm);
@@ -3060,8 +3060,7 @@ static int kvm_guest_time_update(struct kvm_vcpu *v)
 				       offsetof(struct compat_vcpu_info, time));
 	if (vcpu->xen.vcpu_time_info_set)
 		kvm_setup_pvclock_page(v, &vcpu->xen.vcpu_time_info_cache, 0);
-	if (!v->vcpu_idx)
-		kvm_hv_setup_tsc_page(v->kvm, &vcpu->hv_clock);
+	kvm_hv_setup_tsc_page(v->kvm, &vcpu->hv_clock);
 	return 0;
 }

@@ -6039,7 +6038,7 @@ static int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_clock(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
 	if (data.flags & ~KVM_CLOCK_VALID_FLAGS)
 		return -EINVAL;

-	kvm_hv_invalidate_tsc_page(kvm);
+	kvm_hv_request_tsc_page_update(kvm);
 	kvm_start_pvclock_update(kvm);
 	pvclock_update_vm_gtod_copy(kvm);


base-commit: 9f73307be079749233b47e623a67201975c575bc
--


  reply	other threads:[~2021-12-23 21:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-12-10 16:36 [PATCH v6 0/6] x86/xen: Add in-kernel Xen event channel delivery David Woodhouse
2021-12-10 16:36 ` [PATCH v6 1/6] KVM: Warn if mark_page_dirty() is called without an active vCPU David Woodhouse
2021-12-10 16:36 ` [PATCH v6 2/6] KVM: Reinstate gfn_to_pfn_cache with invalidation support David Woodhouse
2021-12-10 16:36 ` [PATCH v6 3/6] KVM: x86/xen: Maintain valid mapping of Xen shared_info page David Woodhouse
2021-12-10 16:36 ` [PATCH v6 4/6] KVM: x86/xen: Add KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_XEN_EVTCHN and event channel delivery David Woodhouse
2021-12-10 16:36 ` [PATCH v6 5/6] KVM: x86: Fix wall clock writes in Xen shared_info not to mark page dirty David Woodhouse
2021-12-10 16:36 ` [PATCH v6 6/6] KVM: x86: First attempt at converting nested virtual APIC page to gpc David Woodhouse
2021-12-11  1:09 ` [PATCH v6 0/6] x86/xen: Add in-kernel Xen event channel delivery Paolo Bonzini
2021-12-22 15:18   ` David Woodhouse
2021-12-23  0:26     ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-12-23 21:24       ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2021-12-23 22:21         ` Paolo Bonzini
2022-01-04  7:48         ` Wanpeng Li
2022-01-05 17:58         ` David Woodhouse
2022-01-08  0:26           ` Sean Christopherson
2022-01-12  3:10             ` Peter Xu
2022-01-19  8:14               ` David Woodhouse
2022-01-19 17:36                 ` Paolo Bonzini
2022-01-19 17:38                   ` David Woodhouse
2022-01-19 17:44                     ` Sean Christopherson
2022-01-21 18:15                       ` Paolo Bonzini

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