From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
linux-mm@kvack.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Sergio Lopez <slp@redhat.com>, Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>,
Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@ibm.com>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
"Dr . David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
brijesh.ksingh@gmail.com, tony.luck@intel.com,
marcorr@google.com, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 21/45] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit
Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2022 14:32:34 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Ygz88uacbwuTTNat@zn.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YgZ427v95xcdOKSC@zn.tnic>
On Fri, Feb 11, 2022 at 03:55:23PM +0100, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> Also, I think adding required functions to x86_platform.guest. is a very
> nice way to solve the ugly if (guest_type) querying all over the place.
So I guess something like below. It builds here...
---
arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h | 1 -
arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h | 12 ++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 2 ++
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c | 6 +++---
arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 2 +-
6 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h
index ff0f2d90338a..ce8dd215f5b3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h
@@ -84,7 +84,6 @@ int set_pages_rw(struct page *page, int numpages);
int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page);
int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page);
bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page);
-void notify_range_enc_status_changed(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc);
extern int kernel_set_to_readonly;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index ec060c433589..2435b0ca6cfc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -95,4 +95,6 @@ static inline void sev_es_nmi_complete(void) { }
static inline int sev_es_efi_map_ghcbs(pgd_t *pgd) { return 0; }
#endif
+void amd_notify_range_enc_status_changed(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc);
+
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
index 22b7412c08f6..226663e2d769 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
@@ -141,6 +141,17 @@ struct x86_init_acpi {
void (*reduced_hw_early_init)(void);
};
+/**
+ * struct x86_guest - Functions used by misc guest incarnations like SEV, TDX,
+ * etc.
+ *
+ * @enc_status_change Notify HV about change of encryption status of a
+ * range of pages
+ */
+struct x86_guest {
+ void (*enc_status_change)(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc);
+};
+
/**
* struct x86_init_ops - functions for platform specific setup
*
@@ -287,6 +298,7 @@ struct x86_platform_ops {
struct x86_legacy_features legacy;
void (*set_legacy_features)(void);
struct x86_hyper_runtime hyper;
+ struct x86_guest guest;
};
struct x86_apic_ops {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
index e6d316a01fdd..e645e868a49b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
@@ -766,6 +766,8 @@ void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void)
if (!sev_es_check_cpu_features())
panic("SEV-ES CPU Features missing");
+ x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change = amd_notify_range_enc_status_changed;
+
/* Enable SEV-ES special handling */
static_branch_enable(&sev_es_enable_key);
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
index 2b2d018ea345..7038a9f7ae55 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ static unsigned long pg_level_to_pfn(int level, pte_t *kpte, pgprot_t *ret_prot)
return pfn;
}
-void notify_range_enc_status_changed(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc)
+void amd_notify_range_enc_status_changed(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT
unsigned long sz = npages << PAGE_SHIFT;
@@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ static int __init early_set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long vaddr,
ret = 0;
- notify_range_enc_status_changed(start, PAGE_ALIGN(size) >> PAGE_SHIFT, enc);
+ amd_notify_range_enc_status_changed(start, PAGE_ALIGN(size) >> PAGE_SHIFT, enc);
out:
__flush_tlb_all();
return ret;
@@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size)
void __init early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc)
{
- notify_range_enc_status_changed(vaddr, npages, enc);
+ amd_notify_range_enc_status_changed(vaddr, npages, enc);
}
void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
index b4072115c8ef..0acc52a3a5b7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
@@ -2027,7 +2027,7 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_pgtable(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
* Notify hypervisor that a given memory range is mapped encrypted
* or decrypted.
*/
- notify_range_enc_status_changed(addr, numpages, enc);
+ x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change(addr, numpages, enc);
return ret;
}
--
2.29.2
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-02-16 13:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 61+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-02-09 18:09 [PATCH v10 00/45] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:09 ` [PATCH v10 01/45] KVM: SVM: Define sev_features and vmpl field in the VMSA Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:09 ` [PATCH v10 02/45] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the SEV-ES save area Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:09 ` [PATCH v10 03/45] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the GHCB " Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:09 ` [PATCH v10 04/45] KVM: SVM: Update the SEV-ES save area mapping Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:09 ` [PATCH v10 05/45] x86/boot: Introduce helpers for MSR reads/writes Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:10 ` [PATCH v10 06/45] x86/boot: Use MSR read/write helpers instead of inline assembly Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:10 ` [PATCH v10 07/45] x86/compressed/64: Detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:10 ` [PATCH v10 08/45] x86/sev: " Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:10 ` [PATCH v10 09/45] x86/mm: Extend cc_attr to include AMD SEV-SNP Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:10 ` [PATCH v10 10/45] x86/sev: Define the Linux specific guest termination reasons Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:10 ` [PATCH v10 11/45] x86/sev: Save the negotiated GHCB version Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:10 ` [PATCH v10 12/45] x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:10 ` [PATCH v10 13/45] x86/sev: Add a helper for the PVALIDATE instruction Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:10 ` [PATCH v10 14/45] x86/sev: Check the vmpl level Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:10 ` [PATCH v10 15/45] x86/compressed: Add helper for validating pages in the decompression stage Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:10 ` [PATCH v10 16/45] x86/compressed: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:10 ` [PATCH v10 17/45] x86/sev: " Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:10 ` [PATCH v10 18/45] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:10 ` [PATCH v10 19/45] x86/kernel: Make the .bss..decrypted section shared in RMP table Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:10 ` [PATCH v10 20/45] x86/kernel: Validate ROM memory before accessing when SEV-SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:10 ` [PATCH v10 21/45] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit Brijesh Singh
2022-02-10 16:48 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-02-11 14:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-02-11 17:27 ` Brijesh Singh
2022-02-13 12:15 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-02-13 14:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2022-02-13 17:21 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-02-15 12:43 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-15 12:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-02-15 13:15 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-15 14:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-02-16 13:32 ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2022-02-09 18:10 ` [PATCH v10 22/45] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:10 ` [PATCH v10 23/45] x86/head/64: Re-enable stack protection Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:10 ` [PATCH v10 24/45] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI detection to helper Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:10 ` [PATCH v10 25/45] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI system table lookup " Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:10 ` [PATCH v10 26/45] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI config " Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:10 ` [PATCH v10 27/45] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI vendor " Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:10 ` [PATCH v10 28/45] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI kexec handling into common code Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:10 ` [PATCH v10 29/45] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:10 ` [PATCH v10 30/45] KVM: x86: Move lookup of indexed CPUID leafs to helper Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:10 ` [PATCH v10 31/45] x86/sev: Move MSR-based VMGEXITs for CPUID " Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:10 ` [PATCH v10 32/45] x86/compressed/64: Add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:10 ` [PATCH v10 33/45] x86/boot: Add a pointer to Confidential Computing blob in bootparams Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:10 ` [PATCH v10 34/45] x86/compressed: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:10 ` [PATCH v10 35/45] x86/compressed: Use firmware-validated CPUID leaves for SEV-SNP guests Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:10 ` [PATCH v10 36/45] x86/compressed: Export and rename add_identity_map() Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:10 ` [PATCH v10 37/45] x86/compressed/64: Add identity mapping for Confidential Computing blob Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:10 ` [PATCH v10 38/45] x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:10 ` [PATCH v10 39/45] x86/sev: Use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:10 ` [PATCH v10 40/45] x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:10 ` [PATCH v10 41/45] x86/sev: Register SEV-SNP guest request platform device Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:10 ` [PATCH v10 42/45] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:10 ` [PATCH v10 43/45] virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:10 ` [PATCH v10 44/45] virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report Brijesh Singh
2022-02-09 18:10 ` [PATCH v10 45/45] virt: sevguest: Add documentation for SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement Brijesh Singh
[not found] <Ygz88uacbwuTTNat@zn.tnic.mbx>
2022-02-16 16:04 ` [PATCH v10 21/45] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit Brijesh Singh
2022-02-21 17:41 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-21 18:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-02-21 19:54 ` Brijesh Singh
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