* [PATCH v2] KVM: VMX: Move VM-exit RSB stuffing out of line
@ 2022-06-30 22:54 Jim Mattson
2022-07-07 19:47 ` Sean Christopherson
0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Jim Mattson @ 2022-06-30 22:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kvm, pbonzini, seanjc; +Cc: Jim Mattson
RSB-stuffing after VM-exit is only needed for legacy CPUs without
eIBRS. Move the RSB-stuffing code out of line to avoid the JMP on
modern CPUs.
Note that CPUs that are subject to SpectreRSB attacks need
RSB-stuffing on VM-exit whether or not RETPOLINE is in use as a
SpectreBTB mitigation. However, I am leaving the existing mitigation
strategy alone.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
index 435c187927c4..ea5986b96004 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
@@ -76,7 +76,8 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(vmx_vmenter)
*/
SYM_FUNC_START(vmx_vmexit)
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
- ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lvmexit_skip_rsb", "", X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE
+ ALTERNATIVE "RET", "", X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE
+
/* Preserve guest's RAX, it's used to stuff the RSB. */
push %_ASM_AX
@@ -87,7 +88,6 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(vmx_vmexit)
or $1, %_ASM_AX
pop %_ASM_AX
-.Lvmexit_skip_rsb:
#endif
RET
SYM_FUNC_END(vmx_vmexit)
--
2.37.0.rc0.161.g10f37bed90-goog
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2] KVM: VMX: Move VM-exit RSB stuffing out of line
2022-06-30 22:54 [PATCH v2] KVM: VMX: Move VM-exit RSB stuffing out of line Jim Mattson
@ 2022-07-07 19:47 ` Sean Christopherson
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Sean Christopherson @ 2022-07-07 19:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jim Mattson; +Cc: kvm, pbonzini
On Thu, Jun 30, 2022, Jim Mattson wrote:
> RSB-stuffing after VM-exit is only needed for legacy CPUs without
> eIBRS. Move the RSB-stuffing code out of line to avoid the JMP on
> modern CPUs.
The shortlog and this sentence need to be updated, the stuffing code is still
in-line, but the JMP is being dropped.
> Note that CPUs that are subject to SpectreRSB attacks need
> RSB-stuffing on VM-exit whether or not RETPOLINE is in use as a
> SpectreBTB mitigation. However, I am leaving the existing mitigation
> strategy alone.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S | 4 ++--
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
> index 435c187927c4..ea5986b96004 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
> @@ -76,7 +76,8 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(vmx_vmenter)
> */
> SYM_FUNC_START(vmx_vmexit)
> #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
> - ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lvmexit_skip_rsb", "", X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE
> + ALTERNATIVE "RET", "", X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE
> +
> /* Preserve guest's RAX, it's used to stuff the RSB. */
> push %_ASM_AX
>
> @@ -87,7 +88,6 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(vmx_vmexit)
> or $1, %_ASM_AX
>
> pop %_ASM_AX
> -.Lvmexit_skip_rsb:
> #endif
> RET
> SYM_FUNC_END(vmx_vmexit)
> --
> 2.37.0.rc0.161.g10f37bed90-goog
>
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