From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Kechen Lu <kechenl@nvidia.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com, vkuznets@redhat.com,
somduttar@nvidia.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 5/7] KVM: x86: add vCPU scoped toggling for disabled exits
Date: Wed, 20 Jul 2022 17:38:58 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Ytg9shoNq9XfTiHS@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220615024311.GA7808@gao-cwp>
On Wed, Jun 15, 2022, Chao Gao wrote:
> >@@ -5980,6 +5987,8 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_irq_line(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_irq_level *irq_event,
> > int kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm,
> > struct kvm_enable_cap *cap)
> > {
> >+ struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
> >+ unsigned long i;
> > int r;
> >
> > if (cap->flags)
> >@@ -6036,14 +6045,17 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm,
> > break;
> >
> > mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
> >- if (kvm->created_vcpus)
> >- goto disable_exits_unlock;
> >+ if (kvm->created_vcpus) {
> >+ kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
> >+ kvm_ioctl_disable_exits(vcpu->arch, cap->args[0]);
> >+ static_call(kvm_x86_update_disabled_exits)(vcpu);
>
> IMO, this won't work on Intel platforms.
It's not safe on AMD either because at best the behavior is non-deterministic if
the vCPU is already running in the guest, and at worst could cause explosions,
e.g. if hardware doesn't like software modifying in-use VMCB state.
> Because, to manipulate a vCPU's VMCS, vcpu_load() should be invoked in
> advance to load the VMCS. Alternatively, you can add a request KVM_REQ_XXX
> and defer updating VMCS to the next vCPU entry.
Definitely use a request, doing vcpu_load() from a KVM-scoped ioctl() would be
a mess as KVM would need to acquire the per-vCPU lock for every vCPU.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-07-20 17:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-06-15 1:16 [RFC PATCH v3 0/7] KVM: x86: add per-vCPU exits disable capability Kechen Lu
2022-06-15 1:16 ` [RFC PATCH v3 1/7] KVM: x86: only allow exits disable before vCPUs created Kechen Lu
2022-07-20 17:12 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-07-20 17:49 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-07-20 18:38 ` Kechen Lu
2022-06-15 1:16 ` [RFC PATCH v3 2/7] KVM: x86: Move *_in_guest power management flags to vCPU scope Kechen Lu
2022-06-15 1:16 ` [RFC PATCH v3 3/7] KVM: x86: Reject disabling of MWAIT interception when not allowed Kechen Lu
2022-07-20 17:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-06-15 1:16 ` [RFC PATCH v3 4/7] KVM: x86: Let userspace re-enable previously disabled exits Kechen Lu
2022-06-15 2:51 ` Chao Gao
2022-07-20 17:18 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-06-15 1:16 ` [RFC PATCH v3 5/7] KVM: x86: add vCPU scoped toggling for " Kechen Lu
2022-06-15 2:43 ` Chao Gao
2022-06-16 3:04 ` Kechen Lu
2022-07-20 17:38 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2022-06-15 1:16 ` [RFC PATCH v3 6/7] KVM: x86: Add a new guest_debug flag forcing exit to userspace Kechen Lu
2022-06-15 1:16 ` [RFC PATCH v3 7/7] KVM: selftests: Add tests for VM and vCPU cap KVM_CAP_X86_DISABLE_EXITS Kechen Lu
2022-06-15 3:14 ` Chao Gao
2022-06-15 18:21 ` Kechen Lu
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