From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>,
pbonzini@redhat.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com,
kai.huang@intel.com, reinette.chatre@intel.com,
xiaoyao.li@intel.com, tony.lindgren@linux.intel.com,
binbin.wu@linux.intel.com, dmatlack@google.com,
isaku.yamahata@intel.com, nik.borisov@suse.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
yan.y.zhao@intel.com, weijiang.yang@intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/7] KVM: TDX: restore host xsave state when exit from the guest TD
Date: Fri, 10 Jan 2025 09:30:16 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Z4FZKOzXIdhLOlU8@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <3a7d93aa-781b-445e-a67a-25b0ffea0dff@intel.com>
On Fri, Jan 10, 2025, Adrian Hunter wrote:
> On 9/01/25 21:11, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > On Fri, Jan 03, 2025, Adrian Hunter wrote:
> >> +static u64 tdx_guest_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> >> +{
> >> + struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm);
> >> + u64 cr4;
> >> +
> >> + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED1, cr4);
> >
> > This won't be accurate long-term. E.g. run KVM on hardware with CR4 bits that
> > neither KVM nor TDX know about, and vcpu->arch.cr4 will end up with bits set that
> > KVM think are illegal, which will cause it's own problems.
>
> Currently validation of CR4 is only done when user space changes it,
> which should not be allowed for TDX. For that it looks like TDX
> would need:
>
> kvm->arch.has_protected_state = true;
>
> Not sure why it doesn't already?
Sorry, I didn't follow any of that.
> > For CR0 and CR4, we should be able to start with KVM's set of allowed bits, not
> > the CPU's. That will mean there will likely be missing bits, in vcpu->arch.cr{0,4},
> > but if KVM doesn't know about a bit, the fact that it's missing should be a complete
> > non-issue.
>
> What about adding:
>
> cr4 &= ~cr4_reserved_bits;
>
> and
>
> cr0 &= ~CR0_RESERVED_BITS
I was thinking a much more explicit:
vcpu->arch.cr4 = ~vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_rsvd_bits;
which if it's done in tdx_vcpu_init(), in conjunction with freezing the vCPU
model (see below), should be solid.
> >> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> >> index d2ea7db896ba..f2b1980f830d 100644
> >> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> >> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> >> @@ -1240,6 +1240,11 @@ static int __kvm_set_xcr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 xcr)
> >> u64 old_xcr0 = vcpu->arch.xcr0;
> >> u64 valid_bits;
> >>
> >> + if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected) {
> >
> > This should be a WARN_ON_ONCE() + return 1, no?
>
> With kvm->arch.has_protected_state = true, KVM_SET_XCRS
> would fail, which would probably be fine except for KVM selftests:
>
> Currently the KVM selftests expect to be able to set XCR0:
>
> td_vcpu_add()
> vm_vcpu_add()
> vm_arch_vcpu_add()
> vcpu_init_xcrs()
> vcpu_xcrs_set()
> vcpu_ioctl(KVM_SET_XCRS)
> __TEST_ASSERT_VM_VCPU_IOCTL(!ret)
>
> Seems like vm->arch.has_protected_state is needed for KVM selftests?
I doubt it's truly needed, my guess (without looking at the code) is that selftests
are fudging around the fact that KVM doesn't stuff arch.xcr0.
> >> + kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(vcpu);
>
> And kvm_update_cpuid_runtime() never gets called otherwise.
> Not sure where would be a good place to call it.
I think we should call it in tdx_vcpu_init(), and then also freeze the vCPU model
at that time. KVM currently "freezes" the model based on last_vmentry_cpu, but
that's a bit of a hack and might even be flawed, e.g. I wouldn't be surprised if
it's possible to lead KVM astray by trying to get a signal to race with KVM_RUN
so that last_vmentry_cpu isn't set despite getting quite far into KVM_RUN.
I'll test and post a patch to add vcpu_model_is_frozen (the below will conflict
mightily with the CPUID rework that's queued for v6.14), as I think it's a good
change even if we don't end up freezing the model at tdx_vcpu_init() (though I
can't think of any reason to allow CPUID updates after that point).
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 4 ++--
arch/x86/kvm/pmu.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 7 +++++++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 9 ++++++++-
arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 5 -----
7 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 0787855ab006..41c31a69924d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -779,6 +779,7 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch {
u64 ia32_misc_enable_msr;
u64 smbase;
u64 smi_count;
+ bool vcpu_model_is_frozen;
bool at_instruction_boundary;
bool tpr_access_reporting;
bool xfd_no_write_intercept;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
index 6c7ab125f582..678518ec1c72 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ static int kvm_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *e2,
* KVM_SET_CPUID{,2} again. To support this legacy behavior, check
* whether the supplied CPUID data is equal to what's already set.
*/
- if (kvm_vcpu_has_run(vcpu)) {
+ if (vcpu->arch.vcpu_model_is_frozen) {
r = kvm_cpuid_check_equal(vcpu, e2, nent);
if (r)
return r;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index 713ca857f2c2..75350a5c6c54 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -5716,9 +5716,9 @@ void kvm_mmu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
/*
* Changing guest CPUID after KVM_RUN is forbidden, see the comment in
- * kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl().
+ * kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run().
*/
- KVM_BUG_ON(kvm_vcpu_has_run(vcpu), vcpu->kvm);
+ KVM_BUG_ON(vcpu->arch.vcpu_model_is_frozen, vcpu->kvm);
}
void kvm_mmu_reset_context(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/pmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/pmu.c
index 47a46283c866..4f487a980eae 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/pmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/pmu.c
@@ -752,7 +752,7 @@ void kvm_pmu_refresh(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu);
- if (KVM_BUG_ON(kvm_vcpu_has_run(vcpu), vcpu->kvm))
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(vcpu->arch.vcpu_model_is_frozen, vcpu->kvm))
return;
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index a587f59167a7..997d14506a1f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -2822,6 +2822,13 @@ static int tdx_vcpu_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_tdx_cmd *cmd)
td_vmcs_write64(tdx, POSTED_INTR_DESC_ADDR, __pa(&tdx->pi_desc));
td_vmcs_setbit32(tdx, PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR);
+ /*
+ * Freeze the vCPU model, as KVM relies on guest CPUID and capabilities
+ * to be consistent with the TDX Module's view from here on out.
+ */
+ vcpu->arch.vcpu_model_is_frozen = true;
+ kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(vcpu);
+
tdx->state = VCPU_TD_STATE_INITIALIZED;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index d2ea7db896ba..3db935737b59 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -2218,7 +2218,8 @@ static int do_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned index, u64 *data)
* writes of the same value, e.g. to allow userspace to blindly stuff
* all MSRs when emulating RESET.
*/
- if (kvm_vcpu_has_run(vcpu) && kvm_is_immutable_feature_msr(index) &&
+ if (vcpu->arch.vcpu_model_is_frozen &&
+ kvm_is_immutable_feature_msr(index) &&
(do_get_msr(vcpu, index, &val) || *data != val))
return -EINVAL;
@@ -11469,6 +11470,12 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
struct kvm_run *kvm_run = vcpu->run;
int r;
+ /*
+ * Freeze the vCPU model, i.e. disallow changing CPUID, feature MSRs,
+ * etc. KVM doesn't support changing the model once the vCPU has run.
+ */
+ vcpu->arch.vcpu_model_is_frozen = true;
+
vcpu_load(vcpu);
kvm_sigset_activate(vcpu);
kvm_run->flags = 0;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
index 514ffd7513f3..6ed074d03616 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
@@ -118,11 +118,6 @@ static inline void kvm_leave_nested(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->leave_nested(vcpu);
}
-static inline bool kvm_vcpu_has_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- return vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu != -1;
-}
-
static inline bool kvm_is_exception_pending(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return vcpu->arch.exception.pending ||
base-commit: d12b37e67b767a9e89b221067d48b257708d3044
--
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-01-10 17:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 82+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-11-21 20:14 [PATCH 0/7] KVM: TDX: TD vcpu enter/exit Adrian Hunter
2024-11-21 20:14 ` [PATCH RFC 1/7] x86/virt/tdx: Add SEAMCALL wrapper to enter/exit TDX guest Adrian Hunter
2024-11-22 11:10 ` Adrian Hunter
2024-11-22 16:33 ` Dave Hansen
2024-11-25 13:40 ` Adrian Hunter
2024-11-28 11:13 ` Adrian Hunter
2024-12-04 15:58 ` Adrian Hunter
2024-12-11 18:43 ` Adrian Hunter
2024-12-13 15:45 ` Adrian Hunter
2024-12-13 16:16 ` Dave Hansen
2024-12-13 16:30 ` Adrian Hunter
2024-12-13 16:44 ` Dave Hansen
2024-11-22 16:26 ` Dave Hansen
2024-11-22 17:29 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-11-25 13:43 ` Adrian Hunter
2024-11-21 20:14 ` [PATCH 2/7] KVM: TDX: Implement TDX vcpu enter/exit path Adrian Hunter
2024-11-22 5:23 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-11-22 5:56 ` Binbin Wu
2024-11-22 14:33 ` Adrian Hunter
2024-11-28 5:56 ` Yan Zhao
2024-11-28 6:26 ` Adrian Hunter
2024-11-21 20:14 ` [PATCH 3/7] KVM: TDX: vcpu_run: save/restore host state(host kernel gs) Adrian Hunter
2024-11-25 14:12 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-11-26 16:15 ` Adrian Hunter
2024-11-21 20:14 ` [PATCH 4/7] KVM: TDX: restore host xsave state when exit from the guest TD Adrian Hunter
2024-11-22 5:49 ` Chao Gao
2024-11-25 11:10 ` Adrian Hunter
2024-11-26 2:20 ` Chao Gao
2024-11-28 6:50 ` Adrian Hunter
2024-12-02 2:52 ` Chao Gao
2024-12-02 6:36 ` Adrian Hunter
2024-12-17 16:09 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-12-20 15:22 ` Adrian Hunter
2024-12-20 16:22 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-12-20 21:24 ` PKEY syscall number for selftest? (was: [PATCH 4/7] KVM: TDX: restore host xsave state when exit from the guest TD) Sean Christopherson
2025-01-27 17:09 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-03 18:16 ` [PATCH 4/7] KVM: TDX: restore host xsave state when exit from the guest TD Adrian Hunter
2025-01-09 19:11 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-10 14:50 ` Adrian Hunter
2025-01-10 17:30 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2025-01-14 20:04 ` Adrian Hunter
2025-01-15 2:28 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-13 19:28 ` Adrian Hunter
2025-01-13 23:47 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-11-25 11:34 ` Adrian Hunter
2024-11-21 20:14 ` [PATCH 5/7] KVM: x86: Allow to update cached values in kvm_user_return_msrs w/o wrmsr Adrian Hunter
2024-11-21 20:14 ` [PATCH 6/7] KVM: TDX: restore user ret MSRs Adrian Hunter
2024-11-21 20:14 ` [PATCH 7/7] KVM: TDX: Add TSX_CTRL msr into uret_msrs list Adrian Hunter
2024-11-22 3:27 ` Chao Gao
2024-11-27 14:00 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-11-29 11:39 ` Adrian Hunter
2024-12-02 19:07 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-12-02 19:24 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-12-03 0:34 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-12-03 17:34 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-12-03 19:17 ` Adrian Hunter
2024-12-04 1:25 ` Chao Gao
2024-12-04 6:18 ` Adrian Hunter
2024-12-04 6:37 ` Chao Gao
2024-12-04 6:57 ` Adrian Hunter
2024-12-04 11:13 ` Chao Gao
2024-12-04 11:55 ` Adrian Hunter
2024-12-04 15:33 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-12-04 23:51 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-12-05 17:31 ` Adrian Hunter
2024-12-06 3:37 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-12-06 14:40 ` Adrian Hunter
2024-12-09 2:46 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-12-09 7:08 ` Adrian Hunter
2024-12-10 2:45 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-12-04 23:40 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-11-25 1:25 ` [PATCH 0/7] KVM: TDX: TD vcpu enter/exit Binbin Wu
2024-11-25 15:19 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-11-25 19:50 ` Huang, Kai
2024-11-25 22:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-11-26 1:43 ` Huang, Kai
2024-11-26 1:44 ` Binbin Wu
2024-11-26 3:52 ` Huang, Kai
2024-11-26 5:29 ` Binbin Wu
2024-11-26 5:37 ` Huang, Kai
2024-11-26 21:41 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-12-10 18:23 ` Paolo Bonzini
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