Re: [PATCH 2/2] KVM: VMX: Inject #GP, not #UD, if SGX2 ENCLS leafs are unsupported

[Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>]

On Wed, Apr 12, 2023, Kai Huang wrote:
> On Thu, 2023-04-06 at 11:00 -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > On Thu, Apr 06, 2023, Huang, Kai wrote:
> > > On Wed, 2023-04-05 at 16:45 -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > > Per Intel's SDM, unsupported ENCLS leafs result in a #GP, not a #UD.
> > > > SGX1 is a special snowflake as the SGX1 flag is used by the CPU as a
> > > > "soft" disable, e.g. if software disables machine check reporting, i.e.
> > > > having SGX but not SGX1 is effectively "SGX completely unsupported" and
> > > > and thus #UDs.
> > > 
> > > If I recall correctly, this is an erratum which can clear SGX1 in CPUID while
> > > the SGX flag is still in CPUID?
> > 
> > Nope, not an erratum, architectural behavior.
> 
> I found the relevant section in SDM:
> 
> All supported IA32_MCi_CTL bits for all the machine check banks must be set
> for Intel SGX to be available (CPUID.SGX_Leaf.0:EAX[SGX1] == 1). Any act of
> clearing bits from '1 to '0 in any of the IA32_MCi_CTL register may disable
> Intel SGX (set CPUID.SGX_Leaf.0:EAX[SGX1] to 0) until the next reset.
> 
> Looking at the code, it seems currently KVM won't clear SGX1 bit in CPUID when
> guest disables IA32_MCi_CTL (writing 0).  Should we do that?

No, the behavior isn't strictly required: clearing bits *may* disable Intel SGX.
And there is zero benefit to the guest, the behavior exists in bare metal purely
to allow the CPU to provide security guarantees.  On the flip side, emulating the
disabling of SGX without causing problems, e.g. when userspace sets MSRs, would be
quite tricky.