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From: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
To: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	<seanjc@google.com>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>, <kai.huang@intel.com>,
	<robert.hu@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 4/6] KVM: x86: Introduce untag_addr() in kvm_x86_ops
Date: Thu, 11 May 2023 14:03:40 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZFyFPOo2Fp+yVU2n@chao-email> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230510060611.12950-5-binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>

On Wed, May 10, 2023 at 02:06:09PM +0800, Binbin Wu wrote:
>Introduce a new optional interface untag_addr() to kvm_x86_ops to untag
>the metadata from linear address. Implement LAM version in VMX.
>
>When enabled feature like Intel Linear Address Masking or AMD Upper
>Address Ignore, linear address may be tagged with metadata. Linear
>address should be checked for modified canonicality and untagged in
>instruction emulations or VMExit handlers if LAM or UAI is applicable.
>
>Introduce untag_addr() to kvm_x86_ops to hide the vendor specific code.
>Pass the 'flags' to avoid distinguishing processor vendor in common emulator
>path for the cases whose untag policies are different in the future.
>


>For VMX, LAM version is implemented.
>LAM has a modified canonical check when applicable:
>* LAM_S48                : [ 1 ][ metadata ][ 1 ]
>                             63               47
>* LAM_U48                : [ 0 ][ metadata ][ 0 ]
>                             63               47
>* LAM_S57                : [ 1 ][ metadata ][ 1 ]
>                             63               56
>* LAM_U57 + 5-lvl paging : [ 0 ][ metadata ][ 0 ]
>                             63               56
>* LAM_U57 + 4-lvl paging : [ 0 ][ metadata ][ 0...0 ]
>                             63               56..47
>LAM identification of an address as user or supervisor is based solely on
>the value of pointer bit 63.
>If LAM is applicable to certain address, untag the metadata bits by
>sign-extending the value of bit 47 (LAM48) or bit 56 (LAM57). Later
>the untagged address will do legacy canonical check. So that LAM canonical
>check and mask can be covered by "untag + legacy canonical check".

Do you think it is better to remove such details from the changelog and
instead document them in comments e.g.,

>Signed-off-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
>Tested-by: Xuelian Guo <xuelian.guo@intel.com>
>---
> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h |  1 +
> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h    |  2 ++
> arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h         |  1 +
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c             | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h             |  2 ++
> 5 files changed, 56 insertions(+)
>
>diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
>index 13bc212cd4bc..c0cebe671d41 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
>+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
>@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP(cache_reg)
> KVM_X86_OP(get_rflags)
> KVM_X86_OP(set_rflags)
> KVM_X86_OP(get_if_flag)
>+KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(untag_addr)
> KVM_X86_OP(flush_tlb_all)
> KVM_X86_OP(flush_tlb_current)
> KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(flush_remote_tlbs)
>diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
>index 46471dd9cc1b..bfccc0e19bf2 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
>+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
>@@ -1588,6 +1588,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
> 	void (*set_rflags)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long rflags);
> 	bool (*get_if_flag)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> 
>+	void (*untag_addr)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *la, u32 flags);
>+
> 	void (*flush_tlb_all)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> 	void (*flush_tlb_current)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> 	int  (*flush_remote_tlbs)(struct kvm *kvm);
>diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h b/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h
>index 5b9ec610b2cb..c2091e24a6b9 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h
>+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h
>@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ struct x86_instruction_info {
> /* x86-specific emulation flags */
> #define X86EMUL_F_FETCH			BIT(0)
> #define X86EMUL_F_WRITE			BIT(1)
>+#define X86EMUL_F_SKIPLAM		BIT(2)
> 
> struct x86_emulate_ops {
> 	void (*vm_bugged)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
>diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>index 9c80048ca30c..b52e44758a4e 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>@@ -8134,6 +8134,54 @@ static void vmx_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
> 	free_pages((unsigned long)kvm_vmx->pid_table, vmx_get_pid_table_order(kvm));
> }
> 
>+#define LAM_S57_EN_MASK (X86_CR4_LAM_SUP | X86_CR4_LA57)
>+static int lam_sign_extend_bit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool user)

we can let this function take an address ...

>+{
>+	u64 cr3, cr4;
>+

then it is natural to add the comment -- "LAM identification ...", like

	/*
	 * The LAM identification of a pointer as user or supervisor is
	 * based solely on the value of pointer bit 63.
	 */
	if (!(addr >> 63)) {

>+	if (user) {
>+		cr3 = kvm_read_cr3(vcpu);
>+		if (cr3 & X86_CR3_LAM_U57)
>+			return 56;
>+		if (cr3 & X86_CR3_LAM_U48)
>+			return 47;
>+	} else {
>+		cr4 = kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, LAM_S57_EN_MASK);
>+		if (cr4 == LAM_S57_EN_MASK)
>+			return 56;
>+		if (cr4 & X86_CR4_LAM_SUP)
>+			return 47;
>+	}
>+	return -1;
>+}
>+
>+/*
>+ * Only called in 64-bit mode.
>+ *
>+ * Metadata bits are [62:48] in LAM48 and [62:57] in LAM57. Mask metadata in
>+ * pointers by sign-extending the value of bit 47 (LAM48) or 56 (LAM57).
>+ * The resulting address after untagging isn't guaranteed to be canonical.
>+ * Callers should perform the original canonical check and raise #GP/#SS if the
>+ * address is non-canonical.

To document the difference between KVM's emulation of LAM and real hardware
behavior:

   *
   * Note that KVM masks the metadata in addresses, performs the (original)
   * canonicality checking and then walks page table. This is slightly
   * different from hardware behavior but achieves the same effect.
   * Specifically, if LAM is enabled, the processor performs a modified
   * canonicality checking where the metadata are ignored instead of
   * masked. After the modified canonicality checking, the processor masks
   * the metadata before passing addresses for paging translation.
   */

>+ */
>+void vmx_untag_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *la, u32 flags)
						  ^
					nit: "gla" or "gva" is slightly better.
					It may be hard to immediately
					connect "la" with "linear address".

					or even better, use "gva_t gva"?
>+{
>+	int sign_ext_bit;
>+
>+	/*
>+	 * Check LAM_U48 in cr3_ctrl_bits to avoid guest_cpuid_has().
>+	 * If not set, vCPU doesn't supports LAM.
>+	 */
>+	if (!(vcpu->arch.cr3_ctrl_bits & X86_CR3_LAM_U48) ||
>+	    (flags & X86EMUL_F_SKIPLAM) || WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_64_bit_mode(vcpu)))
>+		return;
>+
>+	sign_ext_bit = lam_sign_extend_bit(vcpu, !(*la >> 63));
>+	if (sign_ext_bit > 0)
>+		*la = (sign_extend64(*la, sign_ext_bit) & ~BIT_ULL(63)) |
>+		       (*la & BIT_ULL(63));

nit: curly braces are needed.

Overall the patch looks good to me, so

Reviewed-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>

(regardless of whether you choose to make the suggested changes to the
changelog/comments)

>+}
>+
> static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __initdata = {
> 	.name = KBUILD_MODNAME,
> 
>@@ -8182,6 +8230,8 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __initdata = {
> 	.set_rflags = vmx_set_rflags,
> 	.get_if_flag = vmx_get_if_flag,
> 
>+	.untag_addr = vmx_untag_addr,
>+
> 	.flush_tlb_all = vmx_flush_tlb_all,
> 	.flush_tlb_current = vmx_flush_tlb_current,
> 	.flush_tlb_gva = vmx_flush_tlb_gva,
>diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
>index 9e66531861cf..e1e6d2e03b61 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
>+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
>@@ -433,6 +433,8 @@ void vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, int type);
> u64 vmx_get_l2_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> u64 vmx_get_l2_tsc_multiplier(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> 
>+void vmx_untag_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *la, u32 flags);
>+
> static inline void vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr,
> 					     int type, bool value)
> {
>-- 
>2.25.1
>

  reply	other threads:[~2023-05-11  6:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-05-10  6:06 [PATCH v8 0/6] Linear Address Masking (LAM) KVM Enabling Binbin Wu
2023-05-10  6:06 ` [PATCH v8 1/6] KVM: x86: Consolidate flags for __linearize() Binbin Wu
2023-05-10  7:42   ` Chao Gao
2023-05-11  1:25     ` Binbin Wu
2023-05-11  9:58       ` David Laight
2023-05-12  1:35         ` Binbin Wu
2023-05-10 12:41   ` Huang, Kai
2023-05-11  1:30     ` Binbin Wu
2023-05-10  6:06 ` [PATCH v8 2/6] KVM: x86: Virtualize CR4.LAM_SUP Binbin Wu
2023-05-11 12:50   ` Huang, Kai
2023-05-12  1:33     ` Binbin Wu
2023-05-12 10:49       ` Huang, Kai
2023-05-18  4:01         ` Binbin Wu
2023-05-10  6:06 ` [PATCH v8 3/6] KVM: x86: Virtualize CR3.LAM_{U48,U57} Binbin Wu
2023-05-10  8:58   ` Chao Gao
2023-05-11  1:27     ` Binbin Wu
2023-05-10 11:59   ` Huang, Kai
2023-05-10  6:06 ` [PATCH v8 4/6] KVM: x86: Introduce untag_addr() in kvm_x86_ops Binbin Wu
2023-05-11  6:03   ` Chao Gao [this message]
2023-05-11  9:18     ` Binbin Wu
2023-05-11 10:37       ` Chao Gao
2023-05-10  6:06 ` [PATCH v8 5/6] KVM: x86: Untag address when LAM applicable Binbin Wu
2023-05-11  6:28   ` Chao Gao
2023-05-10  6:06 ` [PATCH v8 6/6] KVM: x86: Expose LAM feature to userspace VMM Binbin Wu
2023-05-12 12:49   ` Huang, Kai
2023-05-16  3:30     ` Binbin Wu
2023-05-25  2:08 ` [PATCH v8 0/6] Linear Address Masking (LAM) KVM Enabling Binbin Wu
2023-05-25 15:59   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-06  9:26     ` Binbin Wu

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