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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com>
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: x86/mmu: Remove KVM MMU write lock when accessing indirect_shadow_pages
Date: Mon, 5 Jun 2023 11:25:02 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZH4ofuj0qvKNO9Bz@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAL715WJowYL=W40SWmtPoz1F9WVBFDG7TQwbsV2Bwf9-cS77=Q@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, Jun 05, 2023, Mingwei Zhang wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 5, 2023 at 9:55 AM Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Sun, Jun 4, 2023 at 5:43 PM Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > Remove KVM MMU write lock when accessing indirect_shadow_pages counter when
> > > page role is direct because this counter value is used as a coarse-grained
> > > heuristics to check if there is nested guest active. Racing with this
> > > heuristics without mmu lock will be harmless because the corresponding
> > > indirect shadow sptes for the GPA will either be zapped by this thread or
> > > some other thread who has previously zapped all indirect shadow pages and
> > > makes the value to 0.
> > >
> > > Because of that, remove the KVM MMU write lock pair to potentially reduce
> > > the lock contension and improve the performance of nested VM. In addition
> > > opportunistically change the comment of 'direct mmu' to make the
> > > description consistent with other places.
> > >
> > > Reported-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
> > > Signed-off-by: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com>
> > > ---
> > >  arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 10 ++--------
> > >  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> > > index 5ad55ef71433..97cfa5a00ff2 100644
> > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> > > @@ -8585,15 +8585,9 @@ static bool reexecute_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,
> > >
> > >         kvm_release_pfn_clean(pfn);
> > >
> > > -       /* The instructions are well-emulated on direct mmu. */
> > > +       /* The instructions are well-emulated on Direct MMUs. */
> > >         if (vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct) {
> > > -               unsigned int indirect_shadow_pages;
> > > -
> > > -               write_lock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
> > > -               indirect_shadow_pages = vcpu->kvm->arch.indirect_shadow_pages;
> > > -               write_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
> > > -
> > > -               if (indirect_shadow_pages)
> > > +               if (READ_ONCE(vcpu->kvm->arch.indirect_shadow_pages))
> >
> > I don't understand the need for READ_ONCE() here. That implies that
> > there is something tricky going on, and I don't think that's the case.
> 
> READ_ONCE() is just telling the compiler not to remove the read. Since
> this is reading a global variable,  the compiler might just read a
> previous copy if the value has already been read into a local
> variable. But that is not the case here...
> 
> Note I see there is another READ_ONCE for
> kvm->arch.indirect_shadow_pages, so I am reusing the same thing.

I agree with Jim, using READ_ONCE() doesn't make any sense.  I suspect it may have
been a misguided attempt to force the memory read to be as close to the write_lock()
as possible, e.g. to minimize the chance of a false negative.

> I did check the reordering issue but it should be fine because when
> 'we' see indirect_shadow_pages as 0, the shadow pages must have
> already been zapped. Not only because of the locking, but also the
> program order in __kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page() shows that it will zap
> shadow pages first before updating the stats.

I don't think zapping, i.e. the 1=>0 transition, is a concern.  KVM is dropping
the SPTE, so racing with kvm_mmu_pte_write() is a non-issue because the guest
will either see the old value, or will fault after the SPTE is zapped, i.e. KVM
won't run with a stale even if kvm_mmu_pte_write() sees '0' before TLBs are
flushed.

I believe the 0=>1 transition on the other hand doesn't have a *very* theoretical
bug.  KVM needs to ensure that either kvm_mmu_pte_write() sees an elevated count,
or that a page fault task sees the updated guest PTE, i.e. the emulated write.
The READ_ONCE() likely serves this purpose in practice, though technically it's
insufficient.

So I think this?

---
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h     | 14 ++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c     |  8 +-------
 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
index 92d5a1924fc1..9cd105ccb1d4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
@@ -264,6 +264,20 @@ static inline bool kvm_memslots_have_rmaps(struct kvm *kvm)
 	return !tdp_mmu_enabled || kvm_shadow_root_allocated(kvm);
 }
 
+static inline bool kvm_mmu_has_indirect_shadow_pages(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	/*
+	 * When emulating guest writes, ensure the written value is visible to
+	 * any task that is handling page faults before checking whether or not
+	 * KVM is shadowing a guest PTE.  This ensures either KVM will create
+	 * the correct SPTE in the page fault handler, or this task will see
+	 * a non-zero indirect_shadow_pages.  Pairs with the smp_mb() in
+	 * account_shadowed() and unaccount_shadowed().
+	 */
+	smp_mb();
+	return kvm->arch.indirect_shadow_pages;
+}
+
 static inline gfn_t gfn_to_index(gfn_t gfn, gfn_t base_gfn, int level)
 {
 	/* KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(PG_LEVEL_4K) must be 0. */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index c8961f45e3b1..1735bee3f653 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -830,6 +830,17 @@ static void account_shadowed(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
 	gfn_t gfn;
 
 	kvm->arch.indirect_shadow_pages++;
+
+	/*
+	 * Ensure indirect_shadow_pages is elevated prior to re-reading guest
+	 * child PTEs in FNAME(gpte_changed), i.e. guarantee either in-flight
+	 * emulated writes are visible before re-reading guest PTEs, or that
+	 * an emulated write will see the elevated count and acquire mmu_lock
+	 * to update SPTEs.  Pairs with the smp_mb() in
+	 * kvm_mmu_has_indirect_shadow_pages().
+	 */
+	smp_mb();
+
 	gfn = sp->gfn;
 	slots = kvm_memslots_for_spte_role(kvm, sp->role);
 	slot = __gfn_to_memslot(slots, gfn);
@@ -5692,7 +5703,7 @@ static void kvm_mmu_pte_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
 	 * If we don't have indirect shadow pages, it means no page is
 	 * write-protected, so we can exit simply.
 	 */
-	if (!READ_ONCE(vcpu->kvm->arch.indirect_shadow_pages))
+	if (!kvm_mmu_has_indirect_shadow_pages(vcpu->kvm))
 		return;
 
 	pgprintk("%s: gpa %llx bytes %d\n", __func__, gpa, bytes);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index abfba3cae0ba..22c226f5f4f8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -8588,13 +8588,7 @@ static bool reexecute_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,
 
 	/* The instructions are well-emulated on direct mmu. */
 	if (vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct) {
-		unsigned int indirect_shadow_pages;
-
-		write_lock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
-		indirect_shadow_pages = vcpu->kvm->arch.indirect_shadow_pages;
-		write_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
-
-		if (indirect_shadow_pages)
+		if (kvm_mmu_has_indirect_shadow_pages(vcpu->kvm))
 			kvm_mmu_unprotect_page(vcpu->kvm, gpa_to_gfn(gpa));
 
 		return true;

base-commit: 69b4e5b82fec7195c79c939ce25789b16a133f3a
-- 


  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-06-05 18:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-06-05  0:43 [PATCH] KVM: x86/mmu: Remove KVM MMU write lock when accessing indirect_shadow_pages Mingwei Zhang
2023-06-05 16:55 ` Jim Mattson
2023-06-05 17:17   ` Ben Gardon
2023-06-05 17:53     ` Mingwei Zhang
2023-06-05 18:27     ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-06-05 17:42   ` Mingwei Zhang
2023-06-05 18:11     ` Jim Mattson
2023-06-05 18:23       ` Mingwei Zhang
2023-06-05 18:25     ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2023-06-06 22:46       ` Mingwei Zhang
2023-06-06 22:48         ` Mingwei Zhang
2023-06-06 23:07         ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-07  0:23           ` Mingwei Zhang
2023-06-07  0:28             ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-15 23:57               ` Mingwei Zhang
2023-06-26 17:38                 ` Jim Mattson
2023-06-26 20:42                   ` Sean Christopherson

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