From: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
To: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Cc: <seanjc@google.com>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
<peterz@infradead.org>, <john.allen@amd.com>,
<kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
<rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>, <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 11/20] KVM:x86: Save and reload GUEST_SSP to/from SMRAM
Date: Mon, 24 Jul 2023 17:13:36 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZL5AwOBYN1JV7I4W@chao-email> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230721030352.72414-12-weijiang.yang@intel.com>
On Thu, Jul 20, 2023 at 11:03:43PM -0400, Yang Weijiang wrote:
>Save GUEST_SSP to SMRAM on SMI and reload it on RSM.
>KVM emulates architectural behavior when guest enters/leaves SMM
>mode, i.e., save registers to SMRAM at the entry of SMM and reload
>them at the exit of SMM. Per SDM, GUEST_SSP is defined as one of
To me, GUEST_SSP is confusing here. From QEMU's perspective, it reads/writes
the SSP register. People may confuse it with the GUEST_SSP in nVMCS field.
I prefer to rename it to MSR_KVM_SSP.
>the fields in SMRAM for 64-bit mode, so handle the state accordingly.
>
>Check HF_SMM_MASK to determine whether kvm_cet_is_msr_accessible()
>is called in SMM mode so that kvm_{set,get}_msr() works in SMM mode.
>
>Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
>---
> arch/x86/kvm/smm.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/kvm/smm.h | 2 +-
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 12 +++++++++++-
> 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
>diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/smm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/smm.c
>index b42111a24cc2..a4e19d72224f 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/kvm/smm.c
>+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/smm.c
>@@ -309,6 +309,15 @@ void enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>
> kvm_smm_changed(vcpu, true);
>
>+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>+ if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
>+ u64 data;
>+
>+ if (!kvm_get_msr(vcpu, MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP, &data))
>+ smram.smram64.ssp = data;
I don't think it is correct to continue if kvm fails to read the MSR.
how about:
if (kvm_get_msr(vcpu, MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP, &smram.smram64.ssp))
goto error;
>+ }
>+#endif
>+
> if (kvm_vcpu_write_guest(vcpu, vcpu->arch.smbase + 0xfe00, &smram, sizeof(smram)))
> goto error;
>
>@@ -586,6 +595,14 @@ int emulator_leave_smm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
> if ((vcpu->arch.hflags & HF_SMM_INSIDE_NMI_MASK) == 0)
> static_call(kvm_x86_set_nmi_mask)(vcpu, false);
>
>+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>+ if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
>+ u64 data = smram.smram64.ssp;
>+
>+ if (is_noncanonical_address(data, vcpu) && IS_ALIGNED(data, 4))
shouldn't the checks be already done inside kvm_set_msr()?
>+ kvm_set_msr(vcpu, MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP, data);
please handle the failure case. Probably just return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE like other
failure paths in this function.
>+ }
>+#endif
> kvm_smm_changed(vcpu, false);
>
> /*
>diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/smm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/smm.h
>index a1cf2ac5bd78..b3efef7cb1dc 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/kvm/smm.h
>+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/smm.h
>@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ struct kvm_smram_state_64 {
> u32 smbase;
> u32 reserved4[5];
>
>- /* ssp and svm_* fields below are not implemented by KVM */
>+ /* svm_* fields below are not implemented by KVM */
move this comment one line downward
> u64 ssp;
> u64 svm_guest_pat;
> u64 svm_host_efer;
>diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>index f7558f0f6fc0..70d7c80889d6 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>@@ -3653,8 +3653,18 @@ static bool kvm_cet_is_msr_accessible(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
> return false;
>
>- if (msr->index == MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP)
>+ /*
>+ * This MSR is synthesized mainly for userspace access during
>+ * Live Migration, it also can be accessed in SMM mode by VMM.
>+ * Guest is not allowed to access this MSR.
>+ */
>+ if (msr->index == MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP) {
>+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64) &&
>+ !!(vcpu->arch.hflags & HF_SMM_MASK))
use is_smm() instead.
>+ return true;
>+
> return msr->host_initiated;
>+ }
>
> return msr->host_initiated ||
> guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
>--
>2.27.0
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-07-24 9:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-07-21 3:03 [PATCH v4 00/20] Enable CET Virtualization Yang Weijiang
2023-07-21 3:03 ` [PATCH v4 01/20] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPU feature flags for shadow stacks Yang Weijiang
2023-07-21 3:03 ` [PATCH v4 02/20] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Yang Weijiang
2023-07-21 3:03 ` [PATCH v4 03/20] KVM:x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features Yang Weijiang
2023-07-21 3:03 ` [PATCH v4 04/20] KVM:x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS Yang Weijiang
2023-07-21 3:03 ` [PATCH v4 05/20] KVM:x86: Initialize kvm_caps.supported_xss Yang Weijiang
2023-07-21 3:03 ` [PATCH v4 06/20] KVM:x86: Load guest FPU state when access XSAVE-managed MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-07-21 3:03 ` [PATCH v4 07/20] KVM:x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting Yang Weijiang
2023-07-21 3:03 ` [PATCH v4 08/20] KVM:x86: Report KVM supported CET MSRs as to-be-saved Yang Weijiang
2023-07-21 3:03 ` [PATCH v4 09/20] KVM:x86: Add common code of CET MSR access Yang Weijiang
2023-07-26 7:33 ` Chao Gao
2023-07-26 8:26 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-26 13:46 ` Chao Gao
2023-07-27 6:06 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-27 7:41 ` Chao Gao
2023-07-27 16:58 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-21 3:03 ` [PATCH v4 10/20] KVM:x86: Make guest supervisor states as non-XSAVE managed Yang Weijiang
2023-07-24 8:26 ` Chao Gao
2023-07-24 13:50 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-21 3:03 ` [PATCH v4 11/20] KVM:x86: Save and reload GUEST_SSP to/from SMRAM Yang Weijiang
2023-07-24 9:13 ` Chao Gao [this message]
2023-07-24 14:16 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-24 14:26 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-21 3:03 ` [PATCH v4 12/20] KVM:VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits Yang Weijiang
2023-07-27 5:26 ` Chao Gao
2023-07-27 7:13 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-21 3:03 ` [PATCH v4 13/20] KVM:VMX: Emulate read and write to CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-07-26 8:06 ` Chao Gao
2023-07-27 3:19 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-27 5:16 ` Chao Gao
2023-07-27 7:10 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-27 15:20 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-28 0:43 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-21 3:03 ` [PATCH v4 14/20] KVM:VMX: Set up interception for " Yang Weijiang
2023-07-26 8:30 ` Chao Gao
2023-07-27 3:48 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-21 3:03 ` [PATCH v4 15/20] KVM:VMX: Save host MSR_IA32_S_CET to VMCS field Yang Weijiang
2023-07-26 8:47 ` Chao Gao
2023-07-26 14:05 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-27 7:29 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-21 3:03 ` [PATCH v4 16/20] KVM:x86: Optimize CET supervisor SSP save/reload Yang Weijiang
2023-07-27 3:27 ` Chao Gao
2023-07-27 6:23 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-21 3:03 ` [PATCH v4 17/20] KVM:x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace Yang Weijiang
2023-07-27 6:32 ` Chao Gao
2023-07-27 7:26 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-21 3:03 ` [PATCH v4 18/20] KVM:x86: Enable guest CET supervisor xstate bit support Yang Weijiang
2023-07-27 8:03 ` Chao Gao
2023-07-21 3:03 ` [PATCH v4 19/20] KVM:nVMX: Refine error code injection to nested VM Yang Weijiang
2023-07-21 3:03 ` [PATCH v4 20/20] KVM:nVMX: Enable CET support for " Yang Weijiang
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