From: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
pbonzini@redhat.com, weijiang.yang@intel.com,
rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, x86@kernel.org,
thomas.lendacky@amd.com, bp@alien8.de
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 3/6] KVM: x86: SVM: Pass through shadow stack MSRs
Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 10:25:48 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZMkj/HORmSy685cH@johallen-workstation> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ZJYzPn7ipYfO0fLZ@google.com>
On Fri, Jun 23, 2023 at 05:05:18PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Wed, May 24, 2023, John Allen wrote:
> > If kvm supports shadow stack, pass through shadow stack MSRs to improve
> > guest performance.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
> > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 2 +-
> > 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> > index 6df486bb1ac4..cdbce20989b8 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> > @@ -136,6 +136,13 @@ static const struct svm_direct_access_msrs {
> > { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMICT), .always = false },
> > { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMCCT), .always = false },
> > { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TDCR), .always = false },
> > + { .index = MSR_IA32_U_CET, .always = false },
> > + { .index = MSR_IA32_S_CET, .always = false },
> > + { .index = MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB, .always = false },
> > + { .index = MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP, .always = false },
> > + { .index = MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP, .always = false },
> > + { .index = MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP, .always = false },
> > + { .index = MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, .always = false },
> > { .index = MSR_INVALID, .always = false },
> > };
> >
> > @@ -1181,6 +1188,16 @@ static inline void init_vmcb_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, 1, 1);
> > set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, 1, 1);
> > }
> > +
> > + if (kvm_cet_user_supported() && guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
> > + set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_U_CET, 1, 1);
> > + set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_S_CET, 1, 1);
> > + set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB, 1, 1);
> > + set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP, 1, 1);
> > + set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP, 1, 1);
> > + set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP, 1, 1);
> > + set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, 1, 1);
> > + }
>
> This is wrong, KVM needs to set/clear interception based on SHSKT, i.e. it can't
> be a one-way street. Userspace *probably* won't toggle SHSTK in guest CPUID, but
> weirder things have happened.
Can you clarify what you mean by that? Do you mean that we need to check
both guest_cpuid_has and kvm_cpu_cap_has like the guest_can_use function
that is used in Weijiang Yang's series? Or is there something else I'm
omitting here?
static __always_inline bool guest_can_use(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
unsigned int feature)
{
return kvm_cpu_cap_has(feature) && guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, feature);
}
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-08-01 15:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-05-24 15:53 [RFC PATCH v2 0/6] SVM guest shadow stack support John Allen
2023-05-24 15:53 ` [RFC PATCH v2 1/6] KVM: x86: SVM: Emulate reads and writes to shadow stack MSRs John Allen
2023-05-24 15:53 ` [RFC PATCH v2 2/6] KVM: x86: SVM: Update dump_vmcb with shadow stack save area additions John Allen
2023-05-24 15:53 ` [RFC PATCH v2 3/6] KVM: x86: SVM: Pass through shadow stack MSRs John Allen
2023-06-24 0:05 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-01 15:25 ` John Allen [this message]
2023-08-01 16:42 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-01 16:51 ` John Allen
2023-05-24 15:53 ` [RFC PATCH v2 4/6] KVM: SVM: Save shadow stack host state on VMRUN John Allen
2023-06-23 21:11 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-01 15:19 ` John Allen
2023-08-01 16:28 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-01 17:03 ` John Allen
2023-08-02 2:18 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-02 16:38 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-03 5:11 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-24 15:53 ` [RFC PATCH v2 5/6] KVM: SVM: Add MSR_IA32_XSS to the GHCB for hypervisor kernel John Allen
2023-05-24 15:53 ` [RFC PATCH v2 6/6] KVM: SVM: Add CET features to supported_xss John Allen
2023-05-24 17:24 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-06-09 15:34 ` John Allen
2023-06-09 16:46 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-06-23 22:18 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-26 15:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-06-26 16:28 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-26 16:45 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-06-26 18:22 ` Sean Christopherson
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