From: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
To: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Cc: <seanjc@google.com>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
<peterz@infradead.org>, <john.allen@amd.com>,
<kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
<rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>, <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 12/19] KVM:x86: Save and reload SSP to/from SMRAM
Date: Fri, 4 Aug 2023 15:53:28 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZMyueOBXMwPkVk6J@chao-email> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230803042732.88515-13-weijiang.yang@intel.com>
On Thu, Aug 03, 2023 at 12:27:25AM -0400, Yang Weijiang wrote:
>Save CET SSP to SMRAM on SMI and reload it on RSM.
>KVM emulates architectural behavior when guest enters/leaves SMM
>mode, i.e., save registers to SMRAM at the entry of SMM and reload
>them at the exit of SMM. Per SDM, SSP is defined as one of
>the fields in SMRAM for 64-bit mode, so handle the state accordingly.
>
>Check is_smm() to determine whether kvm_cet_is_msr_accessible()
>is called in SMM mode so that kvm_{set,get}_msr() works in SMM mode.
>
>Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
>---
> arch/x86/kvm/smm.c | 11 +++++++++++
> arch/x86/kvm/smm.h | 2 +-
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 11 ++++++++++-
> 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
>diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/smm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/smm.c
>index b42111a24cc2..e0b62d211306 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/kvm/smm.c
>+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/smm.c
>@@ -309,6 +309,12 @@ void enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>
> kvm_smm_changed(vcpu, true);
>
>+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>+ if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) &&
>+ kvm_get_msr(vcpu, MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP, &smram.smram64.ssp))
>+ goto error;
>+#endif
SSP save/load should go to enter_smm_save_state_64() and rsm_load_state_64(),
where other fields of SMRAM are handled.
>+
> if (kvm_vcpu_write_guest(vcpu, vcpu->arch.smbase + 0xfe00, &smram, sizeof(smram)))
> goto error;
>
>@@ -586,6 +592,11 @@ int emulator_leave_smm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
> if ((vcpu->arch.hflags & HF_SMM_INSIDE_NMI_MASK) == 0)
> static_call(kvm_x86_set_nmi_mask)(vcpu, false);
>
>+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>+ if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) &&
>+ kvm_set_msr(vcpu, MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP, smram.smram64.ssp))
>+ return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
>+#endif
> kvm_smm_changed(vcpu, false);
>
> /*
>diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/smm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/smm.h
>index a1cf2ac5bd78..1e2a3e18207f 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/kvm/smm.h
>+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/smm.h
>@@ -116,8 +116,8 @@ struct kvm_smram_state_64 {
> u32 smbase;
> u32 reserved4[5];
>
>- /* ssp and svm_* fields below are not implemented by KVM */
> u64 ssp;
>+ /* svm_* fields below are not implemented by KVM */
> u64 svm_guest_pat;
> u64 svm_host_efer;
> u64 svm_host_cr4;
>diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>index 98f3ff6078e6..56aa5a3d3913 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>@@ -3644,8 +3644,17 @@ static bool kvm_cet_is_msr_accessible(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
> return false;
>
>- if (msr->index == MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP)
>+ /*
>+ * This MSR is synthesized mainly for userspace access during
>+ * Live Migration, it also can be accessed in SMM mode by VMM.
>+ * Guest is not allowed to access this MSR.
>+ */
>+ if (msr->index == MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP) {
>+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64) && is_smm(vcpu))
>+ return true;
On second thoughts, this is incorrect. We don't want guest in SMM
mode to read/write SSP via the synthesized MSR. Right?
You can
1. move set/get guest SSP into two helper functions, e.g., kvm_set/get_ssp()
2. call kvm_set/get_ssp() for host-initiated MSR accesses and SMM transitions.
3. refuse guest accesses to the synthesized MSR.
>+
> return msr->host_initiated;
>+ }
>
> return msr->host_initiated ||
> guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
>--
>2.27.0
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-08-04 7:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 82+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-08-03 4:27 [PATCH v5 00/19] Enable CET Virtualization Yang Weijiang
2023-08-03 4:27 ` [PATCH v5 01/19] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPU feature flags for shadow stacks Yang Weijiang
2023-08-03 4:27 ` [PATCH v5 02/19] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Yang Weijiang
2023-08-03 4:27 ` [PATCH v5 03/19] KVM:x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features Yang Weijiang
2023-08-03 4:27 ` [PATCH v5 04/19] KVM:x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS Yang Weijiang
2023-08-04 16:02 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-04 21:43 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-08-09 3:11 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-08 14:20 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-04 18:27 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-07 6:55 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-08-09 8:56 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-10 0:01 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-08-10 1:12 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-03 4:27 ` [PATCH v5 05/19] KVM:x86: Initialize kvm_caps.supported_xss Yang Weijiang
2023-08-04 18:45 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-08 15:08 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-03 4:27 ` [PATCH v5 06/19] KVM:x86: Load guest FPU state when access XSAVE-managed MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-08-03 4:27 ` [PATCH v5 07/19] KVM:x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting Yang Weijiang
2023-08-03 9:07 ` Chao Gao
2023-08-03 4:27 ` [PATCH v5 08/19] KVM:x86: Report KVM supported CET MSRs as to-be-saved Yang Weijiang
2023-08-03 10:39 ` Chao Gao
2023-08-04 3:13 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-04 5:51 ` Chao Gao
2023-08-04 18:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-04 22:01 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-08-08 15:16 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-06 8:54 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-04 18:55 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-08 15:26 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-04 21:47 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-08-09 3:14 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-03 4:27 ` [PATCH v5 09/19] KVM:x86: Make guest supervisor states as non-XSAVE managed Yang Weijiang
2023-08-03 11:15 ` Chao Gao
2023-08-04 3:26 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-04 20:45 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-04 20:59 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-04 21:32 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-08-09 2:51 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-09 2:39 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-10 9:29 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-10 14:29 ` Dave Hansen
2023-08-10 15:15 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-08-10 15:37 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-11 3:03 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-28 21:00 ` Dave Hansen
2023-08-29 7:05 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-03 4:27 ` [PATCH v5 10/19] KVM:VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits Yang Weijiang
2023-08-03 4:27 ` [PATCH v5 11/19] KVM:VMX: Emulate read and write to CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-08-04 5:14 ` Chao Gao
2023-08-04 21:27 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-04 21:45 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-08-04 22:21 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-07 7:03 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-08-06 8:44 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-07 7:00 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-08-04 8:28 ` Chao Gao
2023-08-09 7:12 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-04 21:40 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-08-09 3:05 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-03 4:27 ` [PATCH v5 12/19] KVM:x86: Save and reload SSP to/from SMRAM Yang Weijiang
2023-08-04 7:53 ` Chao Gao [this message]
2023-08-04 15:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-06 9:14 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-03 4:27 ` [PATCH v5 13/19] KVM:VMX: Set up interception for CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-08-04 8:16 ` Chao Gao
2023-08-06 9:22 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-07 1:16 ` Chao Gao
2023-08-09 6:11 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-03 4:27 ` [PATCH v5 14/19] KVM:VMX: Set host constant supervisor states to VMCS fields Yang Weijiang
2023-08-04 8:23 ` Chao Gao
2023-08-03 4:27 ` [PATCH v5 15/19] KVM:x86: Optimize CET supervisor SSP save/reload Yang Weijiang
2023-08-04 8:43 ` Chao Gao
2023-08-09 9:00 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-03 4:27 ` [PATCH v5 16/19] KVM:x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace Yang Weijiang
2023-08-03 4:27 ` [PATCH v5 17/19] KVM:x86: Enable guest CET supervisor xstate bit support Yang Weijiang
2023-08-04 22:02 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-08-09 6:07 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-03 4:27 ` [PATCH v5 18/19] KVM:nVMX: Refine error code injection to nested VM Yang Weijiang
2023-08-04 21:38 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-09 3:00 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-03 4:27 ` [PATCH v5 19/19] KVM:nVMX: Enable CET support for " Yang Weijiang
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=ZMyueOBXMwPkVk6J@chao-email \
--to=chao.gao@intel.com \
--cc=binbin.wu@linux.intel.com \
--cc=john.allen@amd.com \
--cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com \
--cc=seanjc@google.com \
--cc=weijiang.yang@intel.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox