From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
x86@kernel.org, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] KVM: SVM: Fix TSC_AUX virtualization setup
Date: Fri, 15 Sep 2023 10:32:05 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZQSVFQ78M/OUtWaj@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <8b047dad-84ac-69f9-3875-38bca92d7534@amd.com>
On Fri, Sep 15, 2023, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> On 9/14/23 15:48, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> > On 9/14/23 15:28, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > On Thu, Sep 14, 2023, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>
> >
> > >
> > > > + if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP))
> > > > + svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_RDTSCP);
> > >
> > > Same thing here.
> >
> > Will do.
>
> For RDTSCP, svm_recalc_instruction_intercepts() will set/clear the RDTSCP
> intercept as part of the svm_vcpu_set_after_cpuid() path, but it will only
> do it based on kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP) being true, which is very
> likely.
>
> Do you think that is good enough and we can drop the setting and clearing of
> the RDTSCP intercept in the sev_es_vcpu_set_after_cpuid() function and only
> deal with the TSC_AUX MSR intercept?
The common handling should be good enough.
> On a side note, it looks like RDTSCP would not be intercepted if the KVM cap
> X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP feature is cleared, however unlikely, in
> kvm_set_cpu_caps() and RDTSCP is not advertised to the guest (assuming the
> guest is ignoring the RDTSCP CPUID bit).
Hmm, yes, though the only scenario in which KVM clears RDTSCP on AMD comes with
a WARN (it's a guard against KVM bugs). If the guest ignores CPUID and uses
RDTSCP anyways, the guest deserves its death, and leaking the host pCPU doesn't
seem like a major issue.
That said, if hardware behavior is to ignore unknown intercepts, e.g. if KVM can
safely set INTERCEPT_RDTSCP even when hardware doesn't support said intercept,
then I wouldn't be opposed to doing:
/*
* Intercept INVPCID if shadow paging is enabled to sync/free shadow
* roots, or if INVPCID is disabled in the guest to inject #UD.
*/
if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_INVPCID) ||
!npt_enabled || !guest_cpuid_has(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_INVPCID))
svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVPCID);
else
svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVPCID);
if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP) &&
guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP))
svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_RDTSCP);
else
svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_RDTSCP);
Alternatively, KVM could check boot_cpu_has() instead or kvm_cpu_cap_has(), but
that's not foolproof either, e.g. see Intel's of hiding PCID to workaround the
TLB flushing bug on Alderlake. So my vote would either be to keep things as-is,
or do the above (if that's safe).
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-09-15 17:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-09-14 19:50 [PATCH 0/2] SEV-ES TSC_AUX virtualization fix and optimization Tom Lendacky
2023-09-14 19:50 ` [PATCH 1/2] KVM: SVM: Fix TSC_AUX virtualization setup Tom Lendacky
2023-09-14 20:28 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-09-14 20:48 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-09-14 21:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-09-15 14:26 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-09-15 14:32 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-09-15 16:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-09-15 17:32 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2023-09-15 20:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-09-14 19:50 ` [PATCH 2/2] KVM: SVM: Do not use user return MSR support for virtualized TSC_AUX Tom Lendacky
2023-09-15 14:43 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-09-15 14:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-09-15 15:08 ` Tom Lendacky
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