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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Cc: nikunj@amd.com, John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org,  linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	pbonzini@redhat.com, weijiang.yang@intel.com,
	 rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, x86@kernel.org,
	thomas.lendacky@amd.com,  bp@alien8.de
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/9] KVM: x86: SVM: Pass through shadow stack MSRs
Date: Mon, 6 Nov 2023 08:45:49 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZUkYPfxHmMZB03iv@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <874ae0019fb33784520270db7d5213af0d42290d.camel@redhat.com>

On Thu, Nov 02, 2023, Maxim Levitsky wrote:
> On Wed, 2023-10-18 at 16:57 +0530, Nikunj A. Dadhania wrote:
> > On 10/17/2023 11:47 PM, John Allen wrote:
> > In that case, intercept should be cleared from the very beginning.
> > 
> > +	{ .index = MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP,                    .always = true },
> > +	{ .index = MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP,                    .always = true },
> > +	{ .index = MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP,                    .always = true },
> > +	{ .index = MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP,                    .always = true },
> 
> .always is only true when a MSR is *always* passed through. CET msrs are only
> passed through when CET is supported.
> 
> Therefore I don't expect that we ever add another msr to this list which has
> .always = true.
> 
> In fact the .always = True for X86_64 arch msrs like MSR_GS_BASE/MSR_FS_BASE
> and such is not 100% correct too - when we start a VM which doesn't have
> cpuid bit X86_FEATURE_LM, these msrs should not exist and I think that we
> have a kvm unit test that fails because of this on 32 bit but I didn't bother
> yet to fix it.
> 
> .always probably needs to be dropped completely.

FWIW, I have a half-baked series to clean up SVM's MSR interception code and
converge the SVM and VMX APIs.  E.g. set_msr_interception_bitmap()'s inverted
polarity confuses me every time I look at its usage.

I can hunt down the branch if someone plans on tackling this code.

  reply	other threads:[~2023-11-06 16:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-10-10 20:02 [PATCH 0/9] SVM guest shadow stack support John Allen
2023-10-10 20:02 ` [PATCH 1/9] KVM: x86: SVM: Emulate reads and writes to shadow stack MSRs John Allen
2023-11-02 18:00   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-10-10 20:02 ` [PATCH 2/9] KVM: x86: SVM: Update dump_vmcb with shadow stack save area additions John Allen
2023-11-02 18:00   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-10-10 20:02 ` [PATCH 3/9] KVM: x86: SVM: Pass through shadow stack MSRs John Allen
2023-10-12  9:01   ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-10-17 18:17     ` John Allen
2023-10-18 11:27       ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-11-02 18:05         ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-06 16:45           ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2023-11-07 18:20             ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-07 23:10               ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-10 20:02 ` [PATCH 4/9] KVM: SVM: Rename vmplX_ssp -> plX_ssp John Allen
2023-11-02 18:06   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-10-10 20:02 ` [PATCH 5/9] KVM: SVM: Save shadow stack host state on VMRUN John Allen
2023-11-02 18:07   ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-02-26 16:56     ` John Allen
2023-10-10 20:02 ` [PATCH 6/9] KVM: SVM: Add MSR_IA32_XSS to the GHCB for hypervisor kernel John Allen
2023-10-14  0:31   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-11-02 18:10   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-02 23:22     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-11-07 18:20       ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-02-15 17:39         ` John Allen
2024-02-20 16:20           ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-20 16:33             ` John Allen
2024-02-21 16:38     ` John Allen
2023-10-10 20:02 ` [PATCH 7/9] x86/sev-es: Include XSS value in GHCB CPUID request John Allen
2023-10-12 12:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-17 18:12     ` John Allen
2023-10-17 18:49       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-02 18:14         ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-10-10 20:02 ` [PATCH 8/9] KVM: SVM: Use KVM-governed features to track SHSTK John Allen
2023-11-02 18:07   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-10-10 20:02 ` [PATCH 9/9] KVM: SVM: Add CET features to supported_xss John Allen
2023-11-02 18:07   ` Maxim Levitsky

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