public inbox for kvm@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	 isaku.yamahata@intel.com, xiaoyao.li@intel.com,
	binbin.wu@linux.intel.com,  chao.gao@intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 06/10] KVM, x86: add architectural support code for #VE
Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2024 15:55:24 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZiBTXPqx8qsf75IK@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240416201935.3525739-7-pbonzini@redhat.com>

KVM: x86:

On Tue, Apr 16, 2024, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> Dump the contents of the #VE info data structure and assert that #VE does
> not happen, but do not yet do anything with it.
> 
> No functional change intended, separated for clarity only.
> 
> Extracted from a patch by Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

...

> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> index 6780313914f8..2c746318c6c3 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> @@ -6408,6 +6408,18 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  	if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID)
>  		pr_err("Virtual processor ID = 0x%04x\n",
>  		       vmcs_read16(VIRTUAL_PROCESSOR_ID));
> +	if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE) {
> +		struct vmx_ve_information *ve_info;
> +
> +		pr_err("VE info address = 0x%016llx\n",
> +		       vmcs_read64(VE_INFORMATION_ADDRESS));
> +		ve_info = __va(vmcs_read64(VE_INFORMATION_ADDRESS));

As I pointed out in v1[*], pulling the PA->VA from the VMCS is a bad idea.  Just
use vmx->ve_info.

 : If KVM is dumping the VMCS, then something has gone wrong, possible in
 : hardware or ucode. Derefencing an address from the VMCS, which could very
 : well be corrupted, is a terrible idea.  This could easily escalate from a
 : dead VM into a dead host. 

[*] https://lore.kernel.org/all/Zd6Sy_PujXJVji0n@google.com

  reply	other threads:[~2024-04-17 22:55 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-04-16 20:19 [PATCH v2 00/10] KVM: MMU changes for confidential computing Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-16 20:19 ` [PATCH v2 01/10] KVM: Allow page-sized MMU caches to be initialized with custom 64-bit values Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-16 20:19 ` [PATCH v2 02/10] KVM: x86/mmu: Replace hardcoded value 0 for the initial value for SPTE Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-16 20:19 ` [PATCH v2 03/10] KVM: x86/mmu: Allow non-zero value for non-present SPTE and removed SPTE Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-16 20:19 ` [PATCH v2 04/10] KVM: x86/mmu: Add Suppress VE bit to EPT shadow_mmio_mask/shadow_present_mask Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-16 20:19 ` [PATCH v2 05/10] KVM: x86/mmu: Track shadow MMIO value on a per-VM basis Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-16 20:19 ` [PATCH v2 06/10] KVM, x86: add architectural support code for #VE Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-17 22:55   ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2024-04-16 20:19 ` [PATCH v2 07/10] KVM: VMX: Introduce test mode related to EPT violation VE Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-17 23:00   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-04-16 20:19 ` [PATCH v2 08/10] KVM: x86/mmu: Pass around full 64-bit error code for KVM page faults Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-17 23:02   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-04-16 20:19 ` [PATCH v2 09/10] KVM: x86/mmu: Use PFERR_GUEST_ENC_MASK to indicate fault is private Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-17 23:07   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-04-16 20:19 ` [PATCH v2 10/10] KVM: x86/mmu: check for invalid async page faults involving private memory Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-19  7:35   ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-04-19  7:38     ` Paolo Bonzini

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=ZiBTXPqx8qsf75IK@google.com \
    --to=seanjc@google.com \
    --cc=binbin.wu@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=chao.gao@intel.com \
    --cc=isaku.yamahata@intel.com \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=xiaoyao.li@intel.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox