From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
x86@kernel.org, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] KVM: VMX: disable preemption when touching segment fields
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2024 15:36:11 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Zpb127FsRoLdlaBb@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240716022014.240960-3-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
On Mon, Jul 15, 2024, Maxim Levitsky wrote:
> VMX code uses segment cache to avoid reading guest segment fields.
>
> The cache is reset each time a segment's field (e.g base/access rights/etc)
> is written, and then a new value of this field is written.
>
> However if the vCPU is preempted between these two events, and this
> segment field is read (e.g kvm reads SS's access rights to check
> if the vCPU is in kernel mode), then old field value will get
> cached and never updated.
It'be super helpful to include the gory details about how kvm_arch_vcpu_put()
reads stale data. Without that information, it's very hard to figure out how
getting preempted is problematic.
vmx_vcpu_reset resets the segment cache bitmask and then initializes
the segments in the vmcs, however if the vcpus is preempted in the
middle of this code, the kvm_arch_vcpu_put is called which
reads SS's AR bytes to determine if the vCPU is in the kernel mode,
which caches the old value.
> Usually a lock is required to avoid such race but since vCPU segments
> are only accessed by its vCPU thread, we can avoid a lock and
> only disable preemption, in places where the segment cache
> is invalidated and segment fields are updated.
This doesn't fully fix the problem. It's not just kvm_sched_out() => kvm_arch_vcpu_put()
that's problematic, it's any path that executes KVM code in interrupt context.
And it's not just limited to segment registers, any register that is conditionally
cached via arch.regs_avail is susceptible to races.
Specifically, kvm_guest_state() and kvm_guest_get_ip() will read SS.AR_bytes and
RIP in NMI and/or IRQ context when handling a PMI.
A few possible ideas.
1. Force reads from IRQ/NMI context to skip the cache and go to the VMCS.
2. Same thing as #1, but focus it specifically on kvm_arch_vcpu_in_kernel()
and kvm_arch_vcpu_get_ip(), and WARN if kvm_register_is_available() or
vmx_segment_cache_test_set() is invoked from IRQ or NMI context.
3. Force caching of SS.AR_bytes, CS.AR_bytes, and RIP prior to kvm_after_interrupt(),
rename preempted_in_kernel to something like "exited_in_kernel" and snapshot
it before kvm_after_interrupt(), and add the same hardening as #2.
This is doable because kvm_guest_state() should never read guest state for
PMIs that occur between VM-Exit and kvm_after_interrupt(), nor should KVM
write guest state in that window. And the intent of the "preempted in kernel"
check is to query vCPU state at the time of exit.
5. Do a combination of #3 and patch 02 (#3 fixes PMIs, patch 02 fixes preemption).
My vote is probably for #2 or #4. I definitely think we need WARNs in the caching
code, and in general kvm_arch_vcpu_put() shouldn't be reading cacheable state, i.e.
I am fairly confident we can restrict it to checking CPL.
I don't hate this patch by any means, but I don't love disabling preemption in a
bunch of flows just so that the preempted_in_kernel logic works.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-07-16 22:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-07-16 2:20 [PATCH v2 0/2] Fix for a very old KVM bug in the segment cache Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-16 2:20 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] KVM: nVMX: use vmx_segment_cache_clear Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-16 21:07 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-24 18:18 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-16 2:20 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] KVM: VMX: disable preemption when touching segment fields Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-16 22:36 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2024-07-25 12:59 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-25 17:37 ` Maxim Levitsky
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