public inbox for kvm@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	x86@kernel.org,  Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	 Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,  "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/4] KVM: x86: relax canonical check for some x86 architectural msrs
Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2024 15:02:02 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Zr_MWkZwJHidWjlQ@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Zr_JX1z8xWNAxHmz@google.com>

On Fri, Aug 16, 2024, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 15, 2024, Maxim Levitsky wrote:
> How about this?
> 
> /*
>  * The canonicality checks for MSRs that hold linear addresses, e.g. segment
>  * bases, SYSENTER targets, etc., are static, in the sense that they are based
>  * on CPU _support_ for 5-level paging, not the state of CR4.LA57.
> 
> > + * size of whose depends only on CPU's support for 5-level
> > + * paging, rather than state of CR4.LA57.
> > + *
> > + * In addition to that, some of these MSRS are directly passed
> > + * to the guest (e.g MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE) thus even if the guest
> > + * doen't have LA57 enabled in its CPUID, for consistency with
> > + * CPUs' ucode, it is better to pivot the check around host
> > + * support for 5 level paging.
> 
> I think we should elaborate on why it's better.  It only takes another line or
> two, and that way we don't forget the edge cases that make properly emulating
> guest CPUID a bad idea.
> 
>  * This creates a virtualization hole where a guest writes to passthrough MSRs
>  * may incorrectly succeed if the CPU supports LA57, but the vCPU does not
>  * (because hardware has no awareness of guest CPUID).  Do not try to plug this
>  * hole, i.e. emulate the behavior for intercepted accesses, as injecting #GP
>  * depending on whether or not KVM happens to emulate a WRMSR would result in
>  * non-deterministic behavior, and could even allow L2 to crash L1, e.g. if L1
>  * passes through an MSR to L2, and then tries to save+restore L2's value.
>  */
> 
> > +
> > +static u8  max_host_supported_virt_addr_bits(void)
> 
> Any objection to dropping the "supported", i.e. going with max_host_virt_addr_bits()?
> Mostly to shorten the name, but also because "supported" suggests there's software
> involvement, e.g. the max supported by the kernel/KVM, which isn't the case.
> 
> If you're ok with the above, I'll fixup when applying.

I take that back, I think we're going to need a v4 (see patch 3).

  reply	other threads:[~2024-08-16 22:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-08-15 12:33 [PATCH v3 0/4] Relax canonical checks on some arch msrs Maxim Levitsky
2024-08-15 12:33 ` [PATCH v3 1/4] KVM: x86: relax canonical check for some x86 architectural msrs Maxim Levitsky
2024-08-16 21:49   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-16 22:02     ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2024-08-20 12:13     ` mlevitsk
2024-08-21 12:04       ` mlevitsk
2024-08-21 16:04         ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-23 11:14           ` mlevitsk
2024-08-23 13:59             ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-12 20:28               ` Jim Mattson
2025-09-16 20:47                 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-15 12:33 ` [PATCH v3 2/4] KVM: x86: add X86_FEATURE_LA57 to governed_features Maxim Levitsky
2024-08-15 12:33 ` [PATCH v3 3/4] KVM: nVMX: relax canonical checks on some x86 registers in vmx host state Maxim Levitsky
2024-08-16 10:40   ` mlevitsk
2024-08-16 22:03     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-20 12:19       ` mlevitsk
2024-08-15 12:33 ` [PATCH v3 4/4] KVM: SVM: fix emulation of msr reads/writes of MSR_FS_BASE and MSR_GS_BASE Maxim Levitsky
2024-08-16 22:04   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-24  0:07     ` Sean Christopherson

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=Zr_MWkZwJHidWjlQ@google.com \
    --to=seanjc@google.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=chao.gao@intel.com \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=mlevitsk@redhat.com \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox