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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
	bp@alien8.de,  x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	mingo@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
	 dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, pgonda@google.com,
	pbonzini@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v12 15/19] tsc: Upgrade TSC clocksource rating
Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2024 09:16:30 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZwasXk_jZAtO6W1G@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241009092850.197575-16-nikunj@amd.com>

On Wed, Oct 09, 2024, Nikunj A Dadhania wrote:
> In virtualized environments running on modern CPUs, the underlying
> platforms guarantees to have a stable, always running TSC, i.e. that the
> TSC is a superior timesource as compared to other clock sources (such as
> kvmclock, HPET, ACPI timer, APIC, etc.).
> 
> Upgrade the rating of the early and regular clock source to prefer TSC over
> other clock sources when TSC is invariant, non-stop and stable.
> 
> Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c
> index c83f1091bb4f..8150f2104474 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c
> @@ -1264,6 +1264,21 @@ static void __init check_system_tsc_reliable(void)
>  		tsc_disable_clocksource_watchdog();
>  }
>  
> +static void __init upgrade_clock_rating(struct clocksource *tsc_early,
> +					struct clocksource *tsc)
> +{
> +	/*
> +	 * Upgrade the clock rating for TSC early and regular clocksource when
> +	 * the underlying platform provides non-stop, invaraint and stable TSC.
> +	 */
> +	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC) &&
> +	    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC) &&
> +	    !tsc_unstable) {

Somewhat of a side topic, should KVM (as a hypervisor) be enumerating something
to guests to inform them that the TSC is reliable, i.e. that X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE
can be forced?  Or, should KVM (as the guest) infer X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE if
INVARIANT_TSC is advertised by KVM (the hyperivosor)?

Also, why on earth is 0x8000_0007.EDX manually scattered via x86_power?

> +		tsc_early->rating = 499;
> +		tsc->rating = 500;
> +	}
> +}

  reply	other threads:[~2024-10-09 16:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-10-09  9:28 [PATCH v12 00/19] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 01/19] virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 02/19] x86/sev: Handle failures from snp_init() Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-16 16:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 03/19] x86/sev: Cache the secrets page address Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 04/19] virt: sev-guest: Consolidate SNP guest messaging parameters to a struct Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 05/19] virt: sev-guest: Reduce the scope of SNP command mutex Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-10 18:32   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 06/19] virt: sev-guest: Carve out SNP message context structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 07/19] x86/sev: Carve out and export SNP guest messaging init routines Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-17  7:42   ` kernel test robot
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 08/19] x86/sev: Relocate SNP guest messaging routines to common code Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 09/19] x86/cc: Add CC_ATTR_GUEST_SNP_SECURE_TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-10 18:34   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 10/19] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 11/19] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 12/19] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 13/19] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable clocksource Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 14/19] tsc: Use the GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR for discovering TSC frequency Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-10 19:39   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-14  3:36     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 15/19] tsc: Upgrade TSC clocksource rating Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09 16:16   ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2024-10-10  6:44     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 16/19] x86/kvmclock: Use clock source callback to update kvm sched clock Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09 15:58   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-10-10 10:14     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-16  8:26       ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 17/19] x86/kvmclock: Abort SecureTSC enabled guest when kvmclock is selected Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-10 19:49   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-14  3:37     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 18/19] x86/cpu/amd: Do not print FW_BUG for Secure TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 19/19] x86/sev: Allow Secure TSC feature for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09 16:08 ` [PATCH v12 00/19] Add Secure TSC support " Dave Hansen
2024-10-10  6:28   ` Nikunj A. Dadhania

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