Re: [PATCH v3 2/9] KVM: selftests: Add a basic SNP smoke test

[Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>]

On Mon, Nov 04, 2024, Pratik R. Sampat wrote:
> 
> 
> On 10/31/2024 11:27 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > On Thu, Oct 31, 2024, Pratik R. Sampat wrote:
> >> Hi Sean,
> >>
> >> On 10/30/2024 12:57 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> >>> On Wed, Oct 30, 2024, Pratik R. Sampat wrote:
> >>>> On 10/30/2024 8:46 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> >>>>> +/* Minimum firmware version required for the SEV-SNP support */
> >>>>> +#define SNP_FW_REQ_VER_MAJOR   1
> >>>>> +#define SNP_FW_REQ_VER_MINOR   51
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Side topic, why are these hardcoded?  And where did they come from?  If they're
> >>>>> arbitrary KVM selftests values, make that super duper clear.
> >>>>
> >>>> Well, it's not entirely arbitrary. This was the version that SNP GA'd
> >>>> with first so that kind of became the minimum required version needed.
> >>>>
> >>>> I think the only place we've documented this is here -
> >>>> https://github.com/AMDESE/AMDSEV/tree/snp-latest?tab=readme-ov-file#upgrade-sev-firmware.
> >>>>
> >>>> Maybe, I can modify the comment above to say something like -
> >>>> Minimum general availability release firmware required for SEV-SNP support.
> >>>
> >>> Hmm, so if AMD says SNP is only supported for firmware version >= 1.51, why on
> >>> earth is that not checked and enforced by the kernel?  Relying on userspace to
> >>> not crash the host (or worse) because of unsupported firmware is not a winning
> >>> strategy.
> >>
> >> We do check against the firmware level 1.51 while setting things up
> >> first (drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:__sev_snp_init_locked()) and we bail
> >> out if it's otherwise. From the userspace, calls to KVM_SEV_INIT2 or any
> >> other corresponding SNP calls should fail cleanly without any adverse
> >> effects to the host.
> > 
> > And I'm saying, that's not good enough.  If the platform doesn't support SNP,
> > the KVM *must not* advertise support for SNP.
> > 
> 
> Sure, fair to expect this. Currently, if the FW check fails, SNP is not
> setup and there is nothing that indicates in the KVM capabilities (apart
> from one dmesg error) that the support does not exist.
> 
> One thing I could do (as an independent patch) is to introduce a CC API
> that abstracts the FW version check made by the CCP module. Since sev
> platform status can be gotten before INIT to extract the major and minor
> version numbers, KVM can also call into this API and use that to decide
> if the KVM capabilities for SNP must be set or not.

Why is CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP set if hardware/firmware can't actually support SNP?
KVM shouldn't have to care about some arbitrary firmware API version, the whole
point of a driver is so that KVM doesn't have to deal with such details.

I'm a-ok with a KVM selftest *asserting* that the kernel isn't broken, but KVM
itself shouldn't need to manually check the firmware version.