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From: "Gupta, Pankaj" <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
To: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>, qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Cc: brijesh.singh@amd.com, dovmurik@linux.ibm.com, armbru@redhat.com,
	michael.roth@amd.com, pbonzini@redhat.com,
	thomas.lendacky@amd.com, isaku.yamahata@intel.com,
	berrange@redhat.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, anisinha@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 28/31] hw/i386: Add support for loading BIOS using guest_memfd
Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2024 10:48:57 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <a93b94b7-078e-0785-7fb5-e1fc85832aaa@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <434b5332-a7fb-44e4-88f5-4ac93de9c09b@intel.com>

On 6/14/2024 10:34 AM, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
> On 5/30/2024 7:16 PM, Pankaj Gupta wrote:
>> From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
>>
>> When guest_memfd is enabled, the BIOS is generally part of the initial
>> encrypted guest image and will be accessed as private guest memory. Add
>> the necessary changes to set up the associated RAM region with a
>> guest_memfd backend to allow for this.
>>
>> Current support centers around using -bios to load the BIOS data.
>> Support for loading the BIOS via pflash requires additional enablement
>> since those interfaces rely on the use of ROM memory regions which make
>> use of the KVM_MEM_READONLY memslot flag, which is not supported for
>> guest_memfd-backed memslots.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
>> ---
>>   hw/i386/x86-common.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++------
>>   1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/hw/i386/x86-common.c b/hw/i386/x86-common.c
>> index f41cb0a6a8..059de65f36 100644
>> --- a/hw/i386/x86-common.c
>> +++ b/hw/i386/x86-common.c
>> @@ -999,10 +999,18 @@ void x86_bios_rom_init(X86MachineState *x86ms, 
>> const char *default_firmware,
>>       }
>>       if (bios_size <= 0 ||
>>           (bios_size % 65536) != 0) {
>> -        goto bios_error;
>> +        if (!machine_require_guest_memfd(MACHINE(x86ms))) {
>> +                g_warning("%s: Unaligned BIOS size %d", __func__, 
>> bios_size);
>> +                goto bios_error;
>> +        }
>> +    }
>> +    if (machine_require_guest_memfd(MACHINE(x86ms))) {
>> +        memory_region_init_ram_guest_memfd(&x86ms->bios, NULL, 
>> "pc.bios",
>> +                                           bios_size, &error_fatal);
>> +    } else {
>> +        memory_region_init_ram(&x86ms->bios, NULL, "pc.bios",
>> +                               bios_size, &error_fatal);
>>       }
>> -    memory_region_init_ram(&x86ms->bios, NULL, "pc.bios", bios_size,
>> -                           &error_fatal);
>>       if (sev_enabled()) {
>>           /*
>>            * The concept of a "reset" simply doesn't exist for
>> @@ -1023,9 +1031,11 @@ void x86_bios_rom_init(X86MachineState *x86ms, 
>> const char *default_firmware,
>>       }
>>       g_free(filename);
>> -    /* map the last 128KB of the BIOS in ISA space */
>> -    x86_isa_bios_init(&x86ms->isa_bios, rom_memory, &x86ms->bios,
>> -                      !isapc_ram_fw);
>> +    if (!machine_require_guest_memfd(MACHINE(x86ms))) {
>> +        /* map the last 128KB of the BIOS in ISA space */
>> +        x86_isa_bios_init(&x86ms->isa_bios, rom_memory, &x86ms->bios,
>> +                          !isapc_ram_fw);
>> +    }
> 
> Could anyone explain to me why above change is related to this patch and 
> why need it?
> 
> because inside x86_isa_bios_init(), the alias isa_bios is set to 
> read_only while guest_memfd doesn't support readonly?

I could not understand your comment entirely. This condition is for non 
guest_memfd case? You expect something else?

Thanks,
Pankaj
> 
>>       /* map all the bios at the top of memory */
>>       memory_region_add_subregion(rom_memory,
> 


  reply	other threads:[~2024-06-14  8:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 72+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-05-30 11:16 [PATCH v4 00/31] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 01/31] i386/sev: Replace error_report with error_setg Pankaj Gupta
2024-06-03 11:57   ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 02/31] linux-headers: Update to current kvm/next Pankaj Gupta
     [not found]   ` <774b70fc-992b-47bc-84ef-c5a22b96c63a@oracle.com>
2024-05-31 15:37     ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 03/31] memory: Introduce memory_region_init_ram_guest_memfd() Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 04/31] i386/sev: Introduce "sev-common" type to encapsulate common SEV state Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-31 11:03   ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 05/31] i386/sev: Move sev_launch_update to separate class method Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 06/31] i386/sev: Move sev_launch_finish " Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 07/31] i386/sev: Introduce 'sev-snp-guest' object Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-31 11:06   ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-06-03 12:02   ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-06-03 17:48     ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 08/31] i386/sev: Add a sev_snp_enabled() helper Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 09/31] i386/sev: Add sev_kvm_init() override for SEV class Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-31 11:06   ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 10/31] i386/sev: Add snp_kvm_init() override for SNP class Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-31 11:07   ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 11/31] i386/cpu: Set SEV-SNP CPUID bit when SNP enabled Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 12/31] i386/sev: Don't return launch measurements for SEV-SNP guests Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 13/31] i386/sev: Add a class method to determine KVM VM type for SNP guests Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 14/31] i386/sev: Update query-sev QAPI format to handle SEV-SNP Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 15/31] i386/sev: Add the SNP launch start context Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 16/31] i386/sev: Add handling to encrypt/finalize guest launch data Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 17/31] i386/sev: Set CPU state to protected once SNP guest payload is finalized Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 18/31] hw/i386/sev: Add function to get SEV metadata from OVMF header Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-31 15:19   ` Liam Merwick
2024-05-31 15:41     ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-31 16:41       ` Liam Merwick
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 19/31] i386/sev: Add support for populating OVMF metadata pages Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 20/31] i386/sev: Add support for SNP CPUID validation Pankaj Gupta
2024-07-02  3:07   ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-07-04  0:34     ` Michael Roth
2024-07-04  4:09       ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-07-04  5:31         ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 21/31] i386/sev: Extract build_kernel_loader_hashes Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 22/31] i386/sev: Reorder struct declarations Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-31 11:12   ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 23/31] i386/sev: Allow measured direct kernel boot on SNP Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-31 11:14   ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 24/31] hw/i386/sev: Add support to encrypt BIOS when SEV-SNP is enabled Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 25/31] i386/sev: Invoke launch_updata_data() for SEV class Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-31 11:10   ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 26/31] i386/sev: Invoke launch_updata_data() for SNP class Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 27/31] hw/i386/sev: Use guest_memfd for legacy ROMs Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-31 11:27   ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-06-14  8:58   ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-06-14 10:02     ` Gupta, Pankaj
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 28/31] hw/i386: Add support for loading BIOS using guest_memfd Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-31 11:22   ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-06-14  8:34   ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-06-14  8:48     ` Gupta, Pankaj [this message]
2024-06-14  9:03       ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 29/31] hw/i386/sev: Allow use of pflash in conjunction with -bios Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-31 12:33   ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-06-03 11:55   ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-06-03 13:38     ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-06-04  9:03       ` Hoffmann, Gerd
2024-06-03 14:27     ` Michael Roth
2024-06-03 14:31       ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-06-03 16:31         ` Michael Roth
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 30/31] i386/kvm: Add KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL handling for KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE Pankaj Gupta
2024-07-04  8:53   ` Binbin Wu
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 31/31] i386/sev: Enable KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE hcall for SNP guests Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-31 11:20 ` [PATCH v4 00/31] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-31 17:34   ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-31 17:40     ` Gupta, Pankaj
2024-05-31 17:53       ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-06-01  4:57         ` Gupta, Pankaj
2024-06-03 14:15           ` Michael Roth
2024-06-03 14:22             ` Paolo Bonzini

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