From: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
To: Jon Kohler <jon@nutanix.com>
Cc: <seanjc@google.com>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>, <tglx@linutronix.de>,
<mingo@redhat.com>, <bp@alien8.de>, <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
<x86@kernel.org>, <hpa@zytor.com>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 06/18] KVM: VMX: Wire up Intel MBEC enable/disable logic
Date: Tue, 22 Apr 2025 15:06:06 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aAc/3p2GyZNmYFUc@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250313203702.575156-7-jon@nutanix.com>
On Thu, Mar 13, 2025 at 01:36:45PM -0700, Jon Kohler wrote:
>Add logic to enable / disable Intel Mode Based Execution Control (MBEC)
>based on specific conditions.
>
>MBEC depends on:
>- User space exposing secondary execution control bit 22
The code below doesn't check this.
>- Extended Page Tables (EPT)
>- The KVM module parameter `enable_pt_guest_exec_control`
>
>If any of these conditions are not met, MBEC will be disabled
>accordingly.
>
>Store runtime enablement within `kvm_vcpu_arch.pt_guest_exec_control`.
>
>Signed-off-by: Jon Kohler <jon@nutanix.com>
>
>---
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 11 +++++++++++
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 7 +++++++
> 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+)
>
>diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>index 7a98f03ef146..116910159a3f 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>@@ -2694,6 +2694,7 @@ static int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,
> return -EIO;
>
> vmx_cap->ept = 0;
>+ _cpu_based_2nd_exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_MODE_BASED_EPT_EXEC;
> _cpu_based_2nd_exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE;
> }
> if (!(_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID) &&
>@@ -4641,11 +4642,15 @@ static u32 vmx_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
> exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID;
> if (!enable_ept) {
> exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT;
>+ exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_MODE_BASED_EPT_EXEC;
> exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE;
> enable_unrestricted_guest = 0;
> }
> if (!enable_unrestricted_guest)
> exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST;
>+ if (!enable_pt_guest_exec_control)
>+ exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_MODE_BASED_EPT_EXEC;
>+
> if (kvm_pause_in_guest(vmx->vcpu.kvm))
> exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING;
> if (!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
>@@ -4770,6 +4775,9 @@ static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
> if (vmx->ve_info)
> vmcs_write64(VE_INFORMATION_ADDRESS,
> __pa(vmx->ve_info));
>+
>+ vmx->vcpu.arch.pt_guest_exec_control =
>+ enable_pt_guest_exec_control && vmx_has_mbec(vmx);
Is it possible for vmx->vcpu.arch.pt_guest_exec_control and
enable_pt_guest_exec_control to differ?
To me, the answer is no. So, why not use enable_pt_guest_exec_control
directly?
> }
>
> if (cpu_has_tertiary_exec_ctrls())
>@@ -8472,6 +8480,9 @@ __init int vmx_hardware_setup(void)
> if (!cpu_has_vmx_unrestricted_guest() || !enable_ept)
> enable_unrestricted_guest = 0;
>
>+ if (!cpu_has_vmx_mbec() || !enable_ept)
>+ enable_pt_guest_exec_control = false;
>+
> if (!cpu_has_vmx_flexpriority())
> flexpriority_enabled = 0;
>
>diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
>index d1e537bf50ea..9f4ae3139a90 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
>+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
>@@ -580,6 +580,7 @@ static inline u8 vmx_get_rvi(void)
> SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMFUNC | \
> SECONDARY_EXEC_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION | \
> SECONDARY_EXEC_NOTIFY_VM_EXITING | \
>+ SECONDARY_EXEC_MODE_BASED_EPT_EXEC | \
> SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING | \
> SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE)
>
>@@ -721,6 +722,12 @@ static inline bool vmx_has_waitpkg(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
> SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE;
> }
>
>+static inline bool vmx_has_mbec(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
>+{
>+ return secondary_exec_controls_get(vmx) &
>+ SECONDARY_EXEC_MODE_BASED_EPT_EXEC;
>+}
>+
> static inline bool vmx_need_pf_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> {
> if (!enable_ept)
>--
>2.43.0
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-04-22 7:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 62+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-03-13 20:36 [RFC PATCH 00/18] KVM: VMX: Introduce Intel Mode-Based Execute Control (MBEC) Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 01/18] KVM: VMX: Remove EPT_VIOLATIONS_ACC_*_BIT defines Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 02/18] KVM: nVMX: Decouple EPT RWX bits from EPT Violation protection bits Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 03/18] KVM: x86: Add module parameter for Intel MBEC Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 18:08 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13 2:18 ` Jon Kohler
2025-05-13 7:57 ` Shah, Amit
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 04/18] KVM: VMX: add cpu_has_vmx_mbec helper Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 18:14 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13 2:17 ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 05/18] KVM: x86: Add pt_guest_exec_control to kvm_vcpu_arch Jon Kohler
2025-04-22 6:27 ` Chao Gao
2025-05-12 18:15 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 06/18] KVM: VMX: Wire up Intel MBEC enable/disable logic Jon Kohler
2025-04-22 7:06 ` Chao Gao [this message]
2025-05-12 18:23 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13 2:16 ` Jon Kohler
2025-05-13 13:28 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-14 11:14 ` Shah, Amit
2025-05-14 12:55 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-06-16 9:27 ` Shah, Amit
2025-06-17 14:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-07-09 13:40 ` Shah, Amit
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 07/18] KVM: VMX: Define VMX_EPT_USER_EXECUTABLE_MASK Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 08/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Remove SPTE_PERM_MASK Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 09/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Extend access bitfield in kvm_mmu_page_role Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 18:32 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13 2:14 ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 10/18] KVM: VMX: Extend EPT Violation protection bits Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 18:37 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 11/18] KVM: VMX: Enhance EPT violation handler for PROT_USER_EXEC Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 18:54 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 12/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Introduce shadow_ux_mask Jon Kohler
2025-04-23 3:06 ` Chao Gao
2025-05-12 19:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 13/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Adjust SPTE_MMIO_ALLOWED_MASK to understand MBEC Jon Kohler
2025-04-23 5:37 ` Chao Gao
2025-05-12 19:37 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13 2:11 ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 14/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Extend is_executable_pte " Jon Kohler
2025-04-23 6:16 ` Chao Gao
2025-05-12 21:16 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13 2:09 ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 15/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Extend make_spte " Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 21:29 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13 2:04 ` Jon Kohler
2025-05-13 17:54 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 16/18] KVM: nVMX: Setup Intel MBEC in nested secondary controls Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 21:32 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 17/18] KVM: VMX: Allow MBEC with EVMCS Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 21:35 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13 2:01 ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 18/18] KVM: x86: Enable module parameter for MBEC Jon Kohler
2025-04-15 9:29 ` [RFC PATCH 00/18] KVM: VMX: Introduce Intel Mode-Based Execute Control (MBEC) Mickaël Salaün
2025-04-15 14:43 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-12 15:26 ` Jon Kohler
2025-04-15 14:43 ` Jon Kohler
2025-04-16 15:44 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-04-23 13:54 ` Adrian-Ken Rueegsegger
2025-05-12 15:26 ` Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 21:46 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13 1:59 ` Jon Kohler
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