From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: David Kaplan <David.Kaplan@amd.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Yosry Ahmed <yosry.ahmed@linux.dev>,
Patrick Bellasi <derkling@google.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Patrick Bellasi <derkling@matbug.net>,
Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>,
Michael Larabel <Michael@michaellarabel.com>
Subject: Re: x86/bugs: KVM: Add support for SRSO_MSR_FIX, back for moar
Date: Mon, 5 May 2025 11:03:56 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aBj9jKhvqB9ZNoP6@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <LV3PR12MB9265029582484A4BC7B6FA7B948E2@LV3PR12MB9265.namprd12.prod.outlook.com>
On Mon, May 05, 2025, David Kaplan wrote:
> > > Almost. My thought was that kvm_run could do something like:
> > >
> > > If (!this_cpu_read(bp_spec_reduce_is_set)) {
> > > wrmsrl to set BP_SEC_REDUCE
> > > this_cpu_write(bp_spec_reduce_is_set, 1) }
> > >
> > > That ensures the bit is set for your core before VMRUN. And as noted
> > > below, you can clear the bit when the count drops to 0 but that one is
> > > safe from race conditions.
> >
> > /facepalm
> >
> > I keep inverting the scenario in my head. I'm so used to KVM needing to ensure it
> > doesn't run with guest state that I keep forgetting that running with
> > BP_SPEC_REDUCE=1 is fine, just a bit slower.
> >
> > With that in mind, the best blend of simplicity and performance is likely to hook
> > svm_prepare_switch_to_guest() and svm_prepare_host_switch().
> > switch_to_guest() is called when KVM is about to do VMRUN, and host_switch() is
> > called when the vCPU is put, i.e. when the task is scheduled out or when KVM_RUN
> > exits to userspace.
> >
> > The existing svm->guest_state_loaded guard avoids toggling the bit when KVM
> > handles a VM-Exit and re-enters the guest. The kernel may run a non-trivial
> > amount of code with BP_SPEC_REDUCE, e.g. if #NPF triggers swap-in, an IRQ
> > arrives while handling the exit, etc., but that's all fine from a security perspective.
> >
> > IIUC, per Boris[*] an IBPB is needed when toggling BP_SPEC_REDUCE on-
> > demand:
> >
> > : You want to IBPB before clearing the MSR as otherwise host kernel will be
> > : running with the mistrained gunk from the guest.
> >
> > [*]
> > https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250217160728.GFZ7NewJHpMaWdiX2M@fat_crate.loc
> > al
> >
> > Assuming that's the case...
> >
> > Compile-tested only. If this looks/sounds sane, I'll test the mechanics and write a
> > changelog.
>
> I'm having trouble following the patch...where do you clear the MSR bit?
Gah, the rdmsrl() in svm_prepare_host_switch() should be a wrmsrl().
> I thought a per-cpu "cache" of the MSR bit might be good to avoid having to
> issue slow RDMSRs, if these paths are 'hot'. I don't know if that's the case
> or not.
Oh, you were only proposing deferring setting BP_SPEC_REDUCE. I like it. That
avoids setting BP_SPEC_REDUCE on CPUs that aren't running VMs, e.g. housekeeping
CPUs, and makes it a heck of a lot easier to elide the lock on 1<=>N transitions.
I posted v2 using that approach (when lore catches up):
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250505180300.973137-1-seanjc@google.com
> Also keep in mind this is a shared (per-core) MSR bit. You can't just clear
> it when you exit one guest because the sibling thread might be running
> another guest.
Heh, well then never mind. I'm not touching SMT coordination.
> > static void svm_prepare_host_switch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {
> > - to_svm(vcpu)->guest_state_loaded = false;
> > + struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
> > +
> > + if (!svm->guest_state_loaded)
> > + return;
> > +
> > + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_BP_SPEC_REDUCE)) {
> > + indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
> > + rdmsrl(MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG, kvm_host.zen4_bp_cfg);
As above, this is supposed to be wrmsrl().
> > + }
> > + svm->guest_state_loaded = false;
> > }
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-05-05 18:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 65+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-12-02 12:04 [PATCH v2 0/4] x86/bugs: Adjust SRSO mitigation to new features Borislav Petkov
2024-12-02 12:04 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] x86/bugs: Add SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO support Borislav Petkov
2024-12-10 6:53 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-12-10 15:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-11 7:53 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-12-11 20:38 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-11 22:35 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-12-16 17:21 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-02 12:04 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] KVM: x86: Advertise SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO to userspace Borislav Petkov
2024-12-02 12:04 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] x86/bugs: KVM: Add support for SRSO_MSR_FIX Borislav Petkov
2024-12-11 22:27 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-12-16 17:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-16 18:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-12-17 9:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-30 11:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08 13:38 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-08 15:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08 17:18 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-08 18:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08 18:37 ` Jim Mattson
2025-01-08 19:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08 19:43 ` Jim Mattson
2025-01-08 19:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-11 12:52 ` [PATCH] " Borislav Petkov
2025-01-17 18:56 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-18 15:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-23 16:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-23 17:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-23 18:04 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-24 12:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-11 19:19 ` Jim Mattson
2025-02-11 20:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-13 10:53 ` Patrick Bellasi
2025-02-13 13:44 ` Patrick Bellasi
2025-02-13 14:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-13 17:50 ` Patrick Bellasi
2025-02-14 20:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-15 0:57 ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-15 9:15 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-17 5:47 ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-17 15:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-15 12:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-17 5:59 ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-17 16:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-17 19:56 ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-17 20:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-17 20:32 ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-18 11:13 ` [PATCH final?] " Borislav Petkov
2025-02-18 14:42 ` Patrick Bellasi
2025-02-18 15:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-29 13:25 ` x86/bugs: KVM: Add support for SRSO_MSR_FIX, back for moar Borislav Petkov
2025-04-30 23:33 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-01 0:42 ` Michael Larabel
2025-05-01 8:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-01 16:56 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-05 15:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-05 15:40 ` Kaplan, David
2025-05-05 15:47 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-05 16:30 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-05 16:42 ` Kaplan, David
2025-05-05 18:03 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2025-05-05 18:25 ` Kaplan, David
2024-12-02 12:04 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] Documentation/kernel-parameters: Fix a typo in kvm.enable_virt_at_load text Borislav Petkov
2024-12-03 14:30 ` [PATCH v2 0/4] x86/bugs: Adjust SRSO mitigation to new features Nikolay Borisov
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2025-05-01 15:03 x86/bugs: KVM: Add support for SRSO_MSR_FIX, back for moar Patrick Bellasi
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