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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Jon Kohler <jon@nutanix.com>
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com,
	bp@alien8.de,  dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org,
	hpa@zytor.com,  kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 03/18] KVM: x86: Add module parameter for Intel MBEC
Date: Mon, 12 May 2025 11:08:07 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aCI5B7Mz8mgP-V2o@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250313203702.575156-4-jon@nutanix.com>

On Thu, Mar 13, 2025, Jon Kohler wrote:
> Add 'enable_pt_guest_exec_control' module parameter to x86 code, with
> default value false.

...

> +bool __read_mostly enable_pt_guest_exec_control;
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(enable_pt_guest_exec_control);
> +module_param(enable_pt_guest_exec_control, bool, 0444);

The default value of a parameter doesn't prevent userspace from enabled the param.
I.e. the instant this patch lands, userspace can enable enable_pt_guest_exec_control,
which means MBEC needs to be 100% functional before this can be exposed to userspace.

The right way to do this is to simply omit the module param until KVM is ready to
let userspace enable the feature.

All that said, I don't see any reason to add a module param for this.  *KVM* isn't
using MBEC, the guest is using MBEC.  And unless host userspace is being extremely
careless with VMX MSRs, exposing MBEC to the guest will require additional VMM
enabling and/or user opt-in.

KVM provides module params to control features that KVM is using, generally when
there is no sane alternative to tell KVM not to use a particular feature, i.e.
when there is way for the user to disable a feature for testing/debug purposes.

Furthermore, how this series keys off the module param throughout KVM is completely
wrong.  The *only* input that ultimately matters is the control bit in vmcs12.
Whether or not KVM allows that bit to be set could be controlled by a module param,
but KVM shouldn't be looking at the module param outside of that particular check.

TL;DR: advertising and enabling MBEC should come along when KVM allows the bit to
       be set in vmcs12.

  reply	other threads:[~2025-05-12 18:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 62+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-03-13 20:36 [RFC PATCH 00/18] KVM: VMX: Introduce Intel Mode-Based Execute Control (MBEC) Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 01/18] KVM: VMX: Remove EPT_VIOLATIONS_ACC_*_BIT defines Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 02/18] KVM: nVMX: Decouple EPT RWX bits from EPT Violation protection bits Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 03/18] KVM: x86: Add module parameter for Intel MBEC Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 18:08   ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2025-05-13  2:18     ` Jon Kohler
2025-05-13  7:57       ` Shah, Amit
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 04/18] KVM: VMX: add cpu_has_vmx_mbec helper Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 18:14   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13  2:17     ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 05/18] KVM: x86: Add pt_guest_exec_control to kvm_vcpu_arch Jon Kohler
2025-04-22  6:27   ` Chao Gao
2025-05-12 18:15   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 06/18] KVM: VMX: Wire up Intel MBEC enable/disable logic Jon Kohler
2025-04-22  7:06   ` Chao Gao
2025-05-12 18:23   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13  2:16     ` Jon Kohler
2025-05-13 13:28       ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-14 11:14         ` Shah, Amit
2025-05-14 12:55           ` Sean Christopherson
2025-06-16  9:27             ` Shah, Amit
2025-06-17 14:13               ` Sean Christopherson
2025-07-09 13:40                 ` Shah, Amit
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 07/18] KVM: VMX: Define VMX_EPT_USER_EXECUTABLE_MASK Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 08/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Remove SPTE_PERM_MASK Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 09/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Extend access bitfield in kvm_mmu_page_role Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 18:32   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13  2:14     ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 10/18] KVM: VMX: Extend EPT Violation protection bits Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 18:37   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 11/18] KVM: VMX: Enhance EPT violation handler for PROT_USER_EXEC Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 18:54   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 12/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Introduce shadow_ux_mask Jon Kohler
2025-04-23  3:06   ` Chao Gao
2025-05-12 19:13   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 13/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Adjust SPTE_MMIO_ALLOWED_MASK to understand MBEC Jon Kohler
2025-04-23  5:37   ` Chao Gao
2025-05-12 19:37   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13  2:11     ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 14/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Extend is_executable_pte " Jon Kohler
2025-04-23  6:16   ` Chao Gao
2025-05-12 21:16   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13  2:09     ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 15/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Extend make_spte " Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 21:29   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13  2:04     ` Jon Kohler
2025-05-13 17:54       ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 16/18] KVM: nVMX: Setup Intel MBEC in nested secondary controls Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 21:32   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 17/18] KVM: VMX: Allow MBEC with EVMCS Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 21:35   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13  2:01     ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 18/18] KVM: x86: Enable module parameter for MBEC Jon Kohler
2025-04-15  9:29 ` [RFC PATCH 00/18] KVM: VMX: Introduce Intel Mode-Based Execute Control (MBEC) Mickaël Salaün
2025-04-15 14:43   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-12 15:26     ` Jon Kohler
2025-04-15 14:43   ` Jon Kohler
2025-04-16 15:44     ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-04-23 13:54 ` Adrian-Ken Rueegsegger
2025-05-12 15:26   ` Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 21:46 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13  1:59   ` Jon Kohler

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