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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: "Xin Li (Intel)" <xin@zytor.com>
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,  linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	corbet@lwn.net, tglx@linutronix.de,  mingo@redhat.com,
	bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org,
	 hpa@zytor.com, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com, luto@kernel.org,
	 peterz@infradead.org, chao.gao@intel.com, xin3.li@intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 14/19] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs()
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2025 09:32:01 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aFrTAT-xTLmlwO5V@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250328171205.2029296-15-xin@zytor.com>

On Fri, Mar 28, 2025, Xin Li (Intel) wrote:
> From: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
> 
> Add FRED related VMCS fields to dump_vmcs() to dump FRED context.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>
> Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com>
> ---
> 
> Change in v3:
> * Use (vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED) instead of is_fred_enabled()
>   (Chao Gao).
> 
> Changes in v2:
> * Use kvm_cpu_cap_has() instead of cpu_feature_enabled() (Chao Gao).
> * Dump guest FRED states only if guest has FRED enabled (Nikolay Borisov).
> ---
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
>  1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> index c76015e1e3f8..03855d6690b2 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> @@ -6462,7 +6462,7 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
>  	u32 vmentry_ctl, vmexit_ctl;
>  	u32 cpu_based_exec_ctrl, pin_based_exec_ctrl, secondary_exec_control;
> -	u64 tertiary_exec_control;
> +	u64 tertiary_exec_control, secondary_vmexit_ctl;
>  	unsigned long cr4;
>  	int efer_slot;
>  
> @@ -6473,6 +6473,8 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  
>  	vmentry_ctl = vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS);
>  	vmexit_ctl = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_CONTROLS);
> +	secondary_vmexit_ctl = cpu_has_secondary_vmexit_ctrls() ?
> +			       vmcs_read64(SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS) : 0;
>  	cpu_based_exec_ctrl = vmcs_read32(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
>  	pin_based_exec_ctrl = vmcs_read32(PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
>  	cr4 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR4);
> @@ -6519,6 +6521,16 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  	vmx_dump_sel("LDTR:", GUEST_LDTR_SELECTOR);
>  	vmx_dump_dtsel("IDTR:", GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT);
>  	vmx_dump_sel("TR:  ", GUEST_TR_SELECTOR);
> +	if (vmentry_ctl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED)
> +		pr_err("FRED guest: config=0x%016llx, stack_levels=0x%016llx\n"
> +		       "RSP0=0x%016llx, RSP1=0x%016llx\n"
> +		       "RSP2=0x%016llx, RSP3=0x%016llx\n",
> +		       vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_CONFIG),
> +		       vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS),
> +		       __rdmsr(MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0),

There is no guarantee the vCPU's FRED_RSP is loaded in hardware at this point.
I think you need to use vmx_read_guest_fred_rsp0().

> +		       vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP1),
> +		       vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP2),
> +		       vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP3));
>  	efer_slot = vmx_find_loadstore_msr_slot(&vmx->msr_autoload.guest, MSR_EFER);
>  	if (vmentry_ctl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER)
>  		pr_err("EFER= 0x%016llx\n", vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_EFER));
> @@ -6566,6 +6578,16 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  	       vmcs_readl(HOST_TR_BASE));
>  	pr_err("GDTBase=%016lx IDTBase=%016lx\n",
>  	       vmcs_readl(HOST_GDTR_BASE), vmcs_readl(HOST_IDTR_BASE));
> +	if (vmexit_ctl & SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_FRED)
> +		pr_err("FRED host: config=0x%016llx, stack_levels=0x%016llx\n"
> +		       "RSP0=0x%016lx, RSP1=0x%016llx\n"
> +		       "RSP2=0x%016llx, RSP3=0x%016llx\n",
> +		       vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_FRED_CONFIG),
> +		       vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS),
> +		       (unsigned long)task_stack_page(current) + THREAD_SIZE,

Maybe add a helper in arch/x86/include/asm/fred.h to generate the desired RSP0?
Not sure it's worth doing that just for this code.

> +		       vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP1),
> +		       vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP2),
> +		       vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP3));
>  	pr_err("CR0=%016lx CR3=%016lx CR4=%016lx\n",
>  	       vmcs_readl(HOST_CR0), vmcs_readl(HOST_CR3),
>  	       vmcs_readl(HOST_CR4));
> @@ -6587,25 +6609,29 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  	pr_err("*** Control State ***\n");
>  	pr_err("CPUBased=0x%08x SecondaryExec=0x%08x TertiaryExec=0x%016llx\n",
>  	       cpu_based_exec_ctrl, secondary_exec_control, tertiary_exec_control);
> -	pr_err("PinBased=0x%08x EntryControls=%08x ExitControls=%08x\n",
> -	       pin_based_exec_ctrl, vmentry_ctl, vmexit_ctl);
> +	pr_err("PinBased=0x%08x EntryControls=0x%08x\n",
> +	       pin_based_exec_ctrl, vmentry_ctl);
> +	pr_err("ExitControls=0x%08x SecondaryExitControls=0x%016llx\n",
> +	       vmexit_ctl, secondary_vmexit_ctl);
>  	pr_err("ExceptionBitmap=%08x PFECmask=%08x PFECmatch=%08x\n",
>  	       vmcs_read32(EXCEPTION_BITMAP),
>  	       vmcs_read32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MASK),
>  	       vmcs_read32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MATCH));
> -	pr_err("VMEntry: intr_info=%08x errcode=%08x ilen=%08x\n",
> +	pr_err("VMEntry: intr_info=%08x errcode=%08x ilen=%08x event_data=%016llx\n",
>  	       vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD),
>  	       vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE),
> -	       vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN));
> +	       vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN),
> +	       kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_FRED) ? vmcs_read64(INJECTED_EVENT_DATA) : 0);
>  	pr_err("VMExit: intr_info=%08x errcode=%08x ilen=%08x\n",
>  	       vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO),
>  	       vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE),
>  	       vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN));
>  	pr_err("        reason=%08x qualification=%016lx\n",
>  	       vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_REASON), vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION));
> -	pr_err("IDTVectoring: info=%08x errcode=%08x\n",
> +	pr_err("IDTVectoring: info=%08x errcode=%08x event_data=%016llx\n",
>  	       vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_INFO_FIELD),
> -	       vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE));
> +	       vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE),
> +	       kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_FRED) ? vmcs_read64(ORIGINAL_EVENT_DATA) : 0);
>  	pr_err("TSC Offset = 0x%016llx\n", vmcs_read64(TSC_OFFSET));
>  	if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING)
>  		pr_err("TSC Multiplier = 0x%016llx\n",
> -- 
> 2.48.1
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2025-06-24 16:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-03-28 17:11 [PATCH v4 00/19] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 01/19] KVM: VMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 02/19] KVM: VMX: Initialize VM entry/exit FRED controls in vmcs_config Xin Li (Intel)
2025-04-14  7:41   ` Chao Gao
2025-04-14 16:53     ` Xin Li
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 03/19] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 15:20   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 04/19] x86/cea: Export per CPU array 'cea_exception_stacks' for KVM to use Xin Li (Intel)
2025-04-10  8:53   ` Christoph Hellwig
2025-04-10 14:18     ` Dave Hansen
2025-04-11 16:16       ` Xin Li
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 05/19] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 06/19] KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR interception Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 15:27   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 07/19] KVM: VMX: Save/restore guest FRED RSP0 Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 15:44   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 08/19] KVM: VMX: Add support for FRED context save/restore Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 16:27   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-06-25 17:18     ` Xin Li
2025-06-26 17:22       ` Xin Li
2025-06-26 20:50         ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 09/19] KVM: x86: Add a helper to detect if FRED is enabled for a vCPU Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 10/19] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 11/19] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 12/19] KVM: x86: Save/restore the nested flag of an exception Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 13/19] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:12 ` [PATCH v4 14/19] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 16:32   ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2025-06-25 17:38     ` Xin Li
2025-03-28 17:12 ` [PATCH v4 15/19] KVM: x86: Allow FRED/LKGS to be advertised to guests Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 16:38   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-06-25 18:05     ` Xin Li
2025-06-25 18:29       ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-28 17:12 ` [PATCH v4 16/19] KVM: nVMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 16:54   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-28 17:12 ` [PATCH v4 17/19] KVM: nVMX: Add FRED VMCS fields to nested VMX context management Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:12 ` [PATCH v4 18/19] KVM: nVMX: Add VMCS FRED states checking Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:12 ` [PATCH v4 19/19] KVM: nVMX: Allow VMX FRED controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:25 ` [PATCH v4 00/19] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li
2025-06-24 17:06   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-06-24 17:43     ` Xin Li
2025-06-24 17:47       ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-06-24 18:02         ` Xin Li
2025-06-24 18:40           ` H. Peter Anvin

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