From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>, kvm <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Subject: Re: SNP guest policy support
Date: Thu, 21 Aug 2025 09:39:18 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aKdLtn-28moWf0_6@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1a054b30-6c3c-8e58-e2e6-c83cb18cb0ee@amd.com>
On Wed, Aug 13, 2025, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> Paolo/Sean,
>
> I'm looking to expand the supported set of policy bits that the VMM can
> supply on an SNP guest launch (e.g. requiring ciphertext hiding, etc.).
>
> Right now we have the SNP_POLICY_MASK_VALID bitmask that is used to
> check for KVM supported policy bits. From the previous patches I
> submitted to add the SMT and SINGLE_SOCKET policy bit support, there was
> some thought of possibly providing supported policy bits to userspace.
>
> Should we just update the mask as we add support for new policy bits? Or
> should we do something similar to the sev_supported_vmsa_features
> support and add a KVM_X86_SEV_POLICY_SUPPORT attribute to the
> KVM_X86_GRP_SEV? Or...?
I think adding KVM_X86_SEV_POLICY_SUPPORT to KVM_X86_GRP_SEV makes the most sense.
If we allow new bits, then we definitely need a way to enumerate support to
userspace. Even if we made KVM fully permissive, we'd need/want a way to communicate
_that_ to userspace, which means adding a capability or something similar.
In other words, we need new uAPI, and if we need new uAPI, then I'd much prefer
to retain control in KVM just in case a policy comes along that we don't want to
(or can't) support for whatever reason.
prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-08-21 16:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-08-13 13:18 SNP guest policy support Tom Lendacky
2025-08-21 16:39 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
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