From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com>
Cc: tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com,
pbonzini@redhat.com, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, nikunj@amd.com,
davem@davemloft.net, aik@amd.com, ardb@kernel.org,
john.allen@amd.com, michael.roth@amd.com,
Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 1/3] x86/sev: Add new dump_rmp parameter to snp_leak_pages() API
Date: Fri, 12 Sep 2025 11:34:04 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aMRnnNVYBrasJnZF@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <c6d2fbe31bd9e2638eaefaabe6d0ffc55f5886bd.1757543774.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com>
On Wed, Sep 10, 2025, Ashish Kalra wrote:
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
> index 00475b814ac4..7a1ae990b15f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
> @@ -635,10 +635,15 @@ void snp_dump_hva_rmpentry(unsigned long address);
> int psmash(u64 pfn);
> int rmp_make_private(u64 pfn, u64 gpa, enum pg_level level, u32 asid, bool immutable);
> int rmp_make_shared(u64 pfn, enum pg_level level);
> -void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages);
> +void __snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages, bool dump_rmp);
> void kdump_sev_callback(void);
> void snp_fixup_e820_tables(void);
>
> +static inline void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int pages)
> +{
> + __snp_leak_pages(pfn, pages, true);
> +}
> +
> static inline void sev_evict_cache(void *va, int npages)
> {
> volatile u8 val __always_unused;
> @@ -668,6 +673,7 @@ static inline int rmp_make_private(u64 pfn, u64 gpa, enum pg_level level, u32 as
> return -ENODEV;
> }
> static inline int rmp_make_shared(u64 pfn, enum pg_level level) { return -ENODEV; }
> +static inline void __snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages, bool dump_rmp) {}
This stub is unnecessary. As pointed out elsewhere[*], I'm pretty sure all these
stubs are unnecessary.
Oof. Even worse, the stubs appear to be actively hiding bugs. The APIs are
guarded with CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y, but **KVM** doesn't call any of these outside
of SEV code. I.e. if *KVM* were the only user, the stubs would just be dead code.
But the below build failures show that they aren't dead code, which means that
kernels with CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=n will silently (until something explodes) do the
wrong thing, because the stubs are hiding the missing dependencies.
arch/x86/boot/startup/sev-shared.c: In function ‘pvalidate_4k_page’:
arch/x86/boot/startup/sev-shared.c:820:17: error: implicit declaration of function ‘sev_evict_cache’ [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
820 | sev_evict_cache((void *)vaddr, 1);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
AR arch/x86/realmode/built-in.a
arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c: In function ‘pvalidate_pages’:
arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c:386:25: error: implicit declaration of function ‘sev_evict_cache’ [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
386 | sev_evict_cache(pfn_to_kaddr(e->gfn), e->pagesize ? 512 : 1);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c: In function ‘mem_encrypt_setup_arch’:
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c:112:17: error: implicit declaration of function ‘snp_fixup_e820_tables’ [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
112 | snp_fixup_e820_tables();
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/x86/mm/fault.c: In function ‘show_fault_oops’:
arch/x86/mm/fault.c:587:17: error: implicit declaration of function ‘snp_dump_hva_rmpentry’ [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
587 | snp_dump_hva_rmpentry(address);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c: In function ‘bsp_determine_snp’:
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c:370:21: error: implicit declaration of function ‘snp_probe_rmptable_info’ [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
370 | snp_probe_rmptable_info()) {
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
AR drivers/iommu/amd/built-in.a
AR drivers/iommu/built-in.a
AR drivers/built-in.a
[*] https://lore.kernel.org/all/aMHP5EO-ucJGdHXz@google.com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-09-12 18:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-09-10 22:55 [PATCH v4 0/3] crypto: ccp - Add AMD Seamless Firmware Servicing (SFS) driver Ashish Kalra
2025-09-10 22:55 ` [PATCH v4 1/3] x86/sev: Add new dump_rmp parameter to snp_leak_pages() API Ashish Kalra
2025-09-12 14:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-12 15:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-09-12 18:34 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-13 10:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-09-16 3:51 ` Herbert Xu
2025-09-16 10:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-09-12 18:34 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2025-09-12 19:37 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-12 19:41 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-12 19:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-10 22:55 ` [PATCH v4 2/3] crypto: ccp - Add new HV-Fixed page allocation/free API Ashish Kalra
2025-09-12 14:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-10 22:55 ` [PATCH v4 3/3] crypto: ccp - Add AMD Seamless Firmware Servicing (SFS) driver Ashish Kalra
2025-09-12 15:49 ` Tom Lendacky
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