From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=intel.com header.i=@intel.com header.b="kn5gp0tN" Received: from mgamail.intel.com (mgamail.intel.com [192.55.52.136]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 351251B3; Tue, 5 Dec 2023 08:36:13 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1701794173; x=1733330173; h=message-id:date:mime-version:subject:to:cc:references: from:in-reply-to:content-transfer-encoding; bh=ThABzw5A+nK+MxJPjLT+zZGPgFnEpl2u3UtVYopsjmA=; b=kn5gp0tNdcZ96rFG8V60wxwMqeKd8Jys1YA0Nlm/K7Y8vt/6LMYnMGRE hCmknzF2FEcRuzmqlkfmcM8bbtItg7Oe+erdA7/f4suUYE1VTVqhFR75t Akbo3Pe7io2gqsame4vzE20E2pWSXZf0NV0Iw+tlgagOSkpWkrctkXehf fdyDbnQirQQ+Z2ZCGwM3wzgQHJM24xK3/MTHVfewcNOmCnCY2r6xcRf/9 AOLcsWNE8tlncBIq/fyK6pQWJMpdGWE2uBzVb8avSua6qBRz/ZlrNTlGU Mj4nkNh3SwT7/s9PPWo9gGqiCAxaRiJwlmBuS+QEHK5cokPqo3H6Ppoi8 g==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6600,9927,10915"; a="373371006" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="6.04,252,1695711600"; d="scan'208";a="373371006" Received: from fmsmga003.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.29]) by fmsmga106.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 05 Dec 2023 08:36:12 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6600,9927,10915"; a="861798366" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="6.04,252,1695711600"; d="scan'208";a="861798366" Received: from nhickam-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO [10.255.230.231]) ([10.255.230.231]) by fmsmga003-auth.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 05 Dec 2023 08:36:11 -0800 Message-ID: Date: Tue, 5 Dec 2023 08:36:10 -0800 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird Subject: Re: [PATCH v15 22/23] x86/mce: Improve error log of kernel space TDX #MC due to erratum Content-Language: en-US To: Sean Christopherson Cc: Kai Huang , "kvm@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , "rafael@kernel.org" , Chao Gao , Tony Luck , "david@redhat.com" , "bagasdotme@gmail.com" , "ak@linux.intel.com" , "kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com" , "mingo@redhat.com" , "pbonzini@redhat.com" , "tglx@linutronix.de" , Isaku Yamahata , "nik.borisov@suse.com" , "hpa@zytor.com" , "sagis@google.com" , "imammedo@redhat.com" , "peterz@infradead.org" , "bp@alien8.de" , Len Brown , "sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com" , Ying Huang , Dan J Williams , "x86@kernel.org" References: <9e80873fac878aa5d697cbcd4d456d01e1009d1f.1699527082.git.kai.huang@intel.com> <9b221937-42df-4381-b79f-05fb41155f7a@intel.com> <1a5b18b2-3072-46d9-9d44-38589cb54e40@intel.com> From: Dave Hansen Autocrypt: addr=dave.hansen@intel.com; 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charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit On 12/4/23 18:04, Sean Christopherson wrote: > Joking aside, why shove TDX module ownership into KVM? It honestly sounds like > a terrible fit, even without the whole TDX-IO mess. KVM state is largely ephemeral, > in the sense that loading and unloading kvm.ko doesn't allocate/free much memory > or do all that much initialization or teardown. Yeah, you have a good point there. We really do need some core code to manage VMXON/OFF now that there is increased interest outside of _purely_ running VMs. For the purposes of _this_ patch, I think I'm happy to leave open the possibility that SEAMCALL can simply fail due to VMXOFF. For now, it means that we can't attribute #MC's to the PAMT unless a VM is running but that seems like a reasonable compromise for the moment. Once TDX gains the ability to "pin" VMXON, the added precision here will be appreciated.