From: "Jörg Rödel" <joro@8bytes.org>
To: sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/4] kvm: svm: Streamline VMSA setting for VCPUs
Date: Thu, 11 Jun 2026 16:13:50 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aiq_X6c5eEiuXIZs@8bytes.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260611125628.C61421F00893@smtp.kernel.org>
On Thu, Jun 11, 2026 at 12:56:28PM +0000, sashiko-bot@kernel.org wrote:
> [Severity: High]
> Does this sequence trigger an RMP violation?
>
> When an SEV-SNP guest provisions an AP and triggers svm_vmgexit_ap_creation(),
> KVM replaces the initial KVM-managed VMSA with the guest-provided one using
> sev_es_set_guest_vmsa(), which eagerly frees the old VMSA via
> sev_es_vcpu_free_vmsa().
>
> For SNP guests, the old VMSA page is in the VMSA_PRIVATE state and has been
> transitioned to the hardware VMSA state. To transition it back to shared
> memory, AMD architecture requires reclaiming the page via snp_page_reclaim()
> before issuing an RMPUPDATE.
Calling snp_page_reclaim() is only needed when the page is reclaimed before
LAUNCH_FINISH. Once the VM is running, which is is when it issues a
svm_vmgexit_ap_creation() request, then an RMPUPDATE is sufficient.
> [Severity: Critical]
> This is a pre-existing issue, but does dropping the page reference here allow
> a malicious guest to crash the host kernel?
>
> When a guest-provided VMSA is used for an AP, KVM resolves the GPA to a PFN
> and immediately drops its page reference here. The physical address is then
> programmed into the hardware VMCB.
>
> If a malicious guest issues a Page State Change request to transition this VMSA
> page back to shared memory, host userspace can handle this by calling
> fallocate(PUNCH_HOLE) on the guest_memfd. This would trigger
> sev_gmem_invalidate(), which attempts rmp_make_shared().
>
> Because the page is still in the VMSA state, rmp_make_shared() would fail.
> sev_gmem_invalidate() only prints a warning and proceeds, freeing the page
> back to the buddy allocator while its RMP entry is still guest-restricted.
>
> When the host buddy allocator reallocates and accesses this page, would it
> trigger an RMP violation and a host kernel panic?
This is not an issue because the RMPUPDATE will only fail when the VMSA is
currently used by a CPU in guest-mode (== its VCPU is running).
But in the sev_es_vcpu_free_vmsa() path this can not happen because this
function is always called in the context of the affecting VCPUs thread, which
makes sure that the VCPU is not in guest-mode.
-Joerg
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-11 14:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-06-11 12:35 [PATCH 0/4] KVM: SEV: Support direct setting of VMSA for SEV-SNP guests Jörg Rödel
2026-06-11 12:35 ` [PATCH 1/4] kvm: svm: Streamline VMSA setting for VCPUs Jörg Rödel
2026-06-11 12:56 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-11 14:13 ` Jörg Rödel [this message]
2026-06-11 12:35 ` [PATCH 2/4] kvm: svm: Defer VMSA allocation to LAUNCH_FINISH stage Jörg Rödel
2026-06-11 12:58 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-11 14:29 ` Jörg Rödel
2026-06-11 12:35 ` [PATCH 3/4] kvm: svm: Support guest-provided VMSA for launching Jörg Rödel
2026-06-11 13:05 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-11 14:43 ` Jörg Rödel
2026-06-11 12:35 ` [PATCH 4/4] kvm: svm: Support KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_VMSA at SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE Jörg Rödel
2026-06-11 12:43 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-06-11 13:23 ` Jörg Rödel
2026-06-11 12:58 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-11 15:23 ` Jörg Rödel
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