public inbox for kvm@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, bp@alien8.de, x86@kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: mingo@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, pgonda@google.com,
	seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 05/24] virt: sev-guest: Fix user-visible strings
Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2024 16:11:01 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <b4da8dc1-17ea-52da-c8f4-76a8bb6acb16@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240531043038.3370793-6-nikunj@amd.com>

On 5/30/24 23:30, Nikunj A Dadhania wrote:
> User-visible abbreviations should be in capitals, ensure messages are
> readable and clear.
> 
> No functional change.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
> ---
>  drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c | 8 ++++----
>  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
> index b6be676f82be..5c0cbdad9fa2 100644
> --- a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
> +++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
> @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ static bool is_vmpck_empty(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
>   */
>  static void snp_disable_vmpck(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
>  {
> -	dev_alert(snp_dev->dev, "Disabling vmpck_id %d to prevent IV reuse.\n",
> +	dev_alert(snp_dev->dev, "Disabling VMPCK%d to prevent IV reuse.\n",

You use "communication key" after each VMPCK%d below. I prefer this
shorter notation, but whichever way it goes, they should all be the same.

Thanks,
Tom

>  		  vmpck_id);
>  	memzero_explicit(snp_dev->vmpck, VMPCK_KEY_LEN);
>  	snp_dev->vmpck = NULL;
> @@ -849,13 +849,13 @@ static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
>  	ret = -EINVAL;
>  	snp_dev->vmpck = get_vmpck(vmpck_id, secrets, &snp_dev->os_area_msg_seqno);
>  	if (!snp_dev->vmpck) {
> -		dev_err(dev, "invalid vmpck id %d\n", vmpck_id);
> +		dev_err(dev, "Invalid VMPCK%d communication key\n", vmpck_id);
>  		goto e_unmap;
>  	}
>  
>  	/* Verify that VMPCK is not zero. */
>  	if (is_vmpck_empty(snp_dev)) {
> -		dev_err(dev, "vmpck id %d is null\n", vmpck_id);
> +		dev_err(dev, "Empty VMPCK%d communication key\n", vmpck_id);
>  		goto e_unmap;
>  	}
>  
> @@ -911,7 +911,7 @@ static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
>  	if (ret)
>  		goto e_free_ctx;
>  
> -	dev_info(dev, "Initialized SEV guest driver (using vmpck_id %d)\n", vmpck_id);
> +	dev_info(dev, "Initialized SEV guest driver (using VMPCK%d communication key)\n", vmpck_id);
>  	return 0;
>  
>  e_free_ctx:

  reply	other threads:[~2024-06-18 21:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-05-31  4:30 [PATCH v9 00/24] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31  4:30 ` [PATCH v9 01/24] virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-12 17:17   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-06-13  3:40     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-05-31  4:30 ` [PATCH v9 02/24] virt: sev-guest: Replace dev_dbg with pr_debug Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31  4:30 ` [PATCH v9 03/24] virt: sev-guest: Make payload a variable length array Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-17 20:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-06-21 16:54   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-06-23 16:16     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-06-24  6:11       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-06-24 10:03         ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-06-24 13:00       ` Tom Lendacky
2024-06-24 13:39         ` Borislav Petkov
2024-06-24 18:12           ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-06-25 12:19             ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-31  4:30 ` [PATCH v9 04/24] virt: sev-guest: Add SNP guest request structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-18 21:06   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-05-31  4:30 ` [PATCH v9 05/24] virt: sev-guest: Fix user-visible strings Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-18 21:11   ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2024-06-19  5:58     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-05-31  4:30 ` [PATCH v9 06/24] virt: sev-guest: Simplify VMPCK and sequence number assignments Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-18 21:27   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-06-19  6:06     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-06-19 15:12       ` Tom Lendacky
2024-06-19 15:20         ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-05-31  4:30 ` [PATCH v9 07/24] virt: sev-guest: Store VMPCK index to SNP guest device structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31  4:30 ` [PATCH v9 08/24] virt: sev-guest: Take mutex in snp_send_guest_request() Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31  4:30 ` [PATCH v9 09/24] virt: sev-guest: Carve out SNP guest messaging init/exit Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31  4:30 ` [PATCH v9 10/24] x86/sev: Move core SEV guest driver routines to common code Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31  4:30 ` [PATCH v9 11/24] x86/sev: Replace dev_[err,alert] with pr_[err,alert] Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31  4:30 ` [PATCH v9 12/24] x86/sev: Make snp_issue_guest_request() static Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31  4:30 ` [PATCH v9 13/24] x86/sev: Make sev-guest driver functional again Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31  4:30 ` [PATCH v9 14/24] x86/sev: Handle failures from snp_init() Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31  4:30 ` [PATCH v9 15/24] x86/sev: Cache the secrets page address Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31  4:30 ` [PATCH v9 16/24] x86/sev: Drop sev_guest_platform_data structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31  4:30 ` [PATCH v9 17/24] x86/cc: Add CC_ATTR_GUEST_SECURE_TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31  4:30 ` [PATCH v9 18/24] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31  4:30 ` [PATCH v9 19/24] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31  4:30 ` [PATCH v9 20/24] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31  4:30 ` [PATCH v9 21/24] x86/kvmclock: Skip kvmclock when Secure TSC is available Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31  4:30 ` [PATCH v9 22/24] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31  4:30 ` [PATCH v9 23/24] x86/cpu/amd: Do not print FW_BUG for Secure TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31  4:30 ` [PATCH v9 24/24] x86/sev: Enable Secure TSC for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=b4da8dc1-17ea-52da-c8f4-76a8bb6acb16@amd.com \
    --to=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=nikunj@amd.com \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=pgonda@google.com \
    --cc=seanjc@google.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox