From: "Yang, Weijiang" <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
To: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Cc: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
<dave.hansen@intel.com>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
<seanjc@google.com>, <peterz@infradead.org>, <chao.gao@intel.com>,
<rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>, <john.allen@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 03/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Add CET supervisor mode state support
Date: Fri, 1 Dec 2023 15:01:38 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ba6dc90a-64a7-4124-a9b9-c600f3bdbd19@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <13aaf1272737737c29ab1de22438695637944d24.camel@redhat.com>
On 12/1/2023 1:27 AM, Maxim Levitsky wrote:
> On Fri, 2023-11-24 at 00:53 -0500, Yang Weijiang wrote:
>> Add supervisor mode state support within FPU xstate management framework.
>> Although supervisor shadow stack is not enabled/used today in kernel,KVM
>> requires the support because when KVM advertises shadow stack feature to
>> guest, architecturally it claims the support for both user and supervisor
>> modes for guest OSes(Linux or non-Linux).
>>
>> CET supervisor states not only includes PL{0,1,2}_SSP but also IA32_S_CET
>> MSR, but the latter is not xsave-managed. In virtualization world, guest
>> IA32_S_CET is saved/stored into/from VM control structure. With supervisor
>> xstate support, guest supervisor mode shadow stack state can be properly
>> saved/restored when 1) guest/host FPU context is swapped 2) vCPU
>> thread is sched out/in.
>>
>> The alternative is to enable it in KVM domain, but KVM maintainers NAKed
>> the solution. The external discussion can be found at [*], it ended up
>> with adding the support in kernel instead of KVM domain.
>>
>> Note, in KVM case, guest CET supervisor state i.e., IA32_PL{0,1,2}_MSRs,
>> are preserved after VM-Exit until host/guest fpstates are swapped, but
>> since host supervisor shadow stack is disabled, the preserved MSRs won't
>> hurt host.
>>
>> [*]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/806e26c2-8d21-9cc9-a0b7-7787dd231729@intel.com/
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h | 14 ++++++++++++--
>> arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h | 6 +++---
>> arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 6 +++++-
>> 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
>> index eb810074f1e7..c6fd13a17205 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
>> @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ enum xfeature {
>> XFEATURE_PKRU,
>> XFEATURE_PASID,
>> XFEATURE_CET_USER,
>> - XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL_UNUSED,
>> + XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL,
>> XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_13,
>> XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_14,
>> XFEATURE_LBR,
>> @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ enum xfeature {
>> #define XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU (1 << XFEATURE_PKRU)
>> #define XFEATURE_MASK_PASID (1 << XFEATURE_PASID)
>> #define XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER (1 << XFEATURE_CET_USER)
>> -#define XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL (1 << XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL_UNUSED)
>> +#define XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL (1 << XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL)
>> #define XFEATURE_MASK_LBR (1 << XFEATURE_LBR)
>> #define XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE_CFG (1 << XFEATURE_XTILE_CFG)
>> #define XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE_DATA (1 << XFEATURE_XTILE_DATA)
>> @@ -264,6 +264,16 @@ struct cet_user_state {
>> u64 user_ssp;
>> };
>>
>> +/*
>> + * State component 12 is Control-flow Enforcement supervisor states
>> + */
>> +struct cet_supervisor_state {
>> + /* supervisor ssp pointers */
>> + u64 pl0_ssp;
>> + u64 pl1_ssp;
>> + u64 pl2_ssp;
>> +};
>> +
>> /*
>> * State component 15: Architectural LBR configuration state.
>> * The size of Arch LBR state depends on the number of LBRs (lbr_depth).
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h
>> index d4427b88ee12..3b4a038d3c57 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h
>> @@ -51,7 +51,8 @@
>>
>> /* All currently supported supervisor features */
>> #define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_SUPPORTED (XFEATURE_MASK_PASID | \
>> - XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER)
>> + XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER | \
>> + XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL)
>>
>> /*
>> * A supervisor state component may not always contain valuable information,
>> @@ -78,8 +79,7 @@
>> * Unsupported supervisor features. When a supervisor feature in this mask is
>> * supported in the future, move it to the supported supervisor feature mask.
>> */
>> -#define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_UNSUPPORTED (XFEATURE_MASK_PT | \
>> - XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL)
>> +#define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_UNSUPPORTED (XFEATURE_MASK_PT)
>>
>> /* All supervisor states including supported and unsupported states. */
>> #define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_ALL (XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_SUPPORTED | \
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
>> index 6e50a4251e2b..b57d909facca 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
>> @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ static const char *xfeature_names[] =
>> "Protection Keys User registers",
>> "PASID state",
>> "Control-flow User registers",
>> - "Control-flow Kernel registers (unused)",
>> + "Control-flow Kernel registers",
>> "unknown xstate feature",
>> "unknown xstate feature",
>> "unknown xstate feature",
>> @@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ static unsigned short xsave_cpuid_features[] __initdata = {
>> [XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR] = X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT,
>> [XFEATURE_PKRU] = X86_FEATURE_OSPKE,
>> [XFEATURE_PASID] = X86_FEATURE_ENQCMD,
>> + [XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL] = X86_FEATURE_SHSTK,
>> [XFEATURE_XTILE_CFG] = X86_FEATURE_AMX_TILE,
>> [XFEATURE_XTILE_DATA] = X86_FEATURE_AMX_TILE,
>> };
>> @@ -277,6 +278,7 @@ static void __init print_xstate_features(void)
>> print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU);
>> print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_PASID);
>> print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER);
>> + print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL);
>> print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE_CFG);
>> print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE_DATA);
>> }
>> @@ -346,6 +348,7 @@ static __init void os_xrstor_booting(struct xregs_state *xstate)
>> XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR | \
>> XFEATURE_MASK_PASID | \
>> XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER | \
>> + XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL | \
>> XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE)
>>
>> /*
>> @@ -546,6 +549,7 @@ static bool __init check_xstate_against_struct(int nr)
>> case XFEATURE_PASID: return XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, struct ia32_pasid_state);
>> case XFEATURE_XTILE_CFG: return XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, struct xtile_cfg);
>> case XFEATURE_CET_USER: return XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, struct cet_user_state);
>> + case XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL: return XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, struct cet_supervisor_state);
>> case XFEATURE_XTILE_DATA: check_xtile_data_against_struct(sz); return true;
>> default:
>> XSTATE_WARN_ON(1, "No structure for xstate: %d\n", nr);
> Any reason why my reviewed-by was not added to this patch?
My apology again! I missed the Reviewed-by tag for this patch!
Appreciated for your careful review for this series!
> Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
>
> Best regards,
> Maxim Levitsky
>
>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-12-01 7:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 105+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-11-24 5:53 [PATCH v7 00/26] Enable CET Virtualization Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 01/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Always preserve non-user xfeatures/flags in __state_perm Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:24 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 02/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Refine CET user xstate bit enabling Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 9:40 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-11-27 2:55 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-28 1:31 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-28 8:50 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-11-28 1:31 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-28 7:52 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:26 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 6:51 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 9:53 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-06 1:03 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-06 15:57 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-08 14:57 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-08 15:15 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-13 9:30 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-13 13:31 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-13 17:01 ` Chang S. Bae
2023-12-14 3:12 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 03/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Add CET supervisor mode state support Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 9:45 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-11-27 4:06 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-28 3:38 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-28 1:34 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-30 17:27 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 7:01 ` Yang, Weijiang [this message]
2023-12-05 9:53 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 04/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XFEATURE_MASK_KERNEL_DYNAMIC xfeature set Yang Weijiang
2023-11-28 1:46 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-28 8:00 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:33 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 7:49 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 9:55 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-06 3:00 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-06 16:11 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-08 15:57 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 05/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce fpu_guest_cfg for guest FPU configuration Yang Weijiang
2023-11-28 14:58 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-29 14:12 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-29 17:08 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-30 13:28 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:29 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-30 18:02 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-30 17:29 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 06/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Create guest fpstate with guest specific config Yang Weijiang
2023-11-28 15:19 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-29 14:16 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:36 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 8:36 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 9:57 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 07/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Warn if kernel dynamic xfeatures detected in normal fpstate Yang Weijiang
2023-11-28 15:25 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-29 14:18 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 08/26] KVM: x86: Rework cpuid_get_supported_xcr0() to operate on vCPU data Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 09/26] KVM: x86: Rename kvm_{g,s}et_msr() to menifest emulation operations Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:36 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 10/26] KVM: x86: Refine xsave-managed guest register/MSR reset handling Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:36 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 11/26] KVM: x86: Add kvm_msr_{read,write}() helpers Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:37 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 12/26] KVM: x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 13/26] KVM: x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:37 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 14/26] KVM: x86: Initialize kvm_caps.supported_xss Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 15/26] KVM: x86: Load guest FPU state when access XSAVE-managed MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:38 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 16/26] KVM: x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 17/26] KVM: x86: Report KVM supported CET MSRs as to-be-saved Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:40 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 18/26] KVM: VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 19/26] KVM: x86: Use KVM-governed feature framework to track "SHSTK/IBT enabled" Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:40 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 20/26] KVM: VMX: Emulate read and write to CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:41 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 21/26] KVM: x86: Save and reload SSP to/from SMRAM Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:42 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 2:23 ` Chao Gao
2023-12-04 0:45 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 10:02 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 8:55 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 22/26] KVM: VMX: Set up interception for CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:44 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 6:33 ` Chao Gao
2023-12-05 10:04 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 9:45 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 10:07 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 23/26] KVM: VMX: Set host constant supervisor states to VMCS fields Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 24/26] KVM: x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:46 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 16:15 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 10:07 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 25/26] KVM: nVMX: Introduce new VMX_BASIC bit for event error_code delivery to L1 Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 26/26] KVM: nVMX: Enable CET support for nested guest Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:53 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-04 8:50 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 10:12 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-06 9:22 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-06 17:24 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-08 15:15 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-08 15:22 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-12 8:56 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-12 11:09 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-15 2:29 ` [PATCH v7 00/26] Enable CET Virtualization Yang, Weijiang
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