From: "Nikunj A. Dadhania" <nikunj@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com,
tglx@linutronix.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
pgonda@google.com, seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v14 03/13] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2024 14:13:43 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <c7bd5e75-0f6f-6718-ce52-533bfad4f37e@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241111134215.GBZzIJtw-T0mWVKG5l@fat_crate.local>
On 11/11/2024 7:12 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 11, 2024 at 05:14:43PM +0530, Nikunj A. Dadhania wrote:
>> Memory allocated for the request, response and certs_data is not
>> freed and we will clear the mdesc when sev-guest driver calls
>> snp_msg_alloc().
>
> Ah, right.
>
> Yeah, this was a weird scheme anyway - a static pointer mdesc but then the
> things it points to get dynamically allocated. So yeah, a full dynamic
> allocation makes it a much more normal pattern.
I have pushed the updated tree here: https://github.com/AMDESE/linux-kvm/commits/sectsc-guest-wip/
Will wait for your comments on rest of the patches before I post the next version.
Regards
Nikunj
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-11-12 8:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-10-28 5:34 [PATCH v14 00/13] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-28 5:34 ` [PATCH v14 01/13] x86/sev: Carve out and export SNP guest messaging init routines Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-29 17:43 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-30 4:44 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-30 10:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-28 5:34 ` [PATCH v14 02/13] x86/sev: Relocate SNP guest messaging routines to common code Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-28 5:34 ` [PATCH v14 03/13] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-29 8:41 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-10-29 8:46 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-29 9:19 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-10-29 14:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-29 14:34 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-29 14:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-29 14:50 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-10-29 15:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-29 15:14 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-10-29 15:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-29 16:50 ` Dave Hansen
2024-10-29 17:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-30 11:55 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-11-01 16:00 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-11 7:03 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-11-11 8:46 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-11-11 10:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-11 11:23 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-11-11 11:30 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-11 11:44 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-11-11 13:42 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-12 8:43 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania [this message]
2024-11-11 10:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-28 5:34 ` [PATCH v14 04/13] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-11-01 16:40 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-11 7:06 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-28 5:34 ` [PATCH v14 05/13] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-11-11 15:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-11 16:39 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-11-11 17:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-28 5:34 ` [PATCH v14 06/13] x86/sev: Prevent GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR " Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-28 5:34 ` [PATCH v14 07/13] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable clocksource Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-28 5:34 ` [PATCH v14 08/13] x86/cpu/amd: Do not print FW_BUG for Secure TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-28 5:34 ` [PATCH v14 09/13] tsc: Use the GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR for discovering TSC frequency Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-29 3:02 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-10-29 3:56 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-29 9:15 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-10-29 9:36 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-28 5:34 ` [PATCH v14 10/13] tsc: Upgrade TSC clocksource rating Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-28 5:34 ` [PATCH v14 11/13] tsc: Switch to native sched clock Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-28 5:34 ` [PATCH v14 12/13] x86/kvmclock: Abort SecureTSC enabled guest when kvmclock is selected Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-28 5:34 ` [PATCH v14 13/13] x86/sev: Allow Secure TSC feature for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
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