From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, bp@alien8.de
Cc: tglx@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
hpa@zytor.com, xin@zytor.com, seanjc@google.com,
pbonzini@redhat.com, x86@kernel.org, sohil.mehta@intel.com,
jon.grimm@amd.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] x86/fred: Fix early boot failures on SEV-ES/SNP guests
Date: Thu, 26 Feb 2026 08:14:59 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <c92d46a3-48a9-48ba-bc65-4eb0df290dcd@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260226092349.803491-3-nikunj@amd.com>
On 2/26/26 03:23, Nikunj A Dadhania wrote:
> FRED-enabled SEV-ES and SNP guests fail to boot due to the following issues
> in the early boot sequence:
>
> * FRED does not have a #VC exception handler in the dispatch logic
>
> * Early FRED #VC exceptions attempt to use uninitialized per-CPU GHCBs
> instead of boot_ghcb
>
> Add X86_TRAP_VC case to fred_hwexc() with a new exc_vmm_communication()
> function that provides the unified entry point FRED requires, dispatching
> to existing user/kernel handlers based on privilege level. The function is
> already declared via DECLARE_IDTENTRY_VC().
>
> Fix early GHCB access by falling back to boot_ghcb in
> __sev_{get,put}_ghcb() when per-CPU GHCBs are not yet initialized.
>
> Fixes: 14619d912b65 ("x86/fred: FRED entry/exit and dispatch code")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.9+
> Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Looking at the code, I think there are a couple of call sights that can
be simplified now. Can you verify that? Then as a follow-on patch,
replace the checks in arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c to just call
__sev_{get,put}_ghcb() now (svsm_perform_call_protocol() and
__set_pages_state())?
Thanks,
Tom
> ---
> arch/x86/coco/sev/noinstr.c | 6 ++++++
> arch/x86/entry/entry_fred.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/noinstr.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/noinstr.c
> index 9d94aca4a698..5afd663a1c21 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/noinstr.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/noinstr.c
> @@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ noinstr struct ghcb *__sev_get_ghcb(struct ghcb_state *state)
>
> WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled());
>
> + if (!sev_cfg.ghcbs_initialized)
> + return boot_ghcb;
> +
> data = this_cpu_read(runtime_data);
> ghcb = &data->ghcb_page;
>
> @@ -164,6 +167,9 @@ noinstr void __sev_put_ghcb(struct ghcb_state *state)
>
> WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled());
>
> + if (!sev_cfg.ghcbs_initialized)
> + return;
> +
> data = this_cpu_read(runtime_data);
> ghcb = &data->ghcb_page;
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_fred.c b/arch/x86/entry/entry_fred.c
> index 88c757ac8ccd..fbe2d10dd737 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_fred.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_fred.c
> @@ -177,6 +177,16 @@ static noinstr void fred_extint(struct pt_regs *regs)
> }
> }
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
> +noinstr void exc_vmm_communication(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
> +{
> + if (user_mode(regs))
> + return user_exc_vmm_communication(regs, error_code);
> + else
> + return kernel_exc_vmm_communication(regs, error_code);
> +}
> +#endif
> +
> static noinstr void fred_hwexc(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
> {
> /* Optimize for #PF. That's the only exception which matters performance wise */
> @@ -207,6 +217,10 @@ static noinstr void fred_hwexc(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET
> case X86_TRAP_CP: return exc_control_protection(regs, error_code);
> #endif
> +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
> + case X86_TRAP_VC: return exc_vmm_communication(regs, error_code);
> +#endif
> +
> default: return fred_bad_type(regs, error_code);
> }
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-02-26 14:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-02-26 9:23 [PATCH v2 0/2] x86/fred: Fix SEV-ES/SNP guest boot failures Nikunj A Dadhania
2026-02-26 9:23 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/cpu: Disable CR pinning during CPU bringup Nikunj A Dadhania
2026-03-09 13:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-03-09 15:38 ` Dave Hansen
2026-03-09 16:15 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-03-09 18:03 ` Dave Hansen
2026-03-09 18:40 ` Tom Lendacky
2026-03-09 19:27 ` Dave Hansen
2026-03-11 10:41 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2026-03-11 14:07 ` Dave Hansen
2026-03-11 15:42 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2026-03-11 17:28 ` Dave Hansen
2026-03-12 7:21 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2026-03-12 7:26 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2026-03-12 14:08 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2026-03-12 14:20 ` Dave Hansen
2026-03-12 14:53 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2026-03-12 15:02 ` Dave Hansen
2026-03-12 19:06 ` David Laight
2026-03-16 20:27 ` Chang S. Bae
2026-03-16 21:43 ` Dave Hansen
2026-03-17 4:12 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2026-03-17 14:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-03-17 15:31 ` Dave Hansen
2026-03-17 16:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-03-18 8:19 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2026-03-17 17:04 ` Chang S. Bae
2026-03-17 17:51 ` Chang S. Bae
2026-03-12 18:09 ` Sohil Mehta
2026-03-13 8:35 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2026-03-13 18:05 ` Sohil Mehta
2026-03-13 19:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-03-17 17:06 ` Chang S. Bae
2026-02-26 9:23 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] x86/fred: Fix early boot failures on SEV-ES/SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2026-02-26 14:14 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2026-02-27 4:14 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
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