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From: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
To: "Yang, Weijiang" <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	dave.hansen@intel.com,  pbonzini@redhat.com, seanjc@google.com,
	peterz@infradead.org, chao.gao@intel.com,
	 rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, john.allen@amd.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 03/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Add CET supervisor mode state support
Date: Tue, 05 Dec 2023 11:53:37 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ca7c3071f17be6fa1f29f2d62cd53a66c97ea289.camel@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ba6dc90a-64a7-4124-a9b9-c600f3bdbd19@intel.com>

On Fri, 2023-12-01 at 15:01 +0800, Yang, Weijiang wrote:
> On 12/1/2023 1:27 AM, Maxim Levitsky wrote:
> > On Fri, 2023-11-24 at 00:53 -0500, Yang Weijiang wrote:
> > > Add supervisor mode state support within FPU xstate management framework.
> > > Although supervisor shadow stack is not enabled/used today in kernel,KVM
> > > requires the support because when KVM advertises shadow stack feature to
> > > guest, architecturally it claims the support for both user and supervisor
> > > modes for guest OSes(Linux or non-Linux).
> > > 
> > > CET supervisor states not only includes PL{0,1,2}_SSP but also IA32_S_CET
> > > MSR, but the latter is not xsave-managed. In virtualization world, guest
> > > IA32_S_CET is saved/stored into/from VM control structure. With supervisor
> > > xstate support, guest supervisor mode shadow stack state can be properly
> > > saved/restored when 1) guest/host FPU context is swapped 2) vCPU
> > > thread is sched out/in.
> > > 
> > > The alternative is to enable it in KVM domain, but KVM maintainers NAKed
> > > the solution. The external discussion can be found at [*], it ended up
> > > with adding the support in kernel instead of KVM domain.
> > > 
> > > Note, in KVM case, guest CET supervisor state i.e., IA32_PL{0,1,2}_MSRs,
> > > are preserved after VM-Exit until host/guest fpstates are swapped, but
> > > since host supervisor shadow stack is disabled, the preserved MSRs won't
> > > hurt host.
> > > 
> > > [*]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/806e26c2-8d21-9cc9-a0b7-7787dd231729@intel.com/
> > > 
> > > Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
> > > ---
> > >   arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h  | 14 ++++++++++++--
> > >   arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h |  6 +++---
> > >   arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c      |  6 +++++-
> > >   3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> > > 
> > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
> > > index eb810074f1e7..c6fd13a17205 100644
> > > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
> > > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
> > > @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ enum xfeature {
> > >   	XFEATURE_PKRU,
> > >   	XFEATURE_PASID,
> > >   	XFEATURE_CET_USER,
> > > -	XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL_UNUSED,
> > > +	XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL,
> > >   	XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_13,
> > >   	XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_14,
> > >   	XFEATURE_LBR,
> > > @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ enum xfeature {
> > >   #define XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU		(1 << XFEATURE_PKRU)
> > >   #define XFEATURE_MASK_PASID		(1 << XFEATURE_PASID)
> > >   #define XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER		(1 << XFEATURE_CET_USER)
> > > -#define XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL	(1 << XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL_UNUSED)
> > > +#define XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL	(1 << XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL)
> > >   #define XFEATURE_MASK_LBR		(1 << XFEATURE_LBR)
> > >   #define XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE_CFG		(1 << XFEATURE_XTILE_CFG)
> > >   #define XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE_DATA	(1 << XFEATURE_XTILE_DATA)
> > > @@ -264,6 +264,16 @@ struct cet_user_state {
> > >   	u64 user_ssp;
> > >   };
> > >   
> > > +/*
> > > + * State component 12 is Control-flow Enforcement supervisor states
> > > + */
> > > +struct cet_supervisor_state {
> > > +	/* supervisor ssp pointers  */
> > > +	u64 pl0_ssp;
> > > +	u64 pl1_ssp;
> > > +	u64 pl2_ssp;
> > > +};
> > > +
> > >   /*
> > >    * State component 15: Architectural LBR configuration state.
> > >    * The size of Arch LBR state depends on the number of LBRs (lbr_depth).
> > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h
> > > index d4427b88ee12..3b4a038d3c57 100644
> > > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h
> > > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h
> > > @@ -51,7 +51,8 @@
> > >   
> > >   /* All currently supported supervisor features */
> > >   #define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_SUPPORTED (XFEATURE_MASK_PASID | \
> > > -					    XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER)
> > > +					    XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER | \
> > > +					    XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL)
> > >   
> > >   /*
> > >    * A supervisor state component may not always contain valuable information,
> > > @@ -78,8 +79,7 @@
> > >    * Unsupported supervisor features. When a supervisor feature in this mask is
> > >    * supported in the future, move it to the supported supervisor feature mask.
> > >    */
> > > -#define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_UNSUPPORTED (XFEATURE_MASK_PT | \
> > > -					      XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL)
> > > +#define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_UNSUPPORTED (XFEATURE_MASK_PT)
> > >   
> > >   /* All supervisor states including supported and unsupported states. */
> > >   #define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_ALL (XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_SUPPORTED | \
> > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
> > > index 6e50a4251e2b..b57d909facca 100644
> > > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
> > > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
> > > @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ static const char *xfeature_names[] =
> > >   	"Protection Keys User registers",
> > >   	"PASID state",
> > >   	"Control-flow User registers",
> > > -	"Control-flow Kernel registers (unused)",
> > > +	"Control-flow Kernel registers",
> > >   	"unknown xstate feature",
> > >   	"unknown xstate feature",
> > >   	"unknown xstate feature",
> > > @@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ static unsigned short xsave_cpuid_features[] __initdata = {
> > >   	[XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR]	= X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT,
> > >   	[XFEATURE_PKRU]				= X86_FEATURE_OSPKE,
> > >   	[XFEATURE_PASID]			= X86_FEATURE_ENQCMD,
> > > +	[XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL]			= X86_FEATURE_SHSTK,
> > >   	[XFEATURE_XTILE_CFG]			= X86_FEATURE_AMX_TILE,
> > >   	[XFEATURE_XTILE_DATA]			= X86_FEATURE_AMX_TILE,
> > >   };
> > > @@ -277,6 +278,7 @@ static void __init print_xstate_features(void)
> > >   	print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU);
> > >   	print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_PASID);
> > >   	print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER);
> > > +	print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL);
> > >   	print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE_CFG);
> > >   	print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE_DATA);
> > >   }
> > > @@ -346,6 +348,7 @@ static __init void os_xrstor_booting(struct xregs_state *xstate)
> > >   	 XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR |			\
> > >   	 XFEATURE_MASK_PASID |			\
> > >   	 XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER |		\
> > > +	 XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL |		\
> > >   	 XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE)
> > >   
> > >   /*
> > > @@ -546,6 +549,7 @@ static bool __init check_xstate_against_struct(int nr)
> > >   	case XFEATURE_PASID:	  return XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, struct ia32_pasid_state);
> > >   	case XFEATURE_XTILE_CFG:  return XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, struct xtile_cfg);
> > >   	case XFEATURE_CET_USER:	  return XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, struct cet_user_state);
> > > +	case XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL: return XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, struct cet_supervisor_state);
> > >   	case XFEATURE_XTILE_DATA: check_xtile_data_against_struct(sz); return true;
> > >   	default:
> > >   		XSTATE_WARN_ON(1, "No structure for xstate: %d\n", nr);
> > Any reason why my reviewed-by was not added to this patch?
> 
> My apology again! I missed the Reviewed-by tag for this patch!
> 
> Appreciated for your careful review for this series!

Thank you very much!

Best regards,
	Maxim Levitsky

> 
> > Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
> > 
> > Best regards,
> > 	Maxim Levitsky
> > 
> > 
> > 





  reply	other threads:[~2023-12-05  9:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 105+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-11-24  5:53 [PATCH v7 00/26] Enable CET Virtualization Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 01/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Always preserve non-user xfeatures/flags in __state_perm Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:24   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 02/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Refine CET user xstate bit enabling Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24  9:40   ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-11-27  2:55     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-28  1:31     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-28  8:50       ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-11-28  1:31   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-28  7:52     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:26   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01  6:51     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05  9:53       ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-06  1:03         ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-06 15:57           ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-08 14:57             ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-08 15:15               ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-13  9:30                 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-13 13:31                   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-13 17:01                   ` Chang S. Bae
2023-12-14  3:12                     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 03/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Add CET supervisor mode state support Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24  9:45   ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-11-27  4:06     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-28  3:38     ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-28  1:34   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-30 17:27   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01  7:01     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05  9:53       ` Maxim Levitsky [this message]
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 04/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XFEATURE_MASK_KERNEL_DYNAMIC xfeature set Yang Weijiang
2023-11-28  1:46   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-28  8:00     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:33   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01  7:49     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05  9:55       ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-06  3:00         ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-06 16:11           ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-08 15:57             ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 05/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce fpu_guest_cfg for guest FPU configuration Yang Weijiang
2023-11-28 14:58   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-29 14:12     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-29 17:08       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-30 13:28         ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:29     ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-30 18:02       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-30 17:29   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 06/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Create guest fpstate with guest specific config Yang Weijiang
2023-11-28 15:19   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-29 14:16     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:36   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01  8:36     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05  9:57       ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 07/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Warn if kernel dynamic xfeatures detected in normal fpstate Yang Weijiang
2023-11-28 15:25   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-29 14:18     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 08/26] KVM: x86: Rework cpuid_get_supported_xcr0() to operate on vCPU data Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 09/26] KVM: x86: Rename kvm_{g,s}et_msr() to menifest emulation operations Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:36   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 10/26] KVM: x86: Refine xsave-managed guest register/MSR reset handling Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:36   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 11/26] KVM: x86: Add kvm_msr_{read,write}() helpers Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:37   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 12/26] KVM: x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 13/26] KVM: x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:37   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 14/26] KVM: x86: Initialize kvm_caps.supported_xss Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 15/26] KVM: x86: Load guest FPU state when access XSAVE-managed MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:38   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 16/26] KVM: x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 17/26] KVM: x86: Report KVM supported CET MSRs as to-be-saved Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:40   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 18/26] KVM: VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 19/26] KVM: x86: Use KVM-governed feature framework to track "SHSTK/IBT enabled" Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:40   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 20/26] KVM: VMX: Emulate read and write to CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:41   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 21/26] KVM: x86: Save and reload SSP to/from SMRAM Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:42   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01  2:23     ` Chao Gao
2023-12-04  0:45       ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 10:02         ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01  8:55     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 22/26] KVM: VMX: Set up interception for CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:44   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01  6:33     ` Chao Gao
2023-12-05 10:04       ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01  9:45     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 10:07       ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 23/26] KVM: VMX: Set host constant supervisor states to VMCS fields Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 24/26] KVM: x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:46   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 16:15     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 10:07       ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 25/26] KVM: nVMX: Introduce new VMX_BASIC bit for event error_code delivery to L1 Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 26/26] KVM: nVMX: Enable CET support for nested guest Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:53   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-04  8:50     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 10:12       ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-06  9:22         ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-06 17:24           ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-08 15:15             ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-08 15:22               ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-12  8:56                 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-12 11:09                   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-15  2:29 ` [PATCH v7 00/26] Enable CET Virtualization Yang, Weijiang

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