From: Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v3 15/17] x86/cet: Run SHSTK and IBT tests as appropriate if either feature is supported
Date: Fri, 14 Nov 2025 09:59:53 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <e3a82783-efff-445f-bc79-99e7ee7d34d5@grsecurity.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251114001258.1717007-16-seanjc@google.com>
On 14.11.25 01:12, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> Run the SHSTK and IBT tests if their respective feature is supported, as
> nothing in the architecture requires both features to be supported.
> Decoupling the two features allows running the SHSTK test on AMD CPUs,
> which support SHSTK but not IBT.
>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
> ---
> x86/cet.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
> 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/x86/cet.c b/x86/cet.c
> index eeab5901..26cd1c9b 100644
> --- a/x86/cet.c
> +++ b/x86/cet.c
> @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ static uint64_t cet_ibt_func(void)
> #define ENABLE_SHSTK_BIT 0x1
> #define ENABLE_IBT_BIT 0x4
>
> -int main(int ac, char **av)
> +static void test_shstk(void)
> {
> char *shstk_virt;
> unsigned long shstk_phys;
> @@ -94,17 +94,10 @@ int main(int ac, char **av)
> bool rvc;
>
> if (!this_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
> - report_skip("SHSTK not enabled");
> - return report_summary();
> + report_skip("SHSTK not supported");
> + return;
> }
>
> - if (!this_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) {
> - report_skip("IBT not enabled");
> - return report_summary();
> - }
> -
> - setup_vm();
> -
> /* Allocate one page for shadow-stack. */
> shstk_virt = alloc_vpage();
> shstk_phys = (unsigned long)virt_to_phys(alloc_page());
> @@ -124,9 +117,6 @@ int main(int ac, char **av)
> /* Store shadow-stack pointer. */
> wrmsr(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, (u64)(shstk_virt + 0x1000));
>
> - /* Enable CET master control bit in CR4. */
> - write_cr4(read_cr4() | X86_CR4_CET);
> -
> printf("Unit tests for CET user mode...\n");
> run_in_user(cet_shstk_func, CP_VECTOR, 0, 0, 0, 0, &rvc);
> report(rvc && exception_error_code() == CP_ERR_NEAR_RET,
> @@ -136,19 +126,45 @@ int main(int ac, char **av)
> report(rvc && exception_error_code() == CP_ERR_FAR_RET,
> "FAR RET shadow-stack protection test");
>
> + /* SSP should be 4-Byte aligned */
> + vector = wrmsr_safe(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, 0x1);
> + report(vector == GP_VECTOR, "MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP alignment test.");
> +}
> +
> +static void test_ibt(void)
> +{
> + bool rvc;
> +
> + if (!this_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) {
> + report_skip("IBT not supported");
> + return;
> + }
> +
> /* Enable indirect-branch tracking */
> wrmsr(MSR_IA32_U_CET, ENABLE_IBT_BIT);
>
> run_in_user(cet_ibt_func, CP_VECTOR, 0, 0, 0, 0, &rvc);
> report(rvc && exception_error_code() == CP_ERR_ENDBR,
> "Indirect-branch tracking test");
> +}
> +
> +int main(int ac, char **av)
> +{
> + if (!this_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) && !this_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) {
> + report_skip("No CET features supported");
> + return report_summary();
> + }
> +
> + setup_vm();
> +
> + /* Enable CET global control bit in CR4. */
> + write_cr4(read_cr4() | X86_CR4_CET);
> +
> + test_shstk();
> + test_ibt();
>
> write_cr4(read_cr4() & ~X86_CR4_CET);
> wrmsr(MSR_IA32_U_CET, 0);
>
> - /* SSP should be 4-Byte aligned */
> - vector = wrmsr_safe(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, 0x1);
> - report(vector == GP_VECTOR, "MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP alignment test.");
> -
> return report_summary();
> }
Looks good to me!
Successfully tested on Intel ADL, selectively disabling IBT (-cpu
host,-ibt), shadow stacks (-cpu host,-shstk) or both (-cpu
host,-ibt,-shstk), each doing "The Right Thing," therefore:
Reviewed-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net>
Tested-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net>
Thanks,
Mathias
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-11-14 8:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-11-14 0:12 [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v3 00/17] x86: Improve CET tests Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 0:12 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v3 01/17] x86/run_in_user: Add an "end branch" marker on the user_mode destination Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 15:51 ` Mathias Krause
2025-11-14 20:46 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-11-15 5:09 ` Mathias Krause
2025-11-14 0:12 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v3 02/17] x86: cet: Pass virtual addresses to invlpg Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 0:12 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v3 03/17] x86: cet: Remove unnecessary memory zeroing for shadow stack Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 0:12 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v3 04/17] x86: cet: Directly check for #CP exception in run_in_user() Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 0:12 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v3 05/17] x86: cet: Validate #CP error code Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 0:12 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v3 06/17] x86: cet: Use report_skip() Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 0:12 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v3 07/17] x86: cet: Drop unnecessary casting Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 0:12 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v3 08/17] x86: cet: Validate writing unaligned values to SSP MSR causes #GP Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 0:12 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v3 09/17] x86: cet: Validate CET states during VMX transitions Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 8:10 ` Mathias Krause
2025-11-14 0:12 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v3 10/17] x86: cet: Make shadow stack less fragile Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 0:12 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v3 11/17] x86: cet: Simplify IBT test Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 0:12 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v3 12/17] x86: cet: Use symbolic values for the #CP error codes Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 0:12 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v3 13/17] x86: cet: Test far returns too Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 0:12 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v3 14/17] x86: Avoid top-most page for vmalloc on x86-64 Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 0:12 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v3 15/17] x86/cet: Run SHSTK and IBT tests as appropriate if either feature is supported Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 8:59 ` Mathias Krause [this message]
2025-11-14 0:12 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v3 16/17] x86/cet: Drop the "intel_" prefix from the CET testcase Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 0:12 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v3 17/17] x86/cet: Add testcases to verify KVM rejects emulation of CET instructions Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 15:19 ` Mathias Krause
2025-11-14 20:42 ` Sean Christopherson
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