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From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
To: Bandan Das <bsd@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com, rkrcmar@redhat.com,
	jmattson@google.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 3/3] KVM: nVMX: Emulate EPTP switching for the L1 hypervisor
Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2017 13:40:09 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <fd35cbc5-4d5e-002a-e269-667caa0d2ac2@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <jpg60e8mmh9.fsf@linux.bootlegged.copy>

On 31.07.2017 21:32, Bandan Das wrote:
> Hi David,
> 
> David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> writes:
> 
>>> +static inline bool nested_cpu_has_eptp_switching(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
>>> +{
>>> +	return nested_cpu_has_vmfunc(vmcs12) &&
>>> +		(vmcs12->vm_function_control &
>>> +		 VMX_VMFUNC_EPTP_SWITCHING);
>>> +}
>>> +
>>>  static inline bool is_nmi(u32 intr_info)
>>>  {
>>>  	return (intr_info & (INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK))
>>> @@ -2791,7 +2800,12 @@ static void nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
>>>  	if (cpu_has_vmx_vmfunc()) {
>>>  		vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_high |=
>>>  			SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMFUNC;
>>> -		vmx->nested.nested_vmx_vmfunc_controls = 0;
>>> +		/*
>>> +		 * Advertise EPTP switching unconditionally
>>> +		 * since we emulate it
>>> +		 */
>>> +		vmx->nested.nested_vmx_vmfunc_controls =
>>> +			VMX_VMFUNC_EPTP_SWITCHING;
>>
>> Should this only be advertised, if enable_ept is set (if the guest also
>> sees/can use SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT)?
> 
> This represents the function control MSR, which on the hardware is
> a RO value. The checks for enable_ept and such are somewhere else.

This is the

if (!nested_cpu_has_eptp_switching(vmcs12) ||
    !nested_cpu_has_ept(vmcs12))
	return 1;

check then, I assume. Makes sense.

> 
>>>  	}
>>>  
>>>  	/*
>>> @@ -7767,6 +7781,85 @@ static int handle_preemption_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>>>  	return 1;
>>>  }
>>>  
>>> +static bool check_ept_address_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 address)
>>
>> check_..._valid -> valid_ept_address() ?
> 
> I think either of the names is fine and I would prefer not
> to respin unless you feel really strongly about it :)

Sure, if you have to respin, you can fix this up.

> 
>>
>>> +{
>>> +	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
>>> +	u64 mask = VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK;
>>> +	int maxphyaddr = cpuid_maxphyaddr(vcpu);
>>> +	struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.walk_mmu;
>>> +
>>> +	/* Check for execute_only validity */
>>> +	if ((address & mask) == VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK) {
>>> +		if (!(vmx->nested.nested_vmx_ept_caps &
>>> +		      VMX_EPT_EXECUTE_ONLY_BIT))
>>> +			return false;
>>> +	}
>>> +
>>> +	/* Bits 5:3 must be 3 */
>>> +	if (((address >> VMX_EPT_GAW_EPTP_SHIFT) & 0x7) != VMX_EPT_DEFAULT_GAW)
>>> +		return false;
>>> +
>>> +	/* Reserved bits should not be set */
>>> +	if (address >> maxphyaddr || ((address >> 7) & 0x1f))
>>> +		return false;
>>> +
>>> +	/* AD, if set, should be supported */
>>> +	if ((address & VMX_EPT_AD_ENABLE_BIT)) {
>>> +		if (!enable_ept_ad_bits)
>>> +			return false;
>>> +		mmu->ept_ad = true;
>>> +	} else
>>> +		mmu->ept_ad = false;
>>
>> I wouldn't expect a "check" function to modify the mmu. Can you move
>> modifying the mmu outside of this function (leaving the
>> enable_ept_ad_bits check in place)? (and maybe even set mmu->ept_ad
>> _after_ the kvm_mmu_unload(vcpu)?, just when setting vmcs12->ept_pointer?)
>>
> 
> Well, the correct thing to do is have a wrapper around it in mmu.c
> without directly calling here and also call this function before
> nested_mmu is initialized. I am working on a separate patch for this btw.

Sounds good. Also thought that encapsulating this might be a good option.

> It seems to me setting mmu->ept_ad after kvm_mmu_unload is unnecessary
> since it's already being set only if everything else succeeds.
> kvm_mmu_unload() isn't affected by the setting of this flag if I understand
> correctly.

It looks at least cleaner to set everything up after the unload has
happened (and could avoid future bugs, if that unload would every rely
on that setting!). + we can reuse that function more easily (e.g. vm entry).

But that's just my personal opinion. Feel free to ignore.

> 
>>> +
>>> +	return true;
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +static int nested_vmx_eptp_switching(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>>> +				     struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
>>> +{
>>> +	u32 index = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX];
>>> +	u64 *l1_eptp_list, address;
>>> +	struct page *page;
>>> +
>>> +	if (!nested_cpu_has_eptp_switching(vmcs12) ||
>>> +	    !nested_cpu_has_ept(vmcs12))
>>> +		return 1;
>>> +
>>> +	if (index >= VMFUNC_EPTP_ENTRIES)
>>> +		return 1;
>>> +
>>> +	page = nested_get_page(vcpu, vmcs12->eptp_list_address);
>>> +	if (!page)
>>> +		return 1;
>>> +
>>> +	l1_eptp_list = kmap(page);
>>> +	address = l1_eptp_list[index];
>>> +
>>> +	/*
>>> +	 * If the (L2) guest does a vmfunc to the currently
>>> +	 * active ept pointer, we don't have to do anything else
>>> +	 */
>>> +	if (vmcs12->ept_pointer != address) {
>>> +		if (!check_ept_address_valid(vcpu, address)) {
>>> +			kunmap(page);
>>> +			nested_release_page_clean(page);
>>> +			return 1;
>>> +		}
>>> +		kvm_mmu_unload(vcpu);
>>> +		vmcs12->ept_pointer = address;
>>> +		/*
>>> +		 * TODO: Check what's the correct approach in case
>>> +		 * mmu reload fails. Currently, we just let the next
>>> +		 * reload potentially fail
>>> +		 */
>>> +		kvm_mmu_reload(vcpu);
>>
>> So, what actually happens if this generates a tripple fault? I guess we
>> will kill the (nested) hypervisor?
> 
> Yes. Not sure what's the right thing to do is though...

Wonder what happens on real hardware.

-- 

Thanks,

David

  reply	other threads:[~2017-08-01 11:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-07-28 19:52 [PATCH v5 0/3] Expose VMFUNC to the nested hypervisor Bandan Das
2017-07-28 19:52 ` [PATCH v5 1/3] KVM: vmx: Enable VMFUNCs Bandan Das
2017-07-28 19:52 ` [PATCH v5 2/3] KVM: nVMX: Enable VMFUNC for the L1 hypervisor Bandan Das
2017-07-28 19:52 ` [PATCH v5 3/3] KVM: nVMX: Emulate EPTP switching " Bandan Das
2017-07-31 11:59   ` David Hildenbrand
2017-07-31 19:32     ` Bandan Das
2017-08-01 11:40       ` David Hildenbrand [this message]
2017-08-01 14:55         ` Radim Krčmář
2017-08-01 15:17   ` Radim Krčmář
2017-08-01 18:30     ` Bandan Das

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